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ABSTRACT
Disciples of the State seeks to explain why some former Ottoman states succeeded in
effectively secularizing schooling and law and regulating religion upon independence - thereby
consolidating state power- whereas others did not. The bulk of the project centers on a detailed
investigation of three former-Ottoman country cases: Turkey, Greece, and Egypt.
The main argument is built around a comparison of the critical historical antecedents that
preceded independence in these three countries. My findings suggest that when manpower for
early modernizing reforms in the 19 th century was severely constrained, state-builders were more
likely to employ strategies of institutional reform based on co6ptation, thereby integrating
religious elites into nascent state structures in a piecemeal fashion. This turbulent (and at times
violent) process of integration and co6ptation spawned a dynamic of differential growth that
severely weakened religious institutions. When religious institutions were weakened in this way
in the 19 th century, it became possible for states to exert full control over the religious
establishment upon independence, producing what we consider today to be successful "secular
revolutions". I find that this dynamic played out in places as different as Greece and late
Ottoman Turkey.
Conversely, when manpower for modernizing reforms was more readily available (often
as a result of colonial occupation) state-building strategies took a different form. Instead of
co6ptating religious actors, state-builders created new sets of "parallel" disciplinary institutions
that largely excluded traditional elites. In this context, rather than sharing expertise, religious
institutions became largely insulated from the state, re-entrenched themselves, and grew in size
over the late 19th and early 20th century. Upon independence, founding regimes thus inherited a
deeply fractured system of disciplinary control making "secular revolutions" much more difficult
to impose. I find the that this dynamic characterized state-building trajectories in Egypt.
Thesis Supervisor: Roger Petersen
Title: Arthur and Ruth Sloan Professor of Political Science
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Chapter One
Disciples of the State? A Theory of Secularization and State Building for the former
Ottoman World
In an interview originally published in the Istanbul newspaper Vakit in 1922, Mustafa
Kemal Atatirk, the war hero who would later become the founder of the Turkish Republic,
recounted his first memory from childhood.
My first childhood memory concerns the issue of my schooling. This caused a
bitter dispute between my parents. My mother wanted me to go to the
neighborhood [Koran] school after initial prayers. My father, who was an official
in the customs and excise department, was in favor of sending me to 5emsi
Efendi's school, which had newly opened, and having me educated in the new
manner In the end, my father found a clever way out. First, I started at the
neighborhood school with the usual ceremony. This satisfied my mother A few
days later, I left the neighborhood school and was entered in Semsi Efendi's
school.'
This disagreement between Mustafa Kemal's parents is indicative of the changing nature of
everyday life in the Ottoman world at the turn of the 2 0th century. At the local level, the social
force of religion remained pervasive. Public demonstrations of piety were still a prerequisite for
being considered an upstanding member of the community, hence a mother's natural concerns
about having her son participate in the religious ceremony that marked the beginning of the
traditional Koranic school year. With the proliferation of new state institutions, however,
alternative paths to upward mobility that were distinct from religious structures became
increasingly available. For people living at the time, the grand sweep of modernization and state
centralization manifested itself in the very type of decision that Kemal's family faced.
Traditional religious institutions of education and law and new state institutions existed
simultaneously. Individuals and families faced a dilemma about which set of institutions should
structure their lives.
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In retrospect, it is easy to see that Kemal's father bet on the right side of history when
choosing to educate his son "in the new manner". By the late 1920s the Turkish Republic had
captured or abolished all the institutions through which the religious establishment had
traditionally excercised its moral authority and influence. Koranic education, sharia law, the
religious orders (tarikatlar) and religious charitible foundations (vakiflar) all became a thing of
the past. In the transition from empire to republic, Turkey's founding regime demonstrated a
remarkable ability to impose revolutionary secular reforms, especially in schooling and law,
without inciting collective resistance by religious elites. Popular protest against state reforms
was minimal, disorganized, sporadic and thus ultimately unsuccessful.
Today, Atatirk's policies are widely (and naively) credited as the source of Turkey's
"unique" status as a democratic and secular Muslim country in the Middle East. An article in the
Washington Times recently attributed to Iraq's perpetual instability to the fact that it lacked an
Atatirk. "The asset Iraq lacks today is what its next-door neighbor, Turkey, enjoyed after the
crushing defeat of the Ottoman Empire in World War I: an intelligent but secular-minded leader,
Kemal Atatirk", argues the writer, who then goes on to say that the "contrast between the two
adjacent countries is startling in its implications."2 This journalist is certainly not the first to
consider Atatirk's secularizing reforms as blueprint for successful modernization. Egypt's Free
Officers, Algeria's Colonel Houari Boumedienne and Tunisia's Habib Bourguiba -to name just a
few- all considered the formation of the Turkish Republic as a template for their own
subsequent state-led reform movements.3 Today, in the aftermath of the Arab Spring revolutions,
leaders in the Middle East are again looking to Turkey to provide a model for change.
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Speaking historically with the benefit of hindsight, it is difficult to ignore the fact that
remarkably similar "modernizing" revolutions designed to achieve state control over schooling,
law and religion (a set of institutions that I refer to as disciplinary institutions) produced vastly
different outcomes across countries. The comparative example of Turkey and Egypt is
illustrative in this respect. Nasser and Egypt's Free Officers may have mimicked Mustafa
Kemal's policies-abolishing the charitable foundations (waqfs) and sharia courts, asserting state
control over the religious establishment and its mosques by decree, reforming primary education
-but they did not achieve the same results. State control of mosques only reached 18 percent in
1961 and 20 percent in 1979 and religious institutions maintained a comparatively large degree
of autonomy.4 In the realm of law, "the principles of Islamic jurisprudence are the chief sources
of legislation" according to the most recent Egyptian constitution. 5 Recent developments since
the fall of Hosni Mubarak lead some to fear that the country could be teetering on the brink of
full-blow theocracy. Indeed, with the passage of time, it is becoming increasingly difficult to
argue that Egypt's 1952 revolution was much of a revolution at all. Today, religious authorities
clamor for even greater influence in Egyptian national politics -many advocating for the
complete abandonment of secular principles and thereby directly challenging the state's right to
exert sovereignty over disciplinary institutions. What explains the varying ability of regimes to
impose secular revolutions that give the state exclusive sovereignty over the realms of
schooling, law and religious regulation?
This dissertation answers the question above by using the countries that emerged from the
Ottoman Empire as a laboratory for comparative historical analysis. I provide both a macro-
level theoretical argument to explain variation across countries and a micro-level argument to
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explain dynamics within countries. At the macro-level I argue that a newly independent state's
ability to achieve exclusive sovereignty over institutions of social discipline is determined by the
interaction of two factors-whether the regime can leverage religious moral authority and
whether religious institutions are self-reinforcing or self-undermining at the time of
independence. At the micro-level I then trace the process that leads to self-reinforcing as
opposed to self-undermining religious institutions by analyzing patterns of strategic interaction
between the religious establishment and early modernizing reformers. Here I contend that the
availability of manpower for early modernizing reforms led to different patterns of institutional
change, some of which set religious institutions onto a self-undermining trajectory and some of
which allowed religious institutions to remain self-reinforcing. Self-reinforcing religious
institutions were resilient against the dramatic secularizing revolutions launched by founding
regimes decades later whereas self-undermining institutions caved under the pressure generated
by such movements.
My argument presents a picture of institutional change during processes of state-building
that runs counter to much of the conventional wisdom on the topic. First, although critical
junctures and those who preside over them usually take the credit (or blame) for the actualization
of dramatic institutional change, my analysis shows that historical antecedents, not just seminal
events, determine whether a given institutional change will or will not occur. Second, I observe
that early modernizing reforms that embedded religious elites in (as opposed to excluding them
from) nascent state structures ultimately facilitated the growth of states' disciplinary authority.
This finding stands in stark contrast to generally accepted ideas about modernization, which posit
a direct link between "secularization" (defined as the separation of religion and state) and the
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other processes of state-centralization. Instead, I show that places where early modernizing
reformers allowed for considerable overlap between religious institutions and nascent state
institutions in the fields of education and law
1) eventually produced states with exclusive sovereignty over disciplinary realms in the
aftermath of secular revolutions;
2) and these states have been better able to convince religious leaders to circumscribe their
own independence/authority and remain servants of the state over the long-term.
Taken together, it follows that the forces behind successful secular revolutions are neither
particularly "secular" nor are they really very "revolutionary." Exclusive state sovereignty over
education, law and religion instead is the result of a gradual accumulation of disciplinary
authority propelled by the layering of institutions and the cooptation of religious elites.
Through the piecemeal co6ptation of religion reformers slowly amassed a robust cultural
machinery for the dissemination of state ideology and silenced religious competitors in the
process. In other words, in the former Ottoman world, so-called "secular" states are actually
anchored by very deep religious roots.
It is also worth noting that this dissertation's focus on religion, schooling and law as
institutions crucial to state-formation provides counterbalance in a field dominated by studies of
the state's extractive (taxation) and purely coercive (military) arms. Schooling and law are
institutions that span the state's coercive and persuasive function, actively linking processes of
social discipline to state centralization. Conceding a role for religious leaders in education and
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law during the early state-formation period in exchange for their subservience thus lessened or
removed the need for force against a collective religious resistance. In addition, joining forces
with the religious establishment facilitated state centralization by providing scarce resources and
valuable networks for the expansion of authority. Consequently, a calculated level of
dependence on religious authorities' symbolic and tangible resources was often pivotal for the
state's overall development -and the way in which this dependence was managed (or
mismanaged), in turn, shaped the state's ability to silence competitors, win moral authority and
achieve exclusive sovereignty over disciplinary institutions.
The rest of this chapter proceeds as follows. Section one clarifies the "dependent
variable" of the study-whether or not secular revolutions result in exclusive state sovereignty
over institutions ofsocial discipline-and shows how such sovereignty is central to overall state
authority and other political processes of interest to social scientists. Section two briefly surveys
the existing literature to explain why past studies fail to account for the varying success of
secular revolutions in post-Ottoman states. This section is less about who I am arguing against
(i.e. people who have gotten it wrong) and more about what I am arguing for-the comparative
study of how the state expanded its scope to include schooling, law and the regulation of
religion. In section three I detail the macro-level argument, focusing on the paradox at the heart
of post-Ottoman state-building efforts: the inherent tension between regimes' need to accrue the
symbolic power of religion and the administrative necessities of state centralization. From this
discussion I derive two key explanatory variables to explain whether or not secularizing
revolutions result in successful state control of disciplinary institutions-the ability to leverage
religious moral authority and whether or not religious institutions are self-reinforcing or self-
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undermining at independence. In section four I shift the level of analysis to the micro-level and
theorize on the processes that cause religious institutions to be self-reinforcing or self-
undermining within a given location.
I. State Control of Social Discipline: Schooling, Law and the Regulation of Religion
Building a country-wide system of schools and legal institutions is an extremely costly
and daunting task for any state, let alone a former Ottoman state recently emerged from imperial
domination and the wreckage of war. Nonetheless, upon independence, erecting a system of
mass education and a coherent legal structure are among the top priorities for virtually every
young governments. This section outlines how and why a desire for social discipline (or mass
socialization) drives the state to build such elaborate and expensive bureaucratic structures.
In the relevant social scientific literature the term social discipline is used loosely to
describe a set of institutional techniques employed to facilitate control over large groups.
Scholars including Max Weber, Michel Foucault, Eugen Weber, Norbert Elias, Timothy Mitchell
and Philip Gorski have all considered the relationship between process of social disciplining and
state authority -though with varying emphasis.6 Gorski, who goes the furthest towards laying
out a comprehensive approach to the study of the relationship between social discipline and the
state, defines social disciplining as "an organizational and communal process in which the
activities and goals of group members are shaped by institutional restraints and shared values so
as to generate highly uniform patterns of collective life."7 This is the definition that will be used
here.
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The most stunning examples of states' efforts to consolidate control over social discipline
can be seen in institutional reforms designed to regulate, centralize and standardize schooling,
law and religion. Although today the provision of mass schooling and law are often taken for
granted as the obvious, inevitable, natural (and even benign) duties of states, this was not always
the case. Over the course of the 19 ' and 2 0th century, the elites at the helm of emerging states
engaged in fierce debates about how best to use compulsory schooling, law and religious
regulation to maximize central authority. To be sure, the historical records of early political
debates in countries as diverse as Greece, Turkey and Egypt all demonstrate that states
approached the (now distinct) issues areas of mass public education, law and religious regulation
all together as a bundle of similar problems joined by virtue of their connection to larger issues
of secularization, socialization and centralized authority.' My decision to focus on these three
sets of institutions is therefore not arbitrary; it is an organic reflection of how state-builders
actually envisioned the challenges of socialization and the production of values and beliefs.
Exclusive control over the institutional reigns of social discipline is the ultimate objective of
"secular revolutions."
Moving forward, a few words about each institutional realm and its respective
relationship to issues of socialization and state sovereignty are in order. Considering first the
importance of a centralized legal system, it is well established that coherent legal systems create
a uniform set of social rules that outline the bounds of acceptable human behavior and stipulate
the punishments to be doled out to potential transgressors. These functions often get grouped
under references to the importance of secure "rule-of-law" in functioning states. But there is
more at stake. Control over a centralized legal system, especially with respect to issues of
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constitutionalism and judicial review, is the sine qua non of the nation states' sovereignty,
legitimacy and authority. Without such control, it is virtually impossible to establish the
fundamental hegemony of any state sponsored "civil religion". Ran Hirschl's work on the
relationship between religion and constitutionalism as competing "comprehensive doctrines"
illustrates this point with remarkable clarity.
The very logic of constitutional law, with its reasoned set of core tenets, prevalent
modes of interpretation, and embedded emphasis on overarching state authority,
makes it an attractive enterprise to those who wish to contain religiosity and
assert state or civil society authority over religious texts, world-views and
interpretive hierarchies.'
According to Hirschl, states by their very nature demonstrate an "unyielding reluctance ... to
accept as binding or even cognizable any potentially competing legal order that originates in
sacred or customary sources of identity and authority." Such competing orders threaten to
undermine a state's very right to rule." It is through the establishment of constitutional authority
as the highest form of social authority that states cement their hegemony and sovereignty.
This brings us to the institutional construct of mass schooling. Schools are not just about
skill building, they also inculcate children with a set of norms about (state-established) rules and
laws that they then carry with them throughout life." In other words, schools specialize in the
instruction of beliefs and morals-or, more cynically speaking, indoctrination-a highly prized
commodity for any would-be ruler. States with exclusive sovereignty over the realm of
schooling possess unrivaled infrastructure and venues necessary for the successful dissemination
of state ideology. It is perhaps not so surprising then that ideologically driven totalitarian
regimes, which are certainly not known for their benevolence, tend to invest more heavily in
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public schooling than do their democratic counterparts.12
Regardless of the ideological disposition of a given regime, nationalist sentiments are an
especially effective ideational glue and can be a potent force for engendering loyalty. The
copious literature on the topic clearly conveys this fact." What often gets lost in discussions on
nationalism, however, is that behind any set of nationalist ideas lays a network of actual brick
and mortar educational institutions. It is within these institutions that ideologies become salient
and identities are anchored into official policy, law and state curricula. As Ernest Gellner writes:
Nationalism emerges only in a milieu [sic.] in which the existence of the state is
already very much taken for granted The existence of politically centralized
units, and of a moral-political climate in which such centralized units are taken
for granted and treated as normative, is a necessary . . . condition for
nationalism."
Consequently, using nationalism alone to explain a given state's ability to garner authority, secure
order and build legitimacy is a quintessential case of putting the cart before the horse. The
"invented traditions"of nationalism-and constitutionalism for that matter-gain traction and
popular resonance only to the extent that they can be standardized, repeated and fused with
every-day practices through state controlled institutions and structures."
Examined together, establishing control over both law and schooling is particularly
appealing to emerging states because governance by coercion alone is inefficient, prohibitively
costly and potentially destabilizing. Without the kind of order created through social discipline,
the act of ruling becomes infinitely more difficult. 6 Migdal puts it well when he writes that,
"No matter how vaunted the bureaucracy, police, and military, officers of the state cannot stand
on every comer ensuring that each person stop at the red light, drive on the right side of the road,
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stop at the cross walk and refrain from stealing, drug dealing and so on."17 The argument here is
a familiar one, based on the "costs" of ruling. The physical coercion of large populations by way
of repression, policing, and constant monitoring requires tremendous resources. Rulers thus feel
a need to instill social discipline in order to reduce the transaction costs of governing and to
cement their status and domination. Gorski is thus correct when he argues that, all else being
equal, "discipline increases state power insofar as it increases overall levels of administrative
efficiency and social order because a more orderly society is cheaper to govern and a more
efficient administration is easier to run." 8
Centralized regulation of religious institutions through the construction of state
sanctioned "ministries of religion" or similar bureaucracies can potentially serve a
complimentary function to-and, as I will argue in the following pages, are largely a byproduct
of-expanding state control over legal and educational realms. Under arrangements such as a
"nationalized church" or a "religion ministry" religion is certainly not eradicated (a tall, and
dangerous, task!). Instead religion is subordinated to the state through normalized, hierarchical
and bureaucratic channels that, under the right conditions conditions, can successfully limit the
ability of religious challengers to question the ultimate moral authority of the state. The
argument developed below illustrates how similar efforts to formally order religion-state
relations in this fashion produce varying results depending upon the strategies of institutional
reform deployed.
Having established that states seek control over disciplinary institutions under the guise
of political programs of "secularization", next on the agenda is laying out how to comparatively
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assess the results of these political programs. The secular/religious divide is almost never black
and white. Modem Turkey, for example, which is often cited as the prototypical "secular" state
has actually institutionalized religion in curious ways (to be detailed in chapters 3 and 6).
Across the former Ottoman world, intriguing amalgams that defy the conventional, dichotomous
classification of secular vs. religious abound.19 Nonetheless, some religion-state configurations
have proven to be more durable, state-centric, and moderating than others. Although the
religious and the secular are not necessarily binary -it is perhaps more helpful to think of
"varieties of secularism"- a critical threshold does seem to separate societies in which religion
poses a direct challenge to state authority vs. those in which religious actors play a more
submissive and docile function. Put simply, some states exercise exclusive sovereignty -i.e.
have the final say- on issues of schooling, law and religious regulation while other states are
ensnared in a fierce battle with religious elements that seek to overthrow (or fundamentally alter)
state authority in these spheres. Loveman's concept of 'routine control' (somewhat similar to the
colloquial idea of "politics as usual") helps illustrate the critical difference separating the two
camps. In the aftermath of successful secular revolutions states exert 'routine control' over
schooling, law and religion without substantial opposition. It must be emphasized that the
exercise of 'routine control' does not mean that struggles and debates about religion disappear
entirely. To the contrary. Rather, the key point here is that struggles and debates assume a
different form. They will be "struggles over the mechanics or techniques of state practices that
are recognized without question as such" as opposed to fundamental struggles over what counts
as a legitimate state practice. 2 After successful secular revolutions religious elites may still be
politically active, but they work through the system, gradually instead of trying to overthrow it.
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Table I. summarizes the observable implications of variation in the dependent variable across
eight post-Ottoman cases.
[Insert Table One About Here]
11. Literature
The discussion in the previous pages defined secularizing revolutions as a state-building
strategy aimed to augment authority via control of schooling, law and religion. Given what we
know about existing states, it should hardly come as a surprise that regimes seek to bolster their
power through the control of disciplinary institutions. Several generations of scholarship clearly
demonstrates that states are more than just material and/or political-military organizations- they
are also "pedagogical, corrective and ideological organizations" engaged in the politics of
socialization." We know that all states exercise (or seek to exercise) disciplinary power through
an array of institutionalized practices- national ideology, compulsory schooling, passports,
censuses, map-making, building museums and monuments."
Unfortunately, the existing literature on state building has tended to privilege the study of
certain dimensions of state power at the expense of others. There is certainly no scarcity of
literature on the processes by which states came to acquire military and extractive powers. For
example, a competent body of work on the rise of the state in the West clearly details how a
series of "extraction-coercion cycles" fueled by the threat of war and the drive for military
armament worked to form states in the heart of Europe. " Hence Tilly's memorable and often
cited observation that "War made the state, and the state made war".2 4 Likewise, there have been
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a number of convincing studies that document how political economy factors, such as the
formation of cross-class coalitions, policies of land reform and the incorporation of economic
notables into political structures, have led to varying extractive capabilities and thus state-
building trajectories."
The underlying assumption of much of the work cited above is that superior tactics of
organized violence, economic co-option and/or extraction can largely explain the degree to
which states achieve predominance and order in the societies over which they rule. With only a
handful of exceptions, little attention has been given to the process by which states build their
strength through the capture of disciplinary institutions.2 6 The result of this overemphasis on
coercion via brute force and the politics of revenue extraction is that theories of state-building
have become detached from an important part of what we know about how state power actually
functions. Scholars have largely ignored the cultural dimensions of state building and the
mundane (but powerful) disciplinary strategies that underpin the expansion of state authority.
This disjuncture between theories of state-building and existing knowledge about how
power works in states has been further perpetuated by the evolution of a popular rhetorical
device used to describe the state-building process: state "penetration". This well-worn trope
suggests that states generate their overall strength in direct proportion to their ability to
"penetrate" society. Michael Mann originally coined the term infrastructural power in 1984 to
describe "the capacity of the state to actually penetrate civil society and implement its actions
across its territories."2 7 Yet in the two decades since, many of the important nuances behind
Mann's ideas about infrastructural power have been eclipsed by a reliance on the catch-all idea of
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state penetration. As Torpey observes, "the now standard imagery of penetration suggests more
or less weak societies simply receive the advances of more or less powerful states. Having been
penetrated, societies give up -to a greater or lesser extent- what states demand of them."28
The idea that states "penetrate" society is not entirely incorrect; but nor is it a particularly
helpful rhetorical device for understanding the multidimensional process behind the expansion
and growth of state power and control. At the most rudimentary level we must ask ourselves,
How does this so-called "penetration" actually happen? All too often the term is used as
shorthand to explain the means by which states institute authority when what is actually being
described is the end result of a bundle of other processes -military dominance, standardized
education, bureaucratic expansion, documenting citizens, the spread of nationalism and secular
law etc. -that then go unexamined. Only recently has the study of the expansion of state
infrastructural power been revived in all its complexities by a group of scholars working to
disentangle the various dimension of state power through careful research in the historical
tradition.2 9 My dissertation makes a contribution to this growing body of literature by detailing
how religious actors and symbols figure into and can shape processes of institutional change
during state-building.
By focusing on the relationship between religious institutions and state institutions during
periods of great change, this study also adds to an existing-but nebulous-literature on the
study of secularization. Scholars have long viewed modernization (and everything that
supposedly goes with it, including state consolidation) as a somehow inherently secular process.
As Gill has pointed out, "secularization theory" is probably "the most durable, yet outdated,
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theoretical perspective in the social sciences."30 At its most basic, secularization theory is built
around the prediction that an all-encompassing process of modernization will replace religion.
Using evidence drawn almost exclusively from the Western European experience, advocates of
the secularization thesis contend that modernization and secularization unfold in tandem and that
the separation of religion and the state is not only the inevitable outcome of modernization but
also a precondition for political development."
If explored more closely, the classic secularization thesis actually contains two distinct
types of argumentation. The first line of reasoning, which gained popularity in the 1960's and
1970's, argues that the rise of rational consciousness fundamentally discredits the central claims
of religious organizations." The advancement of scientific inquiry and the breakneck pace of
technological development are thought to cause a loss in faith, which is eventually reflected in
declining church attendance. The idea here is that the metaphysical underpinnings of religion
simply cannot compete with fields like medicine and engineering, which now offer rational
answers to the questions that used to drive people to religion. As a result, religious participation
decreases and religious institutions are weakened.
A second variety of the secularization argument looks not at the erosion of individual
belief but at the diminishing social function of religious organizations. Although this tradition
has roots that extend back to the work of Durkheim", in the 1960's it was advocated by scholars
like Luckmann" and more recently has been revived by Bruce3". According to the functionalist
reasoning of these authors, religion exists because it holds societies together by providing
meaning and necessary services. Religion is not primarily about belief; rather, it is first and
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foremost a social system of culture and action that revolves around rituals, ceremonies and
charity work. As the reach of the modem state expands and comes to include schooling, welfare
systems and patriotic ceremonies, the social need for religion evaporates. Once the state is
capable of mediating births, marriages, deaths and holidays, people inevitably lose touch with
religion because their basic social needs are being fulfilled elsewhere. Echos of this kind of
thinking reverberate in more recent literature on the how nationalism has filled the religious void
as a kind of new "secular religion."36 Clearly, the problem here is a logic that takes the triumph
of the state and nationalism for granted, thereby leaving little room for problematizing the
various configurations in religion state relations that actually exist in the world today.
Such teleological approaches to the study of secularization dominate much of the
literature on Western Europe, which tends to ignore the critical points of intersection linking
process of state-building and religious regulation. Tilly laments this oversight in his introduction
to The Formation of Nation States in Western Europe. He writes:
Churches and religious organization should have received more direct attention
from the start, for two reasons: 1) churches and churchmen were significant
political actors at the national and international levels throughout most of the
period we are examining; at times they comprised the most formidable rivals,
allies, enemies or instruments of the great state-makers and 2) for several
centuries of our era, nationalism, and anti-nationalism alike customarily wore the
mantel of religious faith; great states like France and the Netherlands were rent
by struggles which inextricably combined religion and politics. For those
reasons, control of belief and devotion should probably have been on our initial
agenda.3 7
The old cliche that "winners write history" rings true for the history of state-building. Church
history plays such a minor role in today's narratives about European state-formation (and thus
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state formation in general) not because it was unimportant, but because the church eventually
lost-out in the struggle to control disciplinary institutions in most European states.
Closely related to the "exceptionalism" of European cases is the rise of what can be
termed cultural or civilizational approaches to the study of religion. Civilizational approaches
attempt to explain the nature of the religion-state relationship in terms of the dominant religious
doctrines and traditions of the country in question. Works in this genre contend that, in the
European or Western world, religion is relatively tame since societies are built around a clear
separation of state and religious institutions, a result that is thought to be a uniquely Christian
solution to the problem of church-state struggles.38 In the Muslim world, by contrast, the role of
religion is thought to be fundamentally different, and more dangerous, by virtue of the fact that
Islamic doctrine claims to encompass all domains, including law and politics.39 The most
popular proponent of this view is Samuel Huntington, who repeatedly compares the rigidity and
backwardness of Islam to the progressive and malleable ideology of the "West" in his well-
known "clash of civilizations" thesis."0 This dichotomous view ignores the variety and
complexity of both the European and Middle-Eastern cases. In viewing Christianity or Islam as
monolithic, civilizational approaches have no way of explaining any type of intra-civilizational
variation, of which there is plenty. Another flaw with civilizational approaches is, as Ahmet
Kuru points out, that it discounts the role of human agency when, in actuality, states and
"religious groups generally design their political preferences regarding socio-political
considerations."41
It is perhaps because of the overwhelming influence of civilizational arguments that,
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despite the multi-religious nature of the Ottoman Empire, scholars have failed to embrace a
comparative approach that looks at religion-state relations in both Muslim and Christian
successor countries.4 2 This lack of comparative work has only reinforced essentialist
interpretations of Muslim and Christian religious organizations in this part of the world.
Bucking this trend, work by Kalyvas, for instance, has shown that comparisons between Muslim
and Christian organizations are fruitful. By contrasting the Islamic fundamentalist movement in
Algeria with a fundamentalist Catholic movement in 19 th century Belgium (both of which were
hostile to democracy), Kalyvas shows how the design of religious institutions, not theology or
doctrine, conditioned outcomes."
Overall, the concept of secularization as it stands now offers little traction for
understanding exactly how modem states triumphed (or failed to triumph) over religious
institutions through politically motivated secular revolutions. Beyond the teleological and
ahistorical fallacies of modernization/secularization theory and civilizational approaches, a large
part of the problem boils down to the fact that there is too much conceptual ambiguity
surrounding what it actually means to "secularize". Secularization is used to describe
phenomena as diverse as: 1) the loss of faith at the individual level; 2) a given religious
organizations' loss of prestige and vitality; 3) the privatization of religion (religion become a
matter for individual concern); 4) non-religious entities, namely the nation state, taking on a
quasi-religious role; and 5) the legal separation of church and state." Clearly, a consensus as to
whether or not secularization is a reality cannot be achieved when scholars are talking past one
another.
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This dissertation sidesteps many of these problems by studying secularization solely as
the outcome of specific political projects that aims to achieving exclusive state sovereignty over
the disciplinary institutions of education and law. This approach corresponds with Gorski and
Ates' suggestion to study secularization as an "analytical variable." Treating secularization as an
analytical variable, they argue, requires that one
... define secularization in a particular way for a particular project, and... use
this definition in an ideal-typical fashion, as a means of identifying variation that
is explained by other concepts or mechanisms, instead of invoking secularization
as both explanans and explanandum, the traditional practice."
By this logic, the outcome of programs of secularization are essentially political settlements
regarding the role that religious institutions and elites will play in a given state. To understand
why a certain settlement prevails over a potential alternative, one must compare political
processes of contestation and changing patterns of control in specific institutional domains. The
next section lays out in detail how the viable "set" of possible settlements for religion and state
in former Ottoman states were limited in important ways by historical legacies and
contingencies.
Before moving on to detail these limiting factors, it is necessary to consider recent work
by Ahmet Kuru which actually seeks to explain varying patterns of secularization by examining
historical legacies. To Kuru's credit, he moves beyond civilizational approaches to compare
religion state dynamics in both a Muslim and Christian settings. Specifically, his book
Secularism and State Policies toward Religion attempts to explain why the US has adopted
passive secularism (the secular state plays a passive role in avoiding the establishment of religion
and allows for public visibility of religion) whereas Turkey and France have opted for assertive
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secularism (the state legislated religion's removal from the public sphere and attempts to confine
it to the private domain). He attributes these different paths to historical conditions and relations
during the country's state-building period. For Kuru, the decisive factor in determining the
adoption of passive vs. assertive secularism is the absence or existence of an ancien regime that
combines monarchy with hegemonic religion. He argues that, if an ancien regime exists, it is
hard to convince hegemonic religious groups to agree to the disestablishment of their religion
and thus conflict, and eventually assertive secularism on the part of the state, results.4 6
Although Kuru's formulation provides a fairly convincing argument for the U.S.'s unique
approach to religion, it is hard to see how one can employ his framework more widely across the
post-Ottoman cases. If we view only Turkey proper as the inheritor of the Ottoman ancien
regime, then should expect the other states of the former Ottoman world to perhaps go the way of
the United States? This certainly has not been the case. On the flip side, if we consider all
former-Ottoman states to be inheritors of an Ottoman ancien regime of some sort, then we would
expect each state to have a similar trajectory, which also has not been born out in reality. In
short, Kuru's ancien regime concept is problematic in the post-Ottoman context because there is
no simple answer to the question of whether or not there was an ancien regime in most post-
Ottoman states. Certainly there was an Ottoman administrative legacy, which I will argue below
mattered greatly and in variety of ways for the new nation states that emerged. However,
untangling the impact of this legacy demands going beyond merely identifying the existence-or
the lack there of-of a monarchy tied to the religious establishment. Religion-state relations in
the post-Ottoman context are much too complex to be described by this overly simplistic catch
phrase.
27
III. Explanatory Variables
Having defined what I mean by institutions of social discipline and reviewed the relevant
literature on state-building and secularization, in this section I put forth a macro-level argument
to explain cross-country variation in founding regimes' ability to launch secular revolutions that
result in state sovereignty over disciplinary institutions. Based on the general characteristics of
post-Ottoman state building, I argue that there are two factors (explanatory variables) that
combine to determine a given regime's ability to capture disciplinary institutions via a secular
revolution. The first factor is the regime's ability to simultaneously leverage religious moral
authority and symbols while secularizing (this appears counter-intuitive but is explained in detail
below). The second factor is whether or not religious institutions themselves are self-reinforcing
or self-undermining at the time of independence. To preview the argument, I contend that
secular revolutions are most likely to result in exclusive state sovereignty in places where
regimes can leverage religious moral authority but religious institutions themselves are on a self-
undermining trajectory.
The importance of a regime leveraging religious moral authority so as to associate
collective religious identities with new secular institutions stems from the fact that politics is not
just about material interests; it is also about what Wedeen refers to as "contests over the symbolic
world, over the management and appropriation of meaning."47 As states consolidate, both
nascent regimes and their opponents can be bolstered by an advantage in symbolic power.
Symbolic power "derives from the recognition of authority as legitimate" and is an invaluable
resource because it grants those who hold it with the "ability to make appear as natural,
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inevitable, and thus apolitical, that which is a product of historical struggle and human
invention."4 " Long standing institutions and communal authorities are common reservoirs of the
type of symbolic power and moral authority that the leaders of nascent regimes seek out.
Tapping into the emotive power of the collective identifications associated with these traditional
institutions can help rising regimes cement authority, win followers and secure mass compliance
during periods of systemic change.
I argue that in the former Ottoman world religiously based symbolic power and common
identities have been particularly potent and thus merit special attention. Surely the link between
religion and moral authority has been recognized elsewhere. Anthony Smith, for example,
shows that the historical role of priests, clerics and scribes in disseminating moral world-views
and transmitting communal memory has rendered religion an influential vehicle of legitimacy for
centuries.49 Yet in the former-Ottoman world, the importance of religion is perhaps greater as a
result of the institutional and cultural legacy of a long standing Ottoman governing arrangement
know as the millet. The millet was an administrative system that gradually emerged over the
course of the 14th and 15th centuries as the answer to the question of how the Ottomans would
govern the Empire's increasingly diverse population. Essentially an informal federation of
theocracies, the millet system functioned by providing a large degree of religious and cultural
autonomy to each major religious group while simultaneous incorporating them into wider
Ottoman administrative and economic structures. Over the centuries, this system engendered
deeply ingrained patterns of local-level rule and social organization that revolved around
religious identity and institutionalized a tradition of political administration by religious elites.
Because religious authority was already seen as legitimate by most citizens, utilizing religious
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moral authority and symbols became a key feature of state-building in the region.
Post-Ottoman states' ability to capitalize on the benefits of religious moral authority
varied substantially across countries. Of course, this is not surprising in and of itself. Reformers
working within territorial boundaries that housed a clear majority religion had an easier time
seeking out moral authority through an association with the dominant faith. In religiously mixed
places like Lebanon or Albania, invoking religious moral authority posed the risk of isolating a
substantial segment of the population and upsetting reforms. In more religiously homogeneous
societies such as Greece or Turkey, however, linking religious sentiments with the concept of
loyalty to an independent and reformed state had the potential to bolster a regime's standing in
the eyes of the masses.
Even in those territories of the former Ottoman Empire lucky enough to be relatively
religiously homogeneous, however, the secularizing dimension of the state centralization project
was not free from complications. Prior to the advent of the nation state, it was religious groups
that carried out the functions of social discipline and acted as the arbitrators of public morality
through their role in education, charity and law. As states sought to extend their administrative
reach into those arenas central to the production and reproduction of belief and morality, they
came into direct confrontation with their religious counterparts. Reflecting this position, Mark
Juergensemeyer writes:
[New states] had to confront the same competition between religion and
nationalism as the West has had to confront, but in a very short period of time ...
If accommodating religion was difficult for the West, efforts to bridle religion in
the new nations were a thousand times more problematic. There, the political
competition of religion was much more obvious. Given religious histories that
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were part of national heritages, religious institutions that were sometimes the
nations' most effective system of communication, and religious leaders who were
often more devoted, efficient, and intelligent than government officials, religion
could not be ignored The attempts to accommodate it, however have not always
been successful.so
In post-Ottoman countries the legacies of the millet system only exacerbated the generic
difficulties that Juergensemeyer outlines here. As a result, even for regimes presiding over
relatively religiously homogeneous populations, state-building was riddled by forces moving in
two opposite directions: nascent regimes needed to both win religious moral authority and
establish sovereignty by eradicating the traditional functions of religious elites.
To elaborate, the ultimate goal of achieving exclusive sovereignty over institutions of
social discipline required that founding regimes demote the authority of religious elites; but, at
the same time, open conflict with the religious establishment had the potential to ignite popular
revolt and derail reforms from below. Much to their own dismay, new states born from the
Ottoman Empire often found themselves pursuing religious legitimization and secularization
simultaneously. Religious legitimization and secularization work in opposite directions.
Founding regimes' use of religious moral authority reinforces, not undercuts, the power of the
religious establishment. Bolstering religious authority, in turn, makes attempts at secular reform
increasingly unpopular and problematic. The upshot of this dilemma can be a vicious cycle of
religious legitimization vs. secularization that ultimately prevents the state from achieving
sovereignty over institutions of social discipline and thereby weakens its overall authority. The
more the state tries to secularize, the less popular it becomes; but without secularizing, state
sovereignty cannot be achieved. I call this dynamic a legitimization-secularization spiral.
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Moving now to the second explanatory variable, I argue that a founding regime's ability
to avert the descent into a legitimization-secularization spiral and launch a successful secular
revolution depended on whether religious institutions were self-reinforcing or self-undermining
at the time of independence. As Greif and Laitin outline in their article on endogenous
institutional change, self-reinforcing institutions are durable and robust: "If an institution
reinforces itself, more individuals in more situations would find it best to adhere to the behavior
associated with it ... and exogenous changes in the underlying situation that otherwise would
have led an institution to change would fail to have this effect." Self-reinforcing institutions
create virtuous spirals and lead to institutional survival-even in the face of large external
shocks. In contrast, self-undermining institutions "cultivate the seeds of their own demise.""
An institution on a self-reinforcing trajectory is better predisposed to weather outside attempts at
dismantling it; an institution on a self-undermining trajectory will be vulnerable to change. The
mechanisms through which religious institutions become self-reinforcing or self-undermining are
discussed in the next section. For now, suffice it to say that founding regimes can only
successfully leverage religious moral authority to their benefit during secular revolutions if
religious institutions themselves have been set on a self-undermining trajectory. When founding
regimes use religious moral authority and religious institutions are still self-reinforcing, they are
likely to plummet into a legitimization-secularization spiral upon or soon after independence.
It is now possible to layout my macro-level argument in its entirety, explaining a given
state's ability to gain sovereignty over disciplinary institutions (and thus build overall authority)
as a product of religious legitimization and the institutional trajectory of the religious
establishment. Table II. depicts the macro-level argument in a two-by-two table.
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[Insert Table II. about here]
Starting from the upper left corner we see that if religious institutions are self-reinforcing
at independence and the regime attempts to leverage religious moral authority, the founding
regime's secular revolution will typically fail to gain exclusive sovereignty over disciplinary
institutions and a legitimization-secularization spiral is likely to follow. Moving to the right, we
find that (unsurprisingly) if religious institutions are self-reinforcing at independence and the
regime cannot leverage religious moral authority to its advantage, the founding regime will again
struggle to control institutions of social discipline. In this quadrant the failure to secularize
results from the increased probability of sectarian conflict between religious groups vying for
control of the state apparatus. In the lower right quadrant, we have the case in which religious
institutions are self-undermining and religious moral authority is not leveraged. In this context,
founding regimes struggle to institutionalize authority, not necessarily because of hostile
religious competitors, but because a usable reservoir of moral-authority and resources is likely to
be lacking. Finally, in the lower-left quadrant we find the proverbial sweet spot for successful
secular revolutions: moral-authority can be leveraged but religious institutions themselves are on
a self-undermining track, allowing the founding regime to launch a successful campaign to
secularize disciplinary structures without massive religious resistance.
IV. Micro-Mechanisms: Manpower, Reform Patterns, and Institutional Trajectories
In some ways the two-by-two table presented above poses more questions than it
answers. Specifically, I have argued that whether religious institutions are on a self-reinforcing
or self-undermining trajectory at independence partially determines a founding regime's ability to
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launch a successful secularizing revolution. The more interesting and critical question therefore
remains: What conditions lead to a self-undermining vs. a self-reinforcing religious
establishment? This section shifts the level of analysis and theoretically examines the micro-
level dynamics of early reform processes in order to answer this question. I argue that the
availability of manpower for early state-building reforms creates distinct patterns of institutional
change that either aid in the religious establishment's undoing (self-undermining) or allow it to
maintain its structural integrity (self-reinforcing). The validity of the general framework
presented below will be assessed in subsequent chapters through the case studies. The objective
here is to generate an abstract representation of key actors, decisions and conditions.
Actors and Contexts
Our story begins with the advent of modernizing reformers, a phenomenon that emerges
in the late 18th and early 19' century. Historical accounts provide a fairly unambiguous answer
to the question of when the process is set into motion. For example in Egypt, the reforms of
Mehmet Ali Pasha, which began in the first decades of the 19th century, mark the onset of
modernizing reforms. In Turkey, the rise of the Young Turks and then Committee for Union and
Progress in the wake of the Tanzimat in the later half of the 19* century denotes the start. For
Greece, the reformists' origins can be traced back to the revolutionary project of the Filiki
Etaireia (Friendly Society) and other late 18 * and early 19' century Greek "Enlightenment"
thinkers.
Reformers are typically a "rising group" of educated elites that admire European
administrative practices and seek to transplant them. A climate of widespread political upheaval
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combined with changing patterns of social mobility means that prototypical reformers are either
the product of military training or members of a diaspora intellectual class. High-modernist
reformers are not populists but elitists. They view themselves as above the common man by
virtue of their superior education, training and/or life experience. Reformers' connection to the
masses is thus tenuous at best. The revolutions and reforms they seek to implement are top
down, not bottom up.5 2 Reformers therefore tend to view intermediary power brokers and local
authorities as a particularly threatening well-spring of competition because of their close
proximity to and influence over the masses. Consequently, even if they are not necessarily "anti-
religious", reformers almost always exhibit anti-clerical "secularist" tendencies and hope to
relegate religion's public and administrative role in society.
Reformers do not operate in a vacuum; to maximize social acceptance they need to feel
their way through existing power structures rather than work simply via blunt force. There is an
already-established cultural machinery that complicates reformers' project to turn high-modernist
ideology into a regular product of political and social organization. Nor are the masses a tabula
rasa devoid of existing cultural imprints. The masses' very identity is a product of and
reinforcement to traditionally established cultural forms. A cadre of existing cultural producers
that specializes in moral authority and were trained under the previous ideological regime is
deeply embedded in the existing cultural machinery. This cadres' professional identity is tied to
and heavily invested in established institutions. As such, existing cultural producers are
predisposed to resist institutional reforms and ideological changes imposed from above by
reformers."
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In our case, the cadre of existing cultural producers is the religious establishment, an
aggregate group consisting of individual members of the religious elite. Religious elites are
individuals whose profession it is to 1) reinforce and propagate religious symbols through ritual
and worship and 2) to uphold the conceptions of the general order of existence through advice,
example, normative sanctioning, moral education and religious law. As an organizational entity,
the shape of the religious establishment ranges from a strict, hierarchical unit centered around
prominent institutional structures to a more loosely organized group of associated or mutually
exclusive regional subunits. The size and general competence of the religious establishment
(literacy, level of professionalism) also varies by country.
Religious elites are status conscious actors, who are, above all, interested in retaining
their dignity. Religious elites' dignity is directly tied to their role as the arbitrators of moral
authority. As status conscious individuals, religious elites seek to preserve or improve their own
position in society, which tends to be closely linked to maintaining institution(s) and structures
that can provide their livelihood. Concern with advancement and promotion is also a central part
of the lifestyle for many members of the religious establishment. Generally speaking, promotion
and appointment in the religious establishment is a function of education, performance in lower-
level positions and the extent of one's connections within the establishment itself. There can be
substantial monetary incentives for moving up in the ranks, not to mention increased prestige,
respect and influence. Religious elites are not necessarily opposed to modernization as such; but
they do take issue with attempts at reform that threaten to infringe upon the institutions from
which they derive their professional status, personal dignity and self-respect.
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In addition to the existence of a potentially defiant religious elite, there are other major
impediments to the actual implementation of reformers' high-modernist agendas in the fields of
education and law. The nature of these obstacles falls into two distinct, yet intricately related,
categories: a moral authority deficit and (in some cases) a lack of sheer man-power / material
resources.
A sizable legitimacy/moral authority deficit is common to reformers across cases since,
by definition, they are typically elitists who seek to launch change from above. Because
reformers have few prospects for legitimizing their authority on their own, they may attempt to
build moral authority and gain popular support by invoking religion. In seeking religious
legitimization, reformers reason that breaking deeply instilled patterns of local parochialism
among the masses demands that they make an appeal to their religious identity and beliefs. As
such, attempts are sometimes made to "sell" reforms through religious imagery, symbols and
rhetoric. Reformers seek to use religious rhetoric to convince the masses that compliance with
reforms is a moral duty, thereby securing obedience without accruing the costs of enforcement.
As mentioned in the discussion above, widespread religious appeals are naturally more difficult
to make in religiously diverse settings than in homogenous ones. Therefore not all reformers (or
the founding regimes that follow in their footsteps) have recourse to the symbolic power and
moral authority of religion.
Reformers' material deficit varies and is dependent upon several factors. First, the size of
the cadre and the scope of its geographical spread are important. Small, localized reform
factions will face more serious resource constraints than larger, evenly-dispersed organizations.
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Second, reformers' resource constraints are conditioned by their ability to procure the buildings
and physical infrastructure necessary for housing schools and courts. The final and by most
important factor is reformers' access to a local hiring pool of educated and literate professionals
capable of providing general administrative expertise as well as staffing schools and courts.
In countries that experience colonial administration at some point following the Ottoman
collapse, material and manpower constraints can diminish as administrators, teachers and other
professionals from the colonial metropole are brought in to staff secular schools and legal
institutions. Not all colonial administrations, however, are created equally. Work by Lange,
Mahoney & vom Hau demonstrates that the level of colonialism -defined as "the extent to
which a colonizing power installs economic, political, and sociocultural institutions in a
colonized territory"- varies substantially across any given imperial power's colonial holdings.
In the former Ottoman World we see everything from no colonial imposition at all (ex. Greece,
Turkey, Albania), to medium (Egypt) and relatively high (Cyprus) levels of colonialism."
Regardless of access to manpower and resources, reformers would ideally like to secure
the religious establishment's blessing to make secularizing and centralizing changes in education
and law. For reformers a publicly supportive, compliant, and completely subordinate religious
establishment would be optimal. On one hand, such an arrangement maximizes the amount of
moral authority that can be derived from religious symbols and rhetoric; on the other, it also
circumscribes religious authorities' future ability to win hearts and minds and thereby act as a
competitor to reformers and founding regimes. Most religious elites exhibit deep skepticism
towards such an arrangement since it threatens their status and potentially their core values as
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believers. The reform process therefore becomes contentious, giving rise to patterns of strategic
interaction between reformers and religious elites.
Reform Patterns
In this general context, early modernizing reform processes can take several shapes
based on the level of manpower and expertise available to reformers. Streeck & Thelen's work
on the mechanisms behind gradual institutional change provides a helpful starting point for
characterizing these various patterns. The discussion below draws on their insights and
elaborates upon their typology to map out the strategies of modernizing institutional change that
existed in the Ottoman world."
Conversion: Most reformers will first attempt to restructure disciplinary institutions from the
outside in an incremental fashion via conversion, demanding that religious schools introduce
some secular elements to their curriculum, or requiring religious courts to apply a new set of
secular legal codes. Conversion is favored in any context because it is cost effective, allowing
reformers to work with existing infrastructure and experts at minimal cost. Also, reformers
envision that institutional change via conversion signals a willingness to work with, rather than
completely against, the religious establishment.
Despite its appeal, conversion rarely achieves the desired outcome because it is
vulnerable to subversion from below. When reformers (in some cases together with colonial
administrators) employ conversion, the religious establishment remains firmly planted on its
home turf, free to reinterpret new reforms and rules as they see fit or simply ignore them entirely.
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Paper reforms or verbal dictates are not strong enough to alter the dominant culture of religious
institutions or the habits and behavior of those elites that work in them. The inertia of long-
standing institutions -in some contexts further reinforced by reformers' appeals to religious
moral authority- tends to block any efforts to redeploy religious institutions for secular
purposes. As a result, the religious establishment retains its integrity and religious institutions
continue on a self-reinforcing trajectory during attempts at institutional change by conversion.
Displacement: Institutional change via displacement occurs when resources and manpower for
reforms are plentiful. Through an "invasion" of these resources, traditional institutions are
successfully supplanted by new (and sometimes foreign) ones. Displacement can occur after
conversion fails or conversion can be bypassed entirely. The critical dimension of institutional
change via displacement is that it requires active and sustained cultivation by committed, affluent
and enterprising actors who are able and willing to expend the large amount of resources
required to overwhelm traditional structures. The superior resources and manpower of reformers
during institutional change via displacement overtakes traditional institutions and, with time, can
engender new beliefs that erode the authority of traditional structures and send them onto a self-
undermining trajectory. When resources and commitment are high enough to make
displacement possible, the importance of religious legitimacy decreases substantially as new
norms about legitimate governance are gradually instilled in the population.
CoOptation: Less costly than displacement but more costly than conversion is a strategy of
piecemeal co6ptation, whereby reformers create a nascent set of rival institutions that are not
directly under the religious establishment's control but somehow include existing religious
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structures. The initial introduction of these institutions is likely to be poorly received by the
religious establishment, who view them as an encroachment on their sphere of influence. The
general public also looks upon these new institutional creations with a degree of suspicion at the
outset.
Under strategies of piecemeal co6ptation, new institutions are "created on the edge of old
ones" in such a way that the "new fringe eats into the old core." 6 In other words, a new
institutional layer siphons off support and expertise from the old/ traditional layer, grows, and
gradually crowds it out over time. This process involves some degree of compromise between
old and new which eventually turns into the defeat of the old. As Selznick observes the
"co6ptative mechanism" involves a "process of absorbing new elements into the leadership or
policy-determining structure of an organization as a means of averting threats to its stability or
existence."" As will be explained in greater detail below, piecemeal co6ptation strategies-but
not all co6ptation strategies-beget a process that sends religious institutions onto a self-
undermining trajectory.
Successful piecemeal co6ptation requires that reformers initiate a process of strategic
compromise with religious elites and use targeted incentives to bring religious expertise into the
new institutions. These incentives take the form of offering individual religious leaders secure
positions in the new, centralized, and ostensibly "secular" institutions of education, law, and
politics in return for their compliance with the reforms and new institutional structures. Forging
this link with the religious establishment necessitates that reformers make a number of
compromises that run contrary to their high-modernist ideological principles. For instance,
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securing a compromise with the religious elite might require that reformers retain religious
curricula in primary schools when they would rather dispose of most (or even all) of these
lessons outright. Put simply, reformers do not consider this trade-off ideal. Rather strategies of
piecemeal co6ptation emerge somewhat begrudgingly and largely out of necessity when the
resources and manpower for reform are scarce.
Parallel Structures: Under this scenario, the material resources and manpower available for
reforms are in the middle range: substantial material support and expertise may be available, but
it is not plentiful or concentrated enough to displace existing institutions. The availability of
some resources and manpower means that there is little incentive for reformers to extensively
integrate traditional elites into the reform process and a strategy of building parallel structures as
opposed to piecemeal co6ptation ensues. With parallel structures a new but fairly weak
institutional layer is created largely in isolation from existing institutional structures. The new
structure is relatively self-sufficient and is staffed largely by outsiders (ie non-traditional elites).
There is minimal borrowing and/or interaction between the old and new institutional structures
and over time they become estranged, polarized and potentially even competitors.
In some instances of strategies based on parallel structures the exclusion of old
institutional elements from new structures results more from mundane colonial administrative
practices than from any deliberate attempts at such exclusion. For example, a colonial
administration might unwittingly design entrance exams for new law and teacher-training
schools in such a way that members of the religious elite are not qualified to sit them.
Regardless of intentions, new disciplinary institutions will be built in isolation from traditional
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structures. In rare cases when new institutional structures manages to successfully "over-power"
older institutions through a combination of superior resources and expertise as well as prolonged
presence parallel structures eventually gives way to displacement. The majority of colonial
occupations are done "on the cheap", however, and material resources seldom go beyond the
middle range-i.e. initially available but not sufficient to create durable, nation-wide systems.
Unless parallel structures give way to institutional displacement, religious institutions will
remain self-reinforcing.
Summary
Although reformers themselves do not recognize it at the time, the piecemeal codptation
of religious elites ultimately primes founding regimes for successful "secular" revolutions for
several reasons. Most basically, creating space for religious elites in a new, centralized system
lends much needed expertise and legitimacy to fledgling state institutions seeking to root
themselves in a rapidly changing society. The public views new institutions staffed by religious
authorities as an organic development, not a foreign imposition. This pattern of institutional
reform therefore gives the illusion of continuity in a period of massive social upheaval and
change. When making basic decisions about where to send their children to school or where to
settle a dispute, the masses are not forced to choose decisively between loyalty to religion and
obedience to a rising trend of reforms. Here it is telling to return to the anecdote about Mustafa
Kemal's schooling introduced at the beginning of this chapter. After Semsi Efendi's school,
Mustafa Kemal's mother went on to enroll him at another "new school" know as a Milkiye
Ralvtiyesi. There Kemal recalls being beaten by Kaymak Hafiz, a devout Arabic teacher who was
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also member of the religious establishment. It was this event the prompted Mustafa Kemal to
abandon his civilian education and pursue a military career.58
Second, by opening up new career pathways for religious elites, gradual co6ptation sends
the religious establishment onto a self-undermining trajectory. Religious elites are integrated
into the new system on an individual, case-by-case basis rather than by simply slapping a state
label onto old religious institutions. Consequently, the power of the religious establishment as a
potential source of collective action is fractured and dispersed in the process. By moving some
religious elites into the "secular" system and making their livelihood dependent on payouts from
a new set of coffers, their interests become aligned with the interests of reformers. Altering the
interests of a sizable portion of the religious establishment in turn shifts disputes about the role of
religion in modernizing disciplinary reforms out of the lime-light. Under such conditions,
debates about the future of the religion-state relationship do not become a head to head show-
down with the religious establishment on one side and nefarious, atheist reformers on the other.
Instead, such disputes are waged behind closed doors within the religious establishment itself -
and ultimately aid its undoing. Curiously then, a lack of manpower and resources for the early
reform of disciplinary institutions can actually abet a state's future ability secure disciplinary
control by sending religious structures onto a self-undermining path and thereby priming
founding regimes for successful secular revolutions.
Access to manpower and expertise therefore significantly alters the dynamics of early
institutional reform. When manpower and expertise are not scarce (but also not plentiful) and
reformers are not forced to invite religious elites into new institutions, the religious establishment
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easily retains both its coherence and rasion d' tre. Lange, Mahoney & Vom Hau, cited above,
have uncovered a general pattern in the relationship between the level of colonialism and
development. They find that whereas "[e]xtensive British colonialism introduced a rule of law,
effective administration, and competitive markets, promoting development ... limited forms of
British colonialism distorted existing institutions in ways that greatly hindered future
development."59 This general observation also holds true for the reform of disciplinary structures
and manifests itself in the divergent institutional scenarios of parallel systems vs. displacement.
To elaborate, limited colonial involvement characterized by parallel systems creates a
new set of institutions that largely excludes traditional elites but also falls short of installing
effective disciplinary institutions in its own right. Often these parallel structures cannot gain
traction because of their inorganic/elitist nature, sporadic performance and/or limited duration.
Post independence, founding regimes will therefore inherit a deeply fractured system of
disciplinary control. In this context religious elites' interests have not been sufficiently aligned
with the objectives of the "secularizing" reforms because colonial occupation excluded these
elites from the early phases of the reform process. As a result, if and when reformers and state
elites seek religious moral authority, they only reinforce the power of a group of religious elites
who remain outside of new secular structures and thus can threaten these structures' survival. By
contrast, under displacement, new institutions are backed and sustained by substantial resources
and an unwavering commitment, allowing them to gain the strength necessary to change beliefs,
norms and habits. The presence of overwhelming manpower and resources, although rare, can
diminish the importance (both perceived and actual) of religious moral authority and instill
significant change via other channels.
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Table III. summarizes the general linkages this section has drawn between the level of
manpower resources, reform patterns and the trajectory of religious institutions. Figure I.
contains an arrow diagram that depicts the entire argument step-by-step leading to variation in
the outcome of secular revolutions.
[Insert Table III about Here]
[Insert Figure I about Here]
The Religious Response to Reform by Piecemeal CoOptation
Institutional change via gradual codptation weakens religious institutions, but we still
need a plausible explanation for why religious elites agree to be cotpted at all. Is the religious
establishment oblivious to reformers' ultimate intentions? Or, believing that there is no viable
alternative, have they simply accepted defeat as afait acompli?
The religious establishment is certainly not looking to be intentionally duped into
forfeiting all of its authority to civil control. Religious-elites are cognizant of the threat to their
authority and alert to the fact that reformers do not always have the religious establishment's best
interests at heart. Nor are religious elites entirely defeatist and uniformly yielding to reformers
demands. Even when a large segment of the religious elite willingly joins new disciplinary
structures, a group of dissenters who openly resists such incorporation/co6ptation almost always
exists. More will be said below about the reasons why some religious elites resist incorporation
and why some comply. For now, suffice it to say that we can not entirely attribute the religious
establishment's response to ignorance, backwardness or a sense of defeatism.
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Religious elites fail to collectively resist strategies of piecemeal co6ptation because in
this context fundamental and value-laden decisions (whether or not to resist secularization) are
converted into a punctuated series of marginal decisions (whether or not to supplement one's
income by picking up an extra shift teaching religion in a state school; whether or not to openly
resist when, ten years later, that same school drops 2 of your 10 teaching hours). The first type
of tradeoff directly pits religious elites' sacred values (and thus their dignity) against material
considerations, inciting resistance since renouncing a sacred value for material gain is considered
equivalent to renouncing one's self-respect.60 This is why secular revolutions that try to "co6pt"
the a large portion of the religious establishment in one fell-swoop at independence are doomed
to failure. With mundane and marginal tradeoffs, however, religious elites make rational
calculations based on more immediate considerations. Since, in the short-term, religious elites
are primarily focused on narrow goals, such as their personal career pathways and maintaining a
foothold in any institution through which they can act as arbitrators of moral consciousness
(education and law), co6ptation is able to take root, religious institutions begin to unwind and the
process of state expansion slowly creeps forward into the realm of social discipline.
When inherently value-laden decisions become framed as marginal-trade-offs through
strategies of piecemeal coptation, the religious elite appear (especially in retrospect) as if they
are collectively blind to the long-term consequences of their immediate decisions. In other
words, they (as a group) seem to fail to grasp the larger reality of how their individual choices
can make the religious establishment vulnerable en masse to manipulation that will eventually
strip their entire class of much of its tangible power and influence. Once a sizable portion of the
religious establishment is ensconced in the new institutional structure and dependent on a
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paycheck issued by a new set of authorities, reformers can gradually go on to phase out religious
elements of school curricula and law, again without inciting massive resistance. Gradually
instituted changes via co6ptation can partially mask the real long-term threats of reform since the
impact on any given elites' dignity at each step in the process appears negligible.
Divide and Conquer? Cooptation and Selective Violence
It was stated above that it is rare in scenarios of piecemeal co6ptation for all religious
elites to be incorporated into newly created institutional structures. Some will choose to resist.
Who will choose which path? Whether or not a given member of the religious establishment
resists co6ptation depends largely on his position in the religious establishment's hierarchy.
Upper-mid level and mid level religious elites with a relatively secure but not excessively visible
position in the religious establishment's hierarchy tend to view themselves as better off joining
new institutions (or at least not resisting their creation). Very low level religious functionaries
and religious students tend to choose to openly protest institutional reforms and, as a result, often
become the victims of selective violence together with top-level symbolic figureheads.
People occupying the upper and middle echelons of the religious establishment believe
that they can preserve their authority in a reformed institutional context for several reasons. For
one, as a result of reformers' lack of moral authority, there is a sizable market for religious
leaders who are willing to engage in acts of legitimization -such as issuing fatwas to justify
political decisions, accompanying politicians to rallies, backing/joining political parties or
writing religious treatises in support of constitutionalism. Upper-mid level religious elites can
thus side-step the threats of reform by opting to join the political fray and use their moral
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authority to justify policies of reform and centralization. Mid level religious actors who are one
step down may lack the public-persona, authority and/or charisma to enter politics directly, but
they are not devoid of options in a reformed system either. As was mentioned above, when
reformers lack expertise and man-power it inadvertently provides new and often lucrative career
pathways for people with traditional religious training. Upper-mid and mid level religious elites
see their own individual opportunities for career advancement and status increase -not decrease
- with the introduction of new institutional structures in this context.
Such options are not open, however, to those individuals at the very bottom of the
religious hierarchy. The entire future of aspiring young religious students rests on the
maintenance of religious institutions that can serve as pathways for upward mobility and status
generation. The creation of new institutions not only directly threatens this future but also offers
few alternatives. When institutional change via collaborative layering is underway, religious
students and very low level functionaries see the institutions that were supposed to afford them
upward mobility being neglected, hemorrhaging staff and diminishing in status as a large number
of their superiors gradually abandon them in favor of new disciplinary structures. New
opportunities are not forthcoming, since reformers are in search of moral authority and expertise
and these religious novices and underdogs cannot effectively offer either given their limited
experience and training, lack of prestige and questionable capacity to wield any kin of moral
prowess.
Low-level religious functionaries and students will therefore often attempt to protest,
resist and/or sabotage new institutional creations. These agitators normally take a fundamentalist
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stance and cite the purity of religion as their driving cause. But such low level attempts to
launch religious resistance from below typically fail to gain momentum if the co6ptation of
upper-ranking religious elites is simultaneously underway. This failure derives from the fact
religious resistance becomes completely deprived of a unique raison d'&tre as reformers actively
appropriate religious constructs and schema and team-up with upper-level segments of the
religious elite. Disgruntled, low-level religious students can hardly launch a counter revolution
in the name of protecting religion when reformers are mounting their own quiet revolution on the
very same terms and now with the backing of some of the religious establishment's most
prominent players!
Religious elites who have joined new disciplinary institutions and hence have a vested
interest in these new structures will never endorse low level attempts at religious agitation. In
fact, mid level elites will cite their authoritative position in the religious establishment and
publicly come out against such religious resistance movements, branding them as recalcitrant,
dangerous and extremist. In some instances, the split in the religious establishment will become
so deep that a group of reform-aligned religious elites will even sanction the use of selective
violence to repress extremist uprisings. Institutional change by gradual co6ptation- which
originates as a makeshift solution for how undertake reform when faced with a dearth of
resources and expertise- ultimately allows reformers to gradually divide and conquer the
religious establishment, paving the way for successful secularizing revolutions upon
independence.
V. Moving Forward
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Although many contemporary troubles in the Balkans and the Middle East seem to
revolve around religion, the theoretical discussion in this chapter has illustrated that the problem
is not religion per se but a more systemic dilemma reflecting the deep complications that have
arisen as a result of trying to carve legitimate and secular nation-states out of a federation of
theocracies like the Ottoman Empire. To summarize, I have shown that politically driven
secularization movements to control schooling, law and, ultimately, religion itself are a key (but
often ignored) component of the overall state building process. Variation in the success of
secularizing revolutions at independence therefore have significant consequences for the
consolidation of state sovereignty over the longue duree. To explain the variation in the success
of secularizing revolutions in post-Ottoman states, I have provided an argument built at two
levels of analysis. At the country level, I contend that the success or failure of radical political
programs of secularization can be explained by a regime's ability to utilize religious moral
authority and by the institutional trajectory of religious institutions (self-reinforcing vs. self
undermining). Put simply, when regimes can gain popular support by leveraging religious
symbols but religious institutions themselves are weak (self-undermining), secularization
movements are likely to succeed. To build the second prong of the argument I shifted the level
of analysis to theorize within country. Here I argued that the level of manpower and resources
for early modernizing reforms creates distinct patterns of institutional change that either allow
religious institutions to self-reinforce or cause them to come undone through self-undermining
dynamics. Taken as a whole, the analysis provides a unique interpretation of the historical
process by which some post-Ottoman states were successfully able to mold their populations into
disciples of the state, while others continue to struggle to assert sovereignty.
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To evaluate the validity of macro and micro-level dynamics proposed in this chapter it is
important to clearly set the scope conditions for this study. In the next chapter I explain why I
consider the former-Ottoman world to be a distinct historical geography with conditions
sufficiently similar to warrant comparison but outcomes variant enough to prompt interesting
puzzles. This entails defining what I mean by the term "former Ottoman world", explaining the
logic of the research design and case selection, and providing some important contextual
background to the cases. It is to this task that I now turn.
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Table I: Observable Implications of Dependent Variable
Outcome Exclusive
State
Sovereignty
Failed secular
revolution
Successful
secular
revolution
No, or only
partial
sovereignty
Yes, state
exercises
exclusive
sovereignty
Regime engages in:
Continued attempts to extend
legitimate state practices to
include schooling, law and
regulation of religion
mechanisms: administrative
innovation, imitation,
co~ptation,
and/or usurpation
Instilling desired categories,
cognitive schemes, and social
practices through state
controlled institutions of
schooling, law and religion
mechanisms:
regulation, codification,
routinization, and socialization.
Opposition takes the
form of:
Struggles over whether or not
the state has the exclusive
right to control schooling,
administer law and regulate
religious institutions
Debates regarding the
mechanics, techniques or
style
of state practices regarding
schooling, law and religion
but little debate about the
state's actual right to exercise
control over these
institutional realms
Table II. Religious Moral Authority, Institutional Trajectories and Control of Social Discipline
Religious
Institutions Self-
reinforcing
Religious
Institutions Self-
undermining
Leveraging of Religious Moral
Authority
Outcome: founding regime fails to gain
sovereignty over disciplinary institutions
Dynamic: legitimization-secularization
spiral / constitution-theocracies
Example: Egypt, Tunisia
No Leveraging of Religious Moral
Authority
Outcome: founding regime fails to gain
(or foregoes attempting to gain)
sovereignty over disciplinary institutions
Dynamic: sectarian tensions, increased
likelihood of religious civil war
Example: Lebanon
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Example
Egypt
Iraq
Lebanon
Tunisia
Turkey
Greece
Albania
Cyprus
Outcome: founding regime gains Outcome: late development of
exclusive sovereignty over disciplinary disciplinary institutions
institutions
Dynamic: state consolidation is weak but
Dynamic: state consolidation is civil war is averted
facilitated / weak form of religious
establishment Example: Albania
Example: Turkey, Greece
Table III. Resources, Reform Patterns and Institutional Trajectories
Level of External
Resources
Pattern of Early Institutional
Reform
Trajectory of Religious
Institutions
Conversion
Piecemeal Co6ptation
Parallel Systems
Displacement
Self-reinforcing
Self-undermining
Self-reinforcing
Self-undermining
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Any/All
Low
Medium
High
Figure I. Arrow Diagram of Argument
High resources make religious
legitimization less necessary
Reform by
Religious
institutions
self-undermine
*Founding regime inherits strong,
* secular disciplinary institutions.
*Example: Cyprus
*Founding regime fails to gain
exclusive sovereignty of social
discipline
*Legitimization secularization
spiral
*Examples: Egypt, Tunisia
Reform by
Manpower P parallel systems
Religious
institutions
self-reinforce
Reform by . Religious institutions
cooptation self-undermine
*Founding regime fails to gain
exclusive sovereignty of social
discipline
*Sectarian Tensions/Conflict
*Examples: Lebanon, Iraq
*Founding regime gains exclusive
sovereignty of social discipline
*Secular revolutions succeed
*Examples:Turkey, Greece
*Late / stagnated development
of disciplinary institutions
*Example: Albania
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Chapter Two
Imperial Footprints and Historical Legacies
Most academic literature distills the legacy of the Ottoman Empire down to its impact in
a single successor state, modem Turkey. True, in terms of cultural and linguistic continuity,
Turkey is a primary inheritor of the Ottoman past. Modem Turkish is the clear successor
language of Ottoman Turkish (despite the heavy influence of Arabic and Persian in Ottoman
writing) and the former Ottoman capital of Istanbul is located in modem Turkey (although it is
not the capital of the new Turkish state). As Black & Brown point out, however, only
considering the influence of Ottoman legacies in Turkey unwittingly lends credence to the
anachronistic myth-histories of nationalism in the Balkans, Turkey and the Arab world.61 Not all
states celebrate their "Ottoman legacy" -surely, many states define themselves in opposition to
anything and everything Ottoman -but this does not mean that such a legacy is absent or
unimportant.
The Ottoman imperial footprint extends beyond the geographical confines of modem-
day Turkey to areas in the the Balkans, the Fertile Crescent and North Africa, all of which shared
centuries of experience under Ottoman rule. Albert Hourani puts it well, writing that "[m]any of
the things Middle Eastern countries have in common can be explained by their having been ruled
for so long by the Ottomans; many of the things which differentiate them can be explained by the
different ways in which they emerged from the Ottoman Empire." 2 Maria Todorova, makes a
similar argument for the Balkans, stating that the "the most striking feature of the dominant
discourses in the different Balkan countries is the remarkable similarity between them" and that
"[T]he perception of the Ottoman legacy is at the center of securing present social arrangements,
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and above all legitimizing the state and searching for identity. . . "63 Despite the profound
influence that Ottoman rule (and collapse) have had on the modem trajectory of states in the
Balkans and Middle East, we lack systematic research about the precise political, institutional
and cultural imprints left by over 600 years of Ottoman domination.
This chapter sets out to define the former Ottoman world as a region with unique
characteristics that warrant a revision of the current wisdom on state-building and secularization.
First, I set the boundaries for the current study and provide a historical justification for "the
world of possible cases" that I should expect to exhibit the dynamics outlined in the previous
chapter. Next I explain my decision to focus research on three country case studies -Turkey,
Egypt and Greece- and show how this research design helps to cast doubt on potential
alternative explanations for why secular revolutions fail or succeed. In the second half of the
chapter, I provide necessary historical background and contextualization that will help situate the
empirical chapters that follow. Specifically I highlight the general importance of religion in
Ottoman and administrative practices and everyday life.
I. Defining the Former Ottoman World
The Ottoman Empire was a multi-ethnic, multi-religious "state"" in existence from
roughly 1300-1922. The Empire began as a ghazi principality headed by Ossman Ghazi in
northwestern Anatolia that began expanding through the Galipoli Peninsula into the Balkans. In
the 16 th century, Ottoman armies went on to conquer parts of the Middle East, Mesepotamia and
Northern Africa.65 At its height, the empire encompassed vast amounts of territory and spanned
three continents. Over the 600-year course of Ottoman rule, wars of expansion and rebellions led
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to territorial acquisitions and losses, causing the scope of Ottoman influence to expand and
contract. Nonetheless, at the start of the nineteenth century, the Empire still included all of North
Africa except Morocco, the entire Balkan Peninsula, Anatolia, Syria, Iraq and parts of the
Arabian Peninsula.66
Given the ever-shifting boundaries on the frontiers of Ottoman authority, which current
countries should be considered part of the former Ottoman world for this study? Opting to
include any territory on which Ottoman administrators ever set foot would produce upward on 27
present day countries to consider.67 Yet such a study would be unwieldy and of dubious quality.
Present day Hungry was under the Ottomans for a time during the 16th and 17 centuries and
today's Kuwait was under the Ottoman's thumb for a brief 30-year stint at the end of the 19 th
century; but it would be a hard sell to convince anyone that these two states share much of
anything, let alone a common path into the modem world. Answering this basic question is
further complicated by the fact that the territorial divisions of the past do not directly map on to
the lines that separate nations today.
To simplify, I use the following basic criteria to determine whether or not a given state
qualifies as "former-Ottoman." First, the majority of the territory encompassed by the present
state must not have dropped out of the Empire prior to the military reforms of Selim III in 1795.
This date is commonly recognized by historians as the point at which the Empire began to
modernize both its military structure and some of its methods of governance.68 Thus, territories
that were not under Ottoman control after 1795 are likely to have undergone significantly
different paths toward modernization, making their "comparability" with territories still in the
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Empire and after 1795 doubtful. Second, the territory must have been under effective Ottoman
control for a total of at least fifty years. I include this criterion because it takes time for
institutions to diffuse and take root. Short stints of Ottoman rule do not instill the type of
cultural and administrative legacies that are central to the arguments I am making here.
Comparing the borders of modem nation states with the criteria mentioned above leaves
the following "former-Ottoman" states as potential candidates for in-depth study: Albania,
Bosnia Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Egypt, Greece, Israel, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya,
Macedonia, Serbia, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey. In nearly all of these countries "secularizing"
regimes came to power at one point or another -typically after the achievement of national
independence. These regimes were armed with an aggressive agenda for direct intervention in
religious affairs, the ultimate aim of which was relegating religion to state control. As Mansoor
Moaddel has observed, across the Middle East secular agendas were fused with political
ideologies of varying stripes and colors. A "secular outlook was crafted to fit various forms of
radical Arab nationalism and socialism"(Egypt, Syria)69 as well as Fascism (Turkey) and
monarchical rule (Greece). Table IV. provides a (non-exhaustive) list of the approximate start
dates for political programs of intensive secularization in several former Ottoman countries.
[Insert Table IV. about Here]
Before moving forward to case selection, a few caveats are in order. First, given the
unique conditions associated with the formation of Israel/Palestine, this case requires particular
attention. The roots of Zionism do not lie in the Ottoman Middle East: "Zionism grew up in
Europe (especially Eastern Europe and Russia) as a European Jewish response to distinctively
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European experiences".7 Moreover, the nature of the events surrounding the creation of the
Israel state, as well as the place that this state occupies on the stage of Middle Eastern and world
politics is in many ways so manifestly unique that it is a difficult partner in any comparison.
Thus, this study refrains from including the Israel/Palestine in the list of candidates for intensive
cases studies.
Second, Egypt and Tunisia should also both be singled out since these two regions
experienced exceptional political autonomy from the beginning of the modernization process in
the Middle East: the beylik of Tunis from 1705-1957 and Egypt under the Muhammad Ali
dynasty from 1805-1952. Each had its own local, although not native, ruling dynasty as well as
an independent bureaucracy and army. Given that the model of these autonomous structures
were to a very large degree similar to Ottoman institutions, and that these two places also shared
a common Ottoman political culture, they are certainly comparable with provinces that were
under more direct forms of Ottoman control. In fact, in many ways these two cases probably
most closely resemble modern Turkey's inheritance given that an independent bureaucracy and
army were in place in all three places. These cases will therefore be retained.7 1
II. Research Design and Theoretical Expectations
The bulk of my research centers on detailed investigation of three country-level case
studies: Turkey, Greece, and Egypt. The selection of these cases seems peculiar at first glace,
but it abides by the following logic. First, the study of Turkey represents the natural starting
point for any investigation of post-Ottoman politics. The bureaucratic and cultural center of the
Ottoman Empire and the seat of the Islamic Caliphate both became part of the territory of
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modem Turkey. In Turkey, therefore, breaking with the Ottoman past and building mass
compliance for a new regime is believed to have been particularly difficult-hence the barrage of
glorifying myth-histories on Ataturk's accomplishments. When judged against the other
founding regimes in the region, the secular revolution in Kemalist Turkey was remarkably
successful, and has led to a high degree of state sovereignty over disciplinary institutions by the
standards of most former Ottoman states. As mentioned in the introduction, still today policy
makers cite Turkish modernization and secularization as a model to be emulated. These factors
make Turkey both a critical case and one with immense policy relevance.
Greece and Egypt were selected on the basis of their potential to yield powerful and
generalizable causal insights through two sets of paired comparisons with Turkey. The selection
of Greece and Egypt also helps "rule-out" some plausible alternative explanations for why
secular revolutions succeed or fail in achieving state sovereignty over education and law. Casting
doubt on alternative theoretical explanations through case selection is particularly important in
qualitative studies based on thick-description where the rigorous "testing" of multiple theories is
infeasible.
The first comparison "set" leverages the method of agreement to uncover why two
countries in the region that ostensibly share very little in common, Turkey and Greece, both
succeeded in achieving sovereignty over schooling and law, thereby laying the foundation for
state sovereignty and control. Greece and Turkey differ in terms of religion, size, class structure,
and timing of independence from the Empire. These differences immediately cast doubts on
plausible alternative explanations that rely exclusively on the role of Islam, structural variables,
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or the nature of late Ottoman reforms.
A second comparison then utilizes the method of difference to juxtapose the inductive
findings produced in the Greece-Turkey comparison with the Egyptian case. Turkey and Egypt
share many key features -both are large, Sunni Muslim majority states highly influenced by
Sufism and dominated (at least until recently) by a powerful military class- but the outcomes of
their secular revolutions have been markedly different. Whereas Turkey largely succeeded in
forging mass compliance with new institutions and gaining exclusive state-sovereignty post-
independence, Egypt remains hobbled by the persistence of powerful religious challengers to
state sovereignty. From the reign of Nasser on, successive Egyptian regimes have attempted
various strategies to end the destabilizing political dynamics of legitimization-secularization
spiraling; none succeeded. The harder the Egyptian state fights to impose its sovereignty, the
harder various religious factions hit-back with moves to undermine state authority.
Table V combines the logic of case selection with information from the literature review
presented in the previous chapter to show exactly why the study of Turkey, Greece and Egypt,
when taken together, challenges many theoretical expectations.
[Insert Table V. about Here]
The information in Table V by no means decisively proves that any of the theories listed above
are false or entirely incorrect. What it does suggest, however, is that these theories cannot be the
"whole story" when it comes to explaining the success and failure of secular revolutions in the
former Ottoman world.
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The remainder of this chapter serves to contextualize the case studies that follow. Late
Ottoman history has been written many times and in much greater detail elsewhere; the objective
here is thus not to present a exhaustive account of late Ottoman governance but to provide
necessary background for readers not familiar with the region or period. Beyond these basics,
the other objective of the historical overview below is to take a deeper look at the millet system
and paint a generalized picture of everyday life for Ottoman subjects. The hope is that the
descriptive information will give readers a feel for the types of differences that set the Ottoman
world apart from the Western Europe experience, as well as the similarities within the Ottoman
world that render many former Ottoman cases comparable.
III. Ottoman Governance
In order to administer the Empire's expansive territorial holdings, Ottoman sultans
gradually developed a complex system of government that combined elements of theocracy,
hierarchy, centralization and tradition.72 The result was a "patrimonial state" radically different
both from early European governments and modern states as we conceive of them today. At the
center of this government was the Sublime Porte (Bab-i Ali) and its scribal service. The Sublime
Porte was a large administrative organization headed by the Sultan, who in turn was assisted by
the Grand Vizer. The power of the Sultan was immense and governance of the Empire was thus
often a product of his personal discretion. Surrounding the Sultan was an elite Ottoman ruling
class, called the askeri. The askeri class was created by the state and its members were so
dependent on the Sultan for their status that they were essentially a slave-servant elite. This class
included officers of the court, the army, civil servants and the ulema (or ilmiye), a corps of
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learned men who had been formally trained in Islamic theology and law.73
The nature of pre-capitalist social formation in the Ottoman Empire is the subject of a
heated, and largely inconclusive, historical debate which is well beyond the objectives of this
chapter.74 Nonetheless, A few words should also be said about macro-level socio-economic and
class structures, especially since they form the backbone of many Marxists and society driven
explanations of state formation and modernization trajectories in Europe.75 At the most basic,
there is general consensus that the Ottoman experience was indeed distinct from that of Europe.
For one, under the initial Ottoman timar system there was no land-based aristocracy, for the fief
holders (sipahi) were a military-service gentry who were paid by the state only indirectly in taxes
collected from peasants. This created the inverse of developments in Europe. Ergn Ozbudun
describes Ottoman realities well:
Instead of economic power (ownership of the means of production) leading to
political power political power (position in the state bureaucracy) gave access to
material wealth. The wealth thus accumulated, however; could not be converted
into permanent economic assets, because it was liable, both in theory and in
practice, to confiscation by the state.76
Furthermore, as Karen Barkey has illustrated, the Ottoman's unique predicament can largely be
traced back to the inertia of tax farming practices that crytalized in the 18 th century. The
Ottoman practice of granting life-term tax-farming contracts created an elite class that were
rentiers, as opposed to the financiers that emerged in France and England. Overtime, large tax-
farmers delegated financial and administrative power to local notables, which deprived the state
of the ability to negotiate directly. For these reasons, unlike England and France, the Ottomans
never succeeded in centralizing tax farms "into one large, bureaucratic entity with increasingly
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refined modes of collection and control."77 Attempts to circumvent tax farmers through direct
taxation also failed. As Barkey writes:
... when they [the Ottoman state] tried to bypass the tax farmers and hire an
entirely new staff of salaried officials (muhassils) to go to the provinces to collect
taxes instead of the tax farmers, they had practically no success. There were not
enough officials ready to accept a salary and collect taxes, and the tax farmers
were certainly not willing to relinquish their positions to become salaried
officials.78
This was especially true since many tax farmers themselves were already members of the
military or somehow affiliated with other branches of the Ottoman elite.
As a result, we do not see the emergence of the bourgeoisie, or its functional equivalent,
that is so central to Barrington Moore's classic story about the path to modernization in Britain.79
This observation is also echoed in work by Hanioglu, who writes that:
. . .the comparison with Europe underscores the weakness of industry, the
consequent lack of an industrial working class, and the failure of a vital
bourgeois class to emerge in the late Ottoman Empire. .. Whereas the emergence
of a bourgeoisie and industry in such European countries as Great Britain and
Belgium was a result of unplanned economic, social, legal, and intellectual
developments, Ottoman administrations set out to create them.
The "creation" of a new bourgeois class that Hanioglu mentions went part and parcel with a
violent shredding of the traditional Ottoman social fabric and an elimination of diversity. This
will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 6. For now, the point is that class-based theoretical
accounts of European modernization are not easily transported to the Ottoman context.
Turning now to the "masses" (reaya), the expansive geography of the Ottoman state
means that demographic generalizations should be issued with caution. That said, some basic
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observations can be made. The subjects of the empire included a mixture of landed peasant
farmers, coastal fishing communities, urban merchants and petty tradesmen, and, though to a
much lesser extent in the late periods, pastoral-nomadic tribes. Among all of these groups
literacy rates were very low. For example, in Anatolia, even as late as the 1910, it is estimated
that only 15% of the population could read and write.8' Demographically the population was
spread between provincial cities, market towns and small villages. Cities and towns were
divided into relatively self-sufficient neighborhoods, which typically congregated around
religious sites (mosque, church, tarikat, synagogue). Village life resembled the neighborhood
structure. 2
Most importantly, the subjects of the Ottoman Empire included followers of three of the
major world religions (Islam, Judaism and Christianity), which were, in turn, each divided into
various denominations, branches and sects. Ottoman attitudes toward minority groups prior to
the 19th century Tanzimat reforms were embodied in the early Islamic notion of zimmi/dhimmi
(literally, a "protected person"). As zimmi non-Muslims subjects of the Ottoman empire were
guaranteed protection and the freedom of worship in exchange for "an inferior status which
included humiliating disabilities and the payment of an annual capitation tax". 3 In terms of
general administration, it was part organically and part by design that the millet system emerged
as the institutional means used by the Ottomans to manage the complexities associated with
governing the Empire's diverse religious groups.84 Although our historical knowledge is still
limited, it appears that the system began as an informal set of arrangements that operated
primarily at the local level only to later be formalized and recognized with 19 century reforms. 85
In many ways, the ruling class also considered the Sunni religious community to be a millet in
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its own right, albeit one that was not subjected to the same discrimination suffered by Christians
and Jews. For this reason it is important to provide some background information on the official
religious establishment linked to Sunni Islam (the ulema) and on the organization and status of
the other confessional communities. After discussing the structure and function of religious
institutions and elites, I draw some general conclusions about the role of religion in everyday life
in the Empire and what that meant for post-Ottoman state-building. I conclude with a brief
discussion of Ottoman decline and the issue of research methods.
IV. The Ulema
The ulema played crucial roles in the official Ottoman ruling apparatus since the Empire's
formative years. Arguably the ulema was the most independent section of the ruling class, for
the Sultan derived and maintained his legitimacy through the performance of religiously valued
functions, and thus was somewhat beholden to these religious leaders. Led by their most
powerful and prominent member, the Seyh-all-islam (the chief Mufti), the ulema were responsible
for teaching religion, upholding the 3eriat (the holy law of Islam) and preserving imperial
tradition. One of the most important avenues through which the ulema lent legitimacy to the
office of the sultanate was through its pronouncements at mosques during the Friday prayer.
Furthermore, Ottoman military campaigns and foreign interventions were nearly always
accompanied by afetva (fatwa, legal opinion) issued by the Seyh-all-islam that provided religious
justification for the war.86 Ottoman rulers organized the ulema and their duties under a robust
and hierarchical structure referred to at the ilmiye. Figure II. depicts the structure of the ilmiye
hierarchy in the classical age.
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[Insert Figure Two About here]8
The ulema also found themselves occupying a position in the upper-ranks of the social
hierarchy by virtue of the group's unique economic situation. According to Zilfi, "by the 18 th
century an ulema aristocracy, its members strikingly similar in parentage, had settled into place."
88 Still, the religious "aristocracy" was not completely impenetrable to outsiders. Many men of
modest origins entered the ilmiye and rose to the top ranks, making it an attractive pathway for
upward mobility.89 The ulema's comparative economic security and wealth derived from several
factors. For one, they were exempt from taxation and their properties were rarely seized by the
state. Furthermore the ulema's economic fortunes were cushioned by the so called arpahk
allowance they could receive for overseeing judicial-religious affairs at the local level. Finally,
the ulema could provide for their daily expenses and sustain wealth through their official
oversight of vakiflar" The Vakif institution, deriving from the Arabic term waqf (pl. evkaf ) and
normally translated roughly as "pious foundation" is widespread in the Islamic world. Stated
simply, it refers to "revenue-bearing property that is withdrawn from commercial transaction and
is made inalienable for some beneficent end ... the property is said to belong to God, and its
revenue is assigned for some religious or charitable purpose"." The ulema's ability to maintain
and transfer property, and thus income and wealth, across generations through the vakif
institutions that they supervised and administered bestowed them with a great advantage over
other segments of society.
Under the ulema were also various ranks of judges know as kadi who were assigned
regional posts in rotation and practiced a combination of secular law (kanun) and the eriat
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(sharia). Kadis were responsible for regulating and registering all "property transactions, leases,
legal documents, money lending agreements, commercial transactions, and tax payments; they
also announced and carried out Imperial and local government orders" and supervised certain
public services.92 The religious class also directed, monitored and taught in the Empires'
network of Koran schools and medreses.93 As ismail Kara then fittingly argues, it is difficult to
overestimate the extent of ulema's influence simply by virtue of the fact that they exercised
authority and/or maintained a presence in so many realms of society and governance.94
Whereas the Ottoman ilmiye hierarchy was concentrated in Istanbul around the Aya
Sofia, Suleymaniye, Beyazid and Fatih mosques, Egypt was home to its own Islamic religious
establishment centered around the al-Azhar mosque and center for Islamic learning. Although at
the height of the Ottoman occupation Turkish-speaking Ottoman ulema members dominated
some of the highest ranking judgeship positions in Egypt, al-Azhar's size and stature grew
remarkably under the Ottoman occupation. Ethnically, the ulema class in Egypt was relatively
homogeneous, the vast majority of members being Arabic-speaking Egyptians (with smaller
numbers from Syria and the Maghreb). Over the course of the eighteenth century, as Ottoman
influence ebbed, the position of Shaykh al-Azhar (the supreme leader of al-Azhar) was founded,
signaling the strength, autonomy and budding hierarchical organization of the Egyptian religious
establishment.95 Like the Ottoman ulema, their Egyptian peers were engaged in administering
education, courts, and the evkaf (charitable foundations) throughout the centuries.
A few words should also be mentioned about the large presence of "religious orders" in
both Ottoman Turkey and Egypt, which somewhat offset the clearly structured hierarchy of the
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Ottoman and Egyptian ulema. Also referred to in the literature as Sufi orders, brotherhoods, or
tarikats, the rise of large-scale religious orders began sometime in the 12 th and 13 centuries.
Although Niki Keddie's claim that "nearly every urban adult male in the Ottoman Empire in the
eighteenth century belonged to a Sufi order," is probably exaggerated, these institutions were
wildly popular and cast a wide net across Ottoman and Egyptian society.96
In the Ottoman period tarikats (literally meaning "way" or "path") congregated around
building compounds known as a tekke or dargah. In most cases the shaykh, or the spiritual
master, of the main dargah appointed the meshayikh (shaykhs) of the other, smaller, branches.
The moral authority of the shaykh derived from his perceived role as an heir of the Prophet and
representative of God on earth and his interpersonal connection with this disciples. 97 The
brotherhoods fulfilled a variety of functions: religious, social, charitable, intellectual,
psychological, and sometimes political. The most important Sufi orders in the Ottoman Empire
were the Mawlawiyya (mevlevi), the Nakshbandiyya, the Djilwatiyya (or Djelwetiyye in
Turkish), the Khalwatiyya (Halveti), the Bayramiyya, the Kadiriyya, the Rifa'iyya and the
Bektashiyya.98 In Egypt the Shadhiliyya, the Ahmadiyya, the Burhamiyya, the Rifa'iyya, the
Qadiriyya, the al-Bayyumiyya, and the Khalawatiyya all had a sizable presence at one point or
another.99
As H lya KUgtk points out, each order was "distinguished by its particular rituals far
more than by its doctrine."100 Above all, the tarikat's diverse functions and malleable
institutional structure also allowed them to develop a certain closeness with the masses and to
adapt to very different social environments. For one, local shaykhs and meshayikhs tended to be
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less rigid and dogmatic than the ulema in their religious teachings. Whereas the learned ulema
studied and practiced a textual based Islam that was prohibitively difficult for the illiterate mass
to grasp and relate too, the tarikats made religion more approachable and "human" through ritual
practices that included music, dance and the veneration of saints.' 0' Furthermore, in many cases,
shaykhs were thought to possess magical powers and the ability to preform miracles, which
made them even more revered.
It is extremely difficult to generalize about the links and tensions between Sunni
"orthodoxy" and Sufism given the complex and subtle ways in which the two overlapped. Many
members of the Ottoman and Egyptian ulema themselves belonged to religious orders.
Furthermore, in some areas, it was normal for an individual to be initiated into multiple orders.
It is equally difficult to generalize about the relationship between the various religious orders and
governing authorities.o 2 Although tarikats' often claimed to be politically neutral, by virtue of
their ability to draw-in and command the masses, they had an inherently political dimension and
function. Throughout the Ottoman period tarikats' intimate link with the masses made them a
potent source of potential collective action: they motivated soldiers, mobilized armies of their
own and they were occasionally used by the Sultans to shape public opinion. As Karen Barkey
points out "The Sufi orders -some of which were heterodox in belief- were probably the most
potentially organized force in society and were neutralized by the state either through co-option
of their leadership or through the counterforce of the Sunni religious establishment."' 03 Even in
Kurdish regions with strong tribal loyalties, the religious orders played a significant role. As
§etmsaya writes, in Mosul "the structure of tribal leadership gradually became intertwined with
Sufism so that shaykhly families came to exercise both religious and world power on a
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hereditary basis."10 4 The religious challenge in both late Ottoman Turkey and Egypt thus
extended beyond the official ranks of the ulema to include the more amorphous networks of
religious orders.
V. The Autonomous Confessional Communities
Whereas the ulema and tarikats were the dominate forces of moral authority in
predominately Muslim areas, the Rum Orthodox (or "Greek"), the Armenian and the Jewish
millets all had semi-autonomous religious establishments of their own. At the top of the Rum
millet was the Ecumenical Patriarch, who was granted official leadership over the entire
Orthodox Christian population of the Empire through an Ottoman berat issued by Mehmet II in
the 15thcentury. 105 Centered in Istanbul, the Patriarch initially held administrative authority over
the Empire's entire Orthodox population regardless of ethnicity, language, etc. One could be
Serb, Bulgarian, Greeks, Vlach, Orthodox Albanian or Arab and still be under the thumb of
Ecumenical Patriarchate, the Holy Synod and the high seats of the Orthodox ecclesiastical
hierarchy. Diversity thus characterized the Orthodox Christian subjects of the Ottoman Empire;
but atop this diversity sat a rigidly organized, hierarchical institutional establishment. The older
sees of Alexandria, Antioch, and Jerusalem all came under the authority of the Patriarch in
Istanbul. Figure III depicts the hierarchical structure of Orthodox religious institutions.
[Insert Figure Three About Here]
The institutionalized power of the Patriarchate in Istanbul meant that the church and
religious elites as a whole took on functions and positions of authority that they had not
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previously enjoyed. As Runciman remarks, "The Muslim conquest had not resulted in the
disestablishment of the Church. On the contrary, it was firmly established with new powers of
jurisdiction that it had never enjoyed in Byzantine times."106 These new powers descended down
to the local level, as the church and village community functioned as the centers of education,
language acquisition, and more. Some bishops were even uncomfortable with their new found
responsibilities.107 Bishop Theophilos of Kampania complained in his Nomikon of 1788 that,
"At the times [sic.] of the Christian Kingdom (alas) ... prelates governed only the priesthood
and matters of the church and did not interfere with the civil ones ... But now ... the prelates in
the provinces accept the mundane lawsuits and trials, for inheritances, for debts and almost all
that deal [sic.] with the Christian civil law."' 08
Indeed, in Ottoman times, Orthodox church officials consumed much of their time with
legislative and judicial activities that revolved around family law. Although family law is
typically thought of in the context of the sharia and Islamic culture, it also played a major role in
lives of the Ottoman Empire's Christian population. By the 18' century, the jurisdiction of
ecclesiastical courts had spread to include all of personal Law. The clergy also helped preside
over civil, criminal and commercial law cases when Christian parties were involved. Religious
elites even issued new legislation on some issues.'09 Cases involving the institutions of trachoma
(a type of dowry) and trimoiria (a class of inheritances) became particularly burdensome for the
clergy. Trachoma refers to the gift of money given from a brides family to the groom. The
institution of trachoma differed from the traditional dowry (proika), which was sanctified by the
church and usually gifted in the form of immovable property. The key distinction between the
dowry and trachoma (both of which existed at the time) was that, in the case that the husband
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deserted his wife, the dowry had to be returned in full whereas the trachoma did not. Many a
Greek families found themselves destitute and bankrupt after loosing their life savings in a
marriage gone bad. Much to its own dismay, the Church found itself responsible for adjudicating
the windfall of disputes between families over issues of trachoma (as well as dowry) and began
issuing Canonical Edicts to impose regulations and order on these practices." 0 Similar steps
were taken with respect to trimoiria (inheritance) institutions, which had become equally
unruly."I
Although the Orthodox millet clearly then did enjoy a great deal of autonomy and
responsibility at the local level, the Patriarchate was ultimately beholden to the Sultan, and was
thereby forced to curry the favor of Ottoman officials. Gradually this process of currying favor,
which began with elaborate gift-giving practices, evolved into a semi- institutionalized system of
office buying, in which various bishops would collect money from the masses in order to
compete amongst one other and gain "preferred status" from the Ottomans. A small group of
Greeks, as the wealthiest and most populous group, dominated this competition, which
eventually led to deep resentment among lower level religious officials and the masses. It was,
after all, the Christian masses who had to actually cough-up the money to fund this elaborate and
deeply corrupt religious popularity contest. Understandably, such a system paved the way for
internal divisions. Eventually, when the Orthodox Church began to fracture with the declaration
of an autocephalous church of Greece in 1833-which was in turn followed by similar
declarations by Serbia, Rumania and Bulagaria as well as tension between the sees of Jerusalem
and Constantinople- it broke along the already well-defined lines of the hierarchy established
under the Ottomans." 2
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Armenians followed the Greeks in receiving their own millet for community organization.
Although the Gregorian Apostolic church was formally Orthodox like that of the Greeks, its
members preserved Armenian traditions, religious beliefs, language and rituals and thus refused
to submit to the authority of the Greek dominated Ecumenical Patriarchate. Instead, the
Armenians pressured the sultan to recognize them as an autonomous group, eventually receiving
such status in 1461 when Mehmed the II authorized a separate Armenian Orthodox community
organized under the chief bishop in Istanbul." 3
The Jewish community of the Ottoman Empire was a diverse group, including but not
limited to Romaniotes/Griegos Jews who used Greek as their secular language, Musta'rab Jews
who had adopted Arabic, Ashkenazi Jews who had fled Europe and Sephardic Jews from Spain
and Portugal. Unlike the Gregorian Apostolic Armenian and Rum millets, the Jewish millet
initially took shape not as a single unified institution headed by a predominant religious leader
but rather a conglomeration of smaller self-governing congregations organized into kahals that
were only to coalesce gradually over the centuries. In small towns and villages there were only
single kahals; but in large cities with significant Jewish populations such as Istanbul and
Salonika, there were numerous kahals, each of which had their own chief rabbi, synagogue,
hospital, cemetery, schools and slaughterhouse. Locally elected rabbis in turn acted as the
mayors of the individual kahals. In addition to his role as a spiritual leader, rabbis were normally
also the chief educator, directing primary and higher education, and the head of the religious
court (Bet Din). Thus, while individual kahals certainly retained a degree of local particularity,
the more general imposition of Jewish law, customs and regulations across kahals meant that
common practices of governance contributed the Ottoman Jewish community's sense of oneness.
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In terms of economic considerations, it should be added that like the ulema and the
Christian clergy, that rabbis were exempt from most Ottoman and Jewish community taxes.
Furthermore, as evidence from Jewish community budgets in Izmir and other locations
demonstrate, community payments for the maintenance of the rabbis (in the form of salaries) and
their courts often far exceeded the amount payed out to the poor or even to civil clerks." 5 Thus,
rabbis enjoyed not only religious and civil authority but also found themselves in a comfortable
economic position relative to other members of their community.
VI. Religious Authority and Everyday Life
The further intricacies of the Armenian and Jewish millets are beyond the scope of this
project and shall not be dealt with here; however these cases do help to illustrate the central
theme of this chapter, which should by now be clear. Whether one be a Muslim, Christian or
Jew, religion played a large role in everyday life via numerous institutional channels.
Furthermore, religious leaders enjoyed protected positions in the Ottoman administrative
structure, which riefied their own authority as the well as the differences across religious groups.
For the individual Ottoman subject, religion was an almost omnipresent source of
authority. In most localities, religious communities would live together in neighborhoods and
have their own schools, hospitals, charitable organizations and public infrastructure. As Stanford
Shaw writes, "Whether in religion or economic regulation, justice, education or social security,
or cleaning and lighting the streets and putting out fires, the subject managed these affairs
through these self-governing entities directed by their religious leaders. . .". 116 At the local level,
the priest/rabbi/imam/sheik not only exercised this kind of spiritual and civic leadership but also
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acted as the intermediary between the village or neighborhood and upper religious leaders, who
in turn oversaw control of larger towns and served as a connection to the higher-up Ottoman
authorities. In all Ottoman territories, then, religious authorities operating at the village and
town level enjoyed significant power and influence. These religious individuals acted as a liaison
between the millet and Ottoman administrators and were responsible for the distribution of state-
lands, tax collection and general order and security."7 As a result, an individual could hardly live
his or her life without coming into contact with religious authority at some level on a regular
basis.
Deference to religion, religious elites and religious boundaries was a widespread norm,
not only habitual but largely unquestioned. Religion forged a division between groups that was
at once both formal and informal, both obvious and subtle. Barkey persuasively argues that
Ottoman administrative practices played a strong role in delineating collective identities. She
writes that
because religious identity determined a persons' legal and political status,
boundaries and belonging were essential; . . . Social boundaries existed between
religious communities, in which people knew where they belonged, were clear
about their religious identity, and entered into relationships fully cognizant of
who the other was, and what was expect of him or her. 118
The ascriptive identity markers used to signal one's religion varied across the expansive
geography of the Empire; but these markers extended well beyond phenotype or dialect, which
were often ambiguous and thus uninformative. In some areas, for example, Jews and Christians
were forbidden from wearing the color green and/or from wearing any type of white head gear
that might be mistaken for a turban. In the bathhouses of Aleppo different sets of towels were
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used to identify one's religious faith. Similarly, in the bathhouses of Cairo, Christians and Jews
were required to wear a special color string or a religious amulet to signify their faith when
clothing could not do this job. As Bruce Masters illustrates in his book on minorities in the
Empire, there existed "a sartorial code whereby one would often know what faith the person
approaching on the street professed. Simply put, you were what you wore." 1 9 Whether getting
dressed, attending school, or paying taxes, an inhabitant of the Ottoman was continuously
reminded of his or her religiously defined "place" in the system.
Although it would be completely unwarranted to assume a single, uniform model of
interaction between state, religion and daily life across the Empire-for variations did exists-a
clear pattern that transcends many regional differences can be discerned: members of the
religious establishment of all three major faiths possessed tremendous moral and spiritual
authority. Religious elites were deeply embedded in governmental, legal, economic, educational
and social institutions-many of these institutions being the exact same ones that we today
associate with the modern nation state. As a result, when the secular state sought to achieve
uncontested sovereignty over education and law it confronted two obstacles: First, the state had
to displace the local religious elites who controlled these functions and had been empowered by
the millet system for centuries; second, the state had to convince the masses, who were long
accustomed to the primacy of religious authority, that the authority of the nation state was now
superior.
VII. The International Context and Ottoman Decline
The system of decentralized governance based on autonomous religious communities that
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I have described above served the Ottomans well for centuries; but as the Empire faced growing
threats from outside, strategies that had been once been beneficial for governing such a wide
territory became increasingly disadvantageous. Military setbacks in the 17 th and 18 centuries
had created a prolonged crisis in Ottoman state authority, resulting in the emergence of a new
alliance between the ulema and the military class of janissaries. The janissaries had provided for
Ottoman power, literally from the barrels of their guns, while the ulema provided ideological
legitimacy and local administrative authority. By the beginning on the 19* century, the
janissaries began to lose their influence as a result of economic constraints and the development
of superior military technologies in Europe. It was not so much that the janissaries became
weaker but rather that European forces became much more powerful.
As a result of this military inferiority, the Ottoman Empire found itself in dire straits: the
Hapsburgs had claimed Belgrade, Napoleon landed in Egypt, Wahabbis were gaining strength in
the Hijaz, and Ali Pasha of Janina was launching rebellion from what is now Greece. Multiple
failures by the janissaries in the face of both rebel insurgents and organized European armies also
resulted in autonomy for lower Greece and Serbia. Gradually, it came to be realized that if the
Empire was to survive, it would have to adopt "western" strategies. The root of the Ottoman's
problems went much deeper than a simple lag in military technologies and organization. Sakrn
Hanioglu describes the depth and interconnectedness of the Ottoman modernization dilemma
beautifully:
The old order, under new circumstances, no longer afforded a cost-effective
solution to the problem of ruling over a vast empire; it reduced the center to
penury and powerlessness. Defense of the empire in the age of modern warfare
demanded a large and professional army and navy equipped with advanced
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weaponry; the maintenance of such military focus depended on effective taxation;
and effective taxation was not commensurate with the rule of local notables.
Instead it required an effective, centralized bureaucracy-hence the centralizing,
bureaucratizing impulse that runs as a common thread through late Ottoman
history.120
The Janissaries' military impotence and prolonged recalcitrance finally spurred Sultan Mahmut II
to have them systematically eliminated through massacres and replaced by a modern army in
1826. Ottoman governance was in a period of fast and furious reform. Sultan Mahmut's actions
paved the way for a period of sustained legislation and restructuring under Abdulmecit known as
the Tanzimat-i Hayriye "Auspicious Re-orderings", which attempted to modernize the Ottoman
state, centralize Ottoman administration over its territories, and increase direct state participation
in society.
What is more, the institutional reforms brought about with the Tanzimat also sought to
fundamentally alter the Ottoman state's relationship with its subjects. Up until this point,
Ottoman subjects had never been granted "rights" beyond those guaranteed to Muslims by
Islamic law and the so-called "protective" status of the autonomous confessional communities
mentioned above. In conjunction with his Westernizing reforms, Abdnlmecit declared through
the Hatt-i Serif of Gulhane in 1839 that all Ottoman subjects, whether Muslim or non-Muslim,
also had secular rights that transcended any religious, ethnic or linguistic affiliation. Many have
interpreted this declaration of "secular" rights as a factor that weakened the autonomous
religious communities grip on power; however quite the contrary was the case, for it was with
the Tanzimat that the millet system actually became more clearly defined and formalized.m'
Schroeter puts it eloquently, showing how Tanzimat reforms
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... created two opposing and essentially incompatible models of the relationship
between religious groups and the state. One model, derived from European
notions of a civil society, saw individuals, regardless of religion, as citizens of the
nation-state-all having equal rights based on secular, universal principles. The
opposing model, derived more from the theoretical construct of the Islamic polity
than from Western principle, formalized the new relationship between the state
and non-Muslim communities by reifying the separate, group identity through the
millet.122
The paradoxical result was that new policies intended to alleviate segmentation actually only
served to further reinforce existing divisions.
Ultimately, Ottoman reforms were cut short by the demise of the Empire itself. Internal
and external threats had overwhelmed the Ottoman state: it was fighting a rear-guard battle
against the various nationalist independence movements that had sprouted up within its borders
while at the same time facing European imperial ambitions that threatened the Empire from the
outside. Throughout the late 19th and early 2 0 th century, financial crisis, domestic revolt and
great-power rivalry, ultimately culminating in vast territorial losses after World War I, led to the
Ottoman Empire's collapse. This final chapter in Ottoman history came to a close with the 1919-
23 Turkish War of Independence, which resulted in a Kemalist victory against Allied plans to
partition the remains of the Ottoman state. It was in the wake of this Kemalist victory that the
Sultanate was abolished and the new Turkish Republic was born.
Given the gradual and tumultuous unraveling of the Ottoman state over the course of a
century, it would be disingenuous to borrow the logic of statistical inference and describe the
Ottoman collapse as an "exogenous shock." There is no quasi-experimental setting to be
manipulated here. To try to impose one upon such a complex situation would be clumsy, not to
mention the definition of bad science. Throughout the study that follows, it will be important to
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keep in mind that each state under consideration has a history of its own characterized by unique
conditions and events.
Still, acknowledging that histories are in many ways unique does not mean that they are
not comparable. "[C]omparative historical analysis," writes Skocpol "serves as an ideal strategy
for mediating between theory and history."123 Working in an intellectual tradition that is
probably most accurately labeled "comparative historical sociology", this dissertation
emphasizes the understanding of processes over time. In the chapters that follow systematic
comparisons make it possible to locate common processes. Locating common processes then
helps to identify the key factors and contexts most determinative of a state's ability to execute a
successful secular revolution and establish exclusive sovereignty over schooling and law.
Macro-level comparative arguments at the country level are anchored against more fine-grained
evidence drawn from the local history of religious regulation, schooling and legal reform in
Turkey, Egypt and Greece.
In summary, this historical overview of Ottoman administration has outlined some of the
major structural constraints that came to characterize post Ottoman paths to statehood in the 19 th
and 2 0th centuries. At one level, there were constraints and tensions that developed between the
Western European example of statehood and the legacies of Ottoman imperial administration.
The countries carved out of Ottoman territory were born into a world system in which the
ideology of the secular nation-state had come to dominate. Western European states had
simultaneously become increasingly secular and increasingly powerful. Europe's unparalleled
military prowess meant that the European state structure was viewed as model to be mimicked, a
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blue-print to be followed-that is, when it was not enforced directly through the barrel of a gun
by European colonial powers themselves.
Even if the regimes in former Ottoman countries did not aspire to Western ideals or
standards, military realities left them with little choice. Reform or perish was the dilemma of the
day. Thus, Ottoman institutional legacies and the demands of state sovereignty and survival
were in great tension with one another. Powerful European states had, almost by definition,
succeeded in gradually disenfranchising (or at least subduing) their religious elites; in former-
Ottoman states religious elites' privileged position (and moral authority) had been crystallized by
the millet system and religious identities were still very much "live" and "politically charged".
The ability of former Ottoman states to achieve sovereignty over the disciplinary institutions
central to the production of state authority was thereby contingent on striping religious elites of
their worldly authority (and customary roles) without provoking the ire of a deeply religious
populace. The next chapter, which explores the religious roots of the secular state in late
Ottoman and Early Republican Turkey, provides an example of how such a feat could be
achieved.
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Table IV. Political Programs of Secularization by Country
Greece: Bavarian Regency under King Otto
(starting -1832)
Turkey: Kemalist Rule
(starting -1923)
Albania: Ahmet Zogu (King Zog)
(starting -1925)
Tunisia:
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Nasser's Free Officers
(starting -1952)
Habib Bourguiba
(starting -1957)
Ba'athist Rule
(starting -1963)
Table V. Case Selection and Theoretical Expectations
Theory Challenge
Islam impedes secularization Turkey: (Muslim majority country with
(e.g. Huntington 2006) successful secular revolution)
Strong military can force centralization/secularization Greece: (had extremely weak-almost non-
(e.g. Tilly 1992) existent-military the time of secular
revolution)
Turkey and Egypt: (had comparably sized
armies at independence / Egypt had larger
army in the 19 t' century 124 )
Extractive capacity helps states centralize / secularize Greece: (very week revenue collection
(e.g. Levi 1988) capacity at time of secular revolution)
Late Ottoman Turkey: (failed to centralize
revenue collection/went bankrupt)
Non-hierarchical religious establishments harder to Greece, Turkey, Egypt (all had defined
silence/bargain with/secularize religious hierarchies)
(e.g. Kalyvas 2000) Turkey, Egypt (both had large and diverse
presence of sufi religious orders, which
could undermine heirarchy)
Tanzimat Reforms in late Ottoman Turkey paved the way Greece (dropped out of the Empire long
for a secular state before Tanzimat was imposed)
(e.g. Lewis 1968)
Assertive secularism prevails if there is an ancien regime Impossible to characterize former Ottoman
(e.g. Kuru 2009) states as having or not having an ancien
regime / Former Ottoman states with a
religious majority all try to impose
assertive secularism
Class structures/ Pre-capitalist social formation determine Ottoman Empire and successors exhibit
modernization trajectories. weakness of industry, lack of an industrial
(e.g. Moore 1966) working class, and the failure of a vital
bourgeois class to emerge (see below)
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Chapter 3
The Religious Roots of the Secular State in Late Ottoman and Early Republican Thrkey
This chapter offers a detailed historical study of how the relationship between state-
builders and religious elites shaped the transformation to modem state institutions made in late
Ottoman and early Republican Turkey, focusing specifically on the period between roughly 1895
- 1924. The objective here is to bring the general theory presented in the previous chapters to
life by identifying the actual actors of interest (reformers and religious elites) in the Turkish case
and providing empirical evidence of their preferences. As the actors are introduced and their
preferences outlined, historical sources and some basic statistics are also used to trace strategic
interaction between these two groups with respect to state centralization of schooling and law, as
well as the creation of a bureaucratic ministry whose objective was to regulate religious leaders
and their practices.
Through this discussion, I present an argument for why Mustafa Kemal's founding regime
was able to assert control over institutions of schooling, law, and religion so decisively in the
1920s. Secular-minded Ottoman reformers working in the late 19th and early 2 0 th century had
grand designs for a total makeover of society based on a high-modem (rational, positivist,
scientific) ideology of social order and control. Yet these reformers lacked the resources, man-
power and expertise to immediately turn their ideas into action. A lack of manpower for initial
reforms drove these early modernizers to offer religious elites incentives in exchange for their
assistance/cooperation in the state centralization and secularization process. To use the language
of chapter one, a lack of manpower created patterns of reform based on the piecemeal co6ptation
religious elites. Reformers' successful co-optation of some segments of the religious
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establishment in this early period set religious institutions on a self-undermining trajectory. Over
the course of several decades the religious establishment became fraught with internal divisions,
hemorrhaged expertise and ultimately became so weak that it was extremely vulnerable to
outside attempts to dismantle it. Put simply, early Ottoman reform strategies caused the religious
establishment to cultivate the seeds of its own demise, making it impossible for religious elites to
collectively defend themselves against the Kemalists' aggressive designs for social change and
"secular revolution" in the 1920s.
The bulk of this chapter documents the precise historical mechanisms through which
religious institutions became self-undermining in late Ottoman Turkey and thus susceptible to
change in the Kemalist period. Whereas most histories of modern Turkey reflect the religious-
secular cleavage currently dividing the nation and interpret modernization as a force entirely at
odds with the religious establishment, this chapter provides an important corrective to such
trends by asserting that modern Turkish history must be written to include religious elites and
their institutions rather than in spite of them. Instead of centering the story of Turkish
modernization on the Kemalist phenomenon and its accoutrements, I focus on critical historical
antecedents from late Ottoman history. Specifically, understanding changes that occurred during
the reign of Sultan Abdiilhamid II and later with the Committee for Union and Progress (CUP)
are essential to understanding Turkish state-building. Thorough histories of the Abduilhamid's
rule and the Committee for Union and Progress have been written before, so there is little need to
rehash the same observations here. Instead, it should suffice to provide brief historical
introduction and then jump directly into the question of the CUP's objectives as a political
movement and the obstacles that it faced.
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I. The Young Turks
In its final years the Ottoman Empire was beleaguered by external threats and convulsed
with mounting internal tensions and political chaos. Bankrupted by its war in Russia, the Empire
also had to confront Austrian rule in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the French occupation of Tunisia, the
British occupation of Egypt, conflicts with nearly all the Balkan states and mounting domestic
tensions among minority groups such as the Albanians and the Armenians. In the words of
Mithat Snkrii Bleda, who came to play an influential role in late Ottoman and early Republican
politics, "the 600 year-old Empire was tottering like gigantic plane tree with a rotten trunk.""
Sultan Abdilhamid II., who ascended to the throne in 1876 at the young age of 34, came
to power in the midst of this storm, inheriting a host of political and fiscal problems. Ruling as
an absolute monarch for 30 years, the Sultan managed to make great strides towards centralizing
the empire and developing modern infrastructure. The blunt edge of the Sultan's autocratic
approach was in part softened by his appeal to conservative Islam and his alliance with the
certain elements of the conservative ulema and other shaykhs. Yet iron-fist tendencies and a
penchant for the brutal suppression of potential opponents earned him a good number of
enemies. While discontent with the seemingly endless military campaigns and economic crises
brewed among the lower ranks of the bureaucracy and military, organized opposition to the
Sultan and his policies began to take shape. 26
It was under these conditions that Young Turk movement appeared on the scene in the
late 19 * century. Historians trace the Young Turk movement, the organization from which
Committee for Union and Progress eventually emerged, back to 1889, when it began as an
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intellectual opposition to the regime of Sultan Abdnlhamid II based out of the Military Medical
School at GUlhane. Slowly, the organization spread, with some members fleeing to Paris, Cairo
and Athens in order to avoid persecution by the Sultan, who had become aware of a conspiracy
forming against him.' Pamphlets and periodicals decrying Hamidian rule proliferated from
these emigre outposts.128 These early Young Turk writings exhibited a commitment to the ideas
of Social Darwinism, materialism, positivism and elitism.129 Furthermore, this emerging
bureaucratic and intellectual elite was becoming increasingly influenced by the anti-religious
ideas that were circulating in Europe, as evidenced by their strong belief in the power of
importing secular Western institutions of education and law, whether wholesale or in some
variant." 0 Not all Young Turks were necessarily anti-religious and some even tried to bridge the
gap between Islam and materialism in their writings-but anti-clericalism was rampant with in
their ranks. As the historian SUkra Hanioglu has astutely observed, there was a growing
sentiment within CUP circles that the ulema's social position and its role in state affairs should be
substantially curtailed."'
It is also important to make clear from the outset that the CUP was a clandestine, not a
populist, organization. Membership was by invitation only.'32 The vast majority of CUP
members were Muslim, with a large number coming from either Macedonia or Istanbul.
Although precise membership figures are difficult to come by, there is evidence that by 1908
numbers were somewhere in the low thousands. 3 Socio-economically speaking, members'
backgrounds varied. This diversity in part stemmed from the fact that the Young Turks ideas
came to fruition and circulated most widely at the War College in Istanbul, where tuition and
board were free, providing an avenue for upward mobility."4 This observation also brings us to
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the most importation characteristic of the CUP movement: it was a militarized political
organization where the overwhelming bulk of its members were army officers.
Like any political faction, the CUP exhibited internal disagreements, certain ideological
inconsistencies and a zigzagging political evolution. Nonetheless, what cannot be disputed is
that the preferences and goals of individual CUP members, and by extrapolation the movement
as an aggregate actor, were intimately linked with the organizations' militaristic character and
composition. The organization's self-proclaimed immediate goal was the reinstatement of the
constitutional monarchy that Abduilhamid II had abolished. Yet research into CUP members'
memoirs, biographies, and published letters as well as official CUP publications reveals that one
objective trumped all others: the desire to preserve an effectively centralized independent state
regulated by law and order with the military as its ultimate protector."' In his dairy, Enver Papa,
a leading figure in the movement, fittingly describes an event that occurred while serving in the
16 th Cavalry Regiment in Uskiip that alerted him to the importance of constructing a state in
which order and the rule of law prevailed:
Once I had to order an imprisonment charge against a man because he failed to
turn up to duty. Here, I was forced to change my previous beliefs, because
apparently, it is not correct to assume that civil servants will work voluntarily. If
it was, there would be no need for laws and the punishments they contain.
Therefore, in order for government to function properly, before anything else, it is
essential to implement the law, word for word."
The immediate means for creating order would be military action; over the long term, however,
this militarily imposed order was to be sustained by the systematic disciplining of the masses
through an effective system of law and education. In the words of historian the Sinan Meydan:
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The Young Turk intellectuals viewed themselves as "elitists" maintaining order in
society. Until society had obtained a certain degree of political maturity, they
would show society the correct path and steer it in that direction. In short, they
would shape society from the top-down ... in other words, they would engage in
social engineering. 137
The linchpin of the CUP's approach can be summarized as the imposition of a centralized and
hierarchical and sovereign authority structure that would allow them to achieve and maintain
both military and political dominance over the empire.
Resource Constraints: Reformer's Moral Authority and Manpower Deficit
In July 1908, the Committee for Union and Progress effectively transformed itself from a
mere opposition organization into a formidable force in Ottoman politics with the so-called
Young Turk Revolution. It can hardly be said, however, that the revolution and first round of
victorious elections that followed provided the CUP with a free hand to rule as it saw fit. There
were major impediments to the actual implementation of the CUP's agenda. The organization
lacked, to a certain degree, both the moral authority and the material resources necessary for
running a state. The CUP was not unaware of the fact that it lacked the type of widespread, mass
credibility needed to completely take-over control of the Empire. After all, prior to the
revolution the CUP had been a secret society-albeit a growing one-that trumpeted elitist, not
populist, political ideals. Hilseyin Cahit Yal9in, a Unionist Deputy from Istanbul and prominent
journalist, recalled the CUP's predicament thus:
This country could not have accepted a young man without rank, decorations, a
beard, glory and reputation, rising to the Grand Vizierate. Since the public
opinion of the country was such, and since the Young Turks themselves were made
up of the same stuff if would be unfair to blame them for not assuming power ...
In July 1908, the CUP could not make a captain or a major Minister of War, not
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Talat Bey, a head postal clerk, Grand Vizier. Conditions and circumstances made
this impossible. . . If this in fact had happened, anarchy would certainly have
broken out in the country.'"'
The tangible counter-part to the CUP's deficit of moral authority was the fact that it also
lacked actual manpower, organizational capacity and institutional presence. As mentioned
above, the CUP had begun as a relatively small umbrella organization harboring the various
groups formed in opposition to the Sultan, meaning that its internal organizational structure was
weak and its scope was limited and uneven, with most active CUP centers located in the
Macedonian provinces.' 3 9 Obviously the organization had a strong foothold in certain military
circles, namely the 3rd Army in Macedonia. The CUP's more general material authority,
however, was in dispute, and it did not control institutions of law and schooling to the extent
necessary to fully and irreversibly institutionalize its power. Military coercion might force
temporary compliance, but the CUP sought to construct a modern, ordered and disciplined
society. To this end, control of education and law were crucial and the CUP did not enjoy such
control.
Just what was the CUP up against in its bid to centralize and dominate education and
law? Historical sources reveal that the task facing the CUP was daunting. To begin with
schooling: The first seeds of reform and centralization had been laid as early as the Tanzimat and
were accelerated following the Ottoman Education Regulation of 1869, which was modeled on
the French experience.140 Safvet Pasha, the Minister of Public Education in 1868-69 even
enacted a policy of sending temporary instructors to Koran schools in an attempt to train local
teachers from the religious establishment in modern methods. Likewise, in 1892 Abdilhamid 1I
made an aborted attempt to bring the medreses under more formalized state control.14' But these
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strategies to reform religious educational institutions from the outside by converting them into
secular establishments were remarkably unsuccessful; and the futility of such an approach
prompted reformers to start designing their own primary schools.' The upshot was the birth of
the new ibtidai mektebi/Mekatib Iptidaiyye, or state primary/elementary school, in 1872 and a
continued policy of benign neglect toward the medreses throughout Abdulhamid II's reign.'"
Attempts were made to multiply the number of these new primary schools in the decades that
followed, but such efforts were far from complete by the time the CUP came onto the scene.
In an ideal world we would have precise data tallying the number of Koran schools vs.
state-run primary schools for the period of interest. From these figures, it would then be possible
to calculate the scope of institutional penetration of both the "state" and the religious
establishment in the field of education.'" In fact, this was the research strategy I tried to employ
when first undertaking the study of this case. A closer investigation into the actual nature of late
Ottoman schools puts a wrinkle in such a seemingly straight-forward approach, for the
supposedly dual-nature of late Ottoman education is more of a myth than a historical reality.
Modernizing reforms through collaborative layering from 1872 onwards blurred the distinction
between "secular" and "religious" institutional structures. Despite the tendency in the literature
to refer to the schools founded by the Ottoman state in the late 19 th and early 20 century as
"modern", "secular" and/or "Western", these new institutions are actually not so easily
distinguishable from the schools run by the religious establishment. 4 Toward the end of the
Hamidian period, the term ibtidai mektebi, which is often used interchangeably with the terms
"modern", "secular" or "state" schools in the secondary literature, was actually also the standard
term for traditional Koran schools in many official government documents. Such ambiguity
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makes it impossible to distinguish traditional schools from state-schools in many official records.
This " .. .usage of the term ibtidai mektebi both for Koran schools as well as for government
schools in official documents," argues this historian Akin Somel, is "related to the 'historical
relict ' of considering primary education as an integral part of religious instruction." 14 6
More than just a historical relic, however, one of the primary reasons for the blurring of
the lines between religious and "state" institutions in the field of education during this period
resulted from the severe shortages in civilian-trained (i.e. non-religiously trained) teachers. The
Ottoman state, and equally then the CUP, did not have at its disposal a cadre of qualified
civilians capable of instructing even primary school students. This can be illustrated by the
following figures compiled by the Ottoman statistical office for the year 1897/8 (1313). The
total number of "state-founded" schools is listed as 29,081; consisting of 55 "high schools"
(Mekatib-i idadiyye), 412 "middle schools" (Mekatib-i Rflydiyye) and 28, 614
"primary/elementary schools" (Mekatib-i iptidaiyye). However, the same records do not
indicate there being anywhere near an adequate amount of teachers to fill these schools: the total
number of teaching staff and other personal was listed as only 3,613! Furthermore, the number
of students enrolled at the Empire's 14 training programs for elementary school teachers
(Darulmuallimin) was only 277 that same year, meaning that a new crop of available teachers
was not on the horizon. 4 7 Even by the year 1905-6, when the number of teacher training
schools had increased to 32, there were still only 1,000 projected graduates. 48
The Ottoman state and foreigners too were well aware of the manpower predicament. An
1888 document by the Ottoman Commission for Education reported that
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. . .regarding the appointment of individuals capable of teaching in the new
method, because of serious concerns about empty teaching slots and the absence
of teachers, recourse has to be taken by continuing [to appoint] those with
traditional training in existing methods.' 9
Grace Ellision, a renowned British journalist who was one of the only Westerners given
permission to report from behind enemy lines during the Turkish War of Independence, made a
similar observation several decades later, remaking specifically on the Turks unwillingness to
employ use foreigners to staff state institutions.
The Turk to-day, whether he can, as he says he can, or whether he cannot, as the
foreign school says he cannot, declares himself the best person to undertake
education 'They haven't enough teachers!' says the foreigner. 'We will have.' the
Turk replies '... in the meantime we will manage the best we can. "O
Teachers were not the only thing in short supply. Sufficient building space was equally
difficult to come by. In his extensive history of Turkish education, Ergin claims that "there had
never been a time when there was so much disarray and such a need for buildings" as then at the
turn of the century. "Especially following the 1908 revolution," he writes "buildings that were
supposed to alleviate the immediate need for new schools were not built nor were there budgets
allocated for such an effort." As a result, "schools, big and small, were forced to meet in rental
homes, ruined barracks and police stations." 1 In other instances, neighborhood mosques or
abandoned churches were temporarily turned-into schools.s 2 It is apparent then that, in the
period when the CUP rose to power, mass education exhibited a certain make-shift quality. Our
typical, modern idea of a school with its well equipped, spacious classrooms and neatly aligned
desks was not the norm-even in the so called "state" and "secular" schools. Early modernizing
reforms were collaborative reforms, that layered "new" and so-called "secular" institutions onto
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existing religious institutional structures.
In the legal realm too, centralizing reforms had only come so far by the end of the 19 *
century. Experimental reforms in the Tanzimat era that were, again, modeled after the French
system, initiated the institutional antecedents to the development of the nizamiye"' court
institution as separate from the sharia courts. Fueled by the work of prominent reformers, such
as Ahmet Cevdet Paga, these developments culminated in 1879, when a Code of Civil Procedure
and Code of Criminal Procedure (which were almost exact translations of their French
counterpart) were finally introduced into, and thus solidified, the new nizamiye system." These
codes were a milestone in the centralization of the legal apparatus in that they substantially
limited an individual judge's discretion by creating a uniformity of procedure that did not exist
for the religiously trained kadi operating in sharia courts. 1878 also marked the opening of the
first Ottoman Law School (Mekteb-i Hukuk) designed to train judges and lawyers for the
nizamiye courts.
Still, the beginning of the new nizamiye system did not immediately herald the end of the
traditional sharia courts and religious legal order. In fact, over the course of the late 19 th and
early 2 0th century, the two sets of institutions coexisted simultaneously and with significant
overlap as a result of reform via collaborative layering. Data derived from the catalog of
Ottoman court records shows that in 1908, the year of the Young Turk revolution, 121 of the 166
established judicial centers for sharia law (73%) were still producing bound volumes of witness
testimony and judicial verdicts, meaning, of course, that they were still active and hearing cases.
By 1922, however, that number had dropped to 32, meaning that only 19% of these centers were
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still active.'55 The interesting question then is not How did Mustafa Kemal close the sharia
courts in 1924 ? but rather How were these courts successfully phased out in the period before
he rose to power?
To summarize, the standardization and centralization of schooling and law were
underway but far from complete when the CUP leadership assumed power in 1908.
Furthermore, the religious establishment had retained a substantial foothold in both sets of
institutions since initial reforms were largely collaborative and co6ptative, building new
institutions on the edge of traditional structures. Given the CUP's determination to impose order,
centralize control and eradicate the influence of intermediary power-brokers situated between the
state and society, the question of what was to become of the sizable religious elite populating
Empire and its key bureaucratic institutions loomed large. Keeping in mind the CUP's
preferences and the obstacles that it faced in the pursuit of its goals, I now turn to examine the
other side of the equation: the nature and preferences of religious elites in the late Ottoman
period.
II. The Religious Elite: Identity, Motives and Preferences
The religious establishment in the late Ottoman period can be characterized as a rather
heterogeneous mix of official ulema members organized under the Office of the Seyhnllislam as
well as informal sheikhs and hocas from the various religious orders, with substantial cross-over
between the "formal" and "informal" realm. Precise numbers for the religious establishment as a
whole, and even the formal ulema, are difficult to come by. Still, some data from 1913 helps
provide a sense of what the organization looked like, at least in the eyes of the Ottoman state.
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Generally speaking, ulema members were separated into the subcategories of kadi (Islamic
judge), miftai (legal official working at the district level) and naib (lower ranking judicial
officials). In the year 1913 the Empire was divided into the administrative units listed in Table
VI.
[Insert Table VI. About Here]
Based on the Ottoman policy that each vilayet, liva and kaza have both a kadi and a miftal, and
that each nahiye have a naib and a maiftal, we can assume that some 3,278 upper-level ulema
members were, at least in theory, on the state's books.156
What this figure does not take into consideration is the number of medrese instructors,
talebeler/softa students, imamlar (prayer leaders), malezzinler (call to prayer reciters), and
Hafizler (Koran reciters). Again, precise numbers are elusive but some basic estimates are
possible. First, in 1892 Ottoman authorities estimated the number of medrese students in the
capital alone to be near to 12,000, a sizable number indeed. 5 7 And, by another estimate the
combined number of imamlar, malezzinler and hafizler empire-wide was 188,000.158 Surely then,
the religious elite was more than a mere nuisance for secular-minded reformers; it was a potential
breeding ground for collective resistance to the forces of state-centralization that had to be taken
very seriously.
When investigating religious elites' motives, we find that concern over career
advancement and promotion were a central part of the lifestyle for many ulema members. As
Table VI. demonstrates, there were monetary incentives for moving up in the ranks, as well as
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the allure of increased prestige and influence. Promotion was function of training, experience in
lower-level positions and the extent of one's connections within the establishment. 5 9 From a
compilation of the career biographies of nearly 2,000 ulema members from the final decades of
the empire, we find that promotions and rotations are a frequent occurrence in the ulema
lifestyle. 6 0 Yet the serious financial crisis besieging the Empire in this period had dried up many
of the sources of funding for religious causes and institutions, which in turn came to imperil the
avenues that had been traditionally used by religious functionaries to rise up the ranks. Nowhere
was this reality more clearly reflected than in the rapidly deteriorating conditions at the centers
for higher religious learning, the medreses. According to Ismail Kara, "Medreses had serious
problems that stemmed from their own foundation and internal workings," the most detrimental
of which were the institution's "inability to renew itself as needed and ... needing to seek
external support to ensure its existence and status."' The ulema's resentfulness over the fact that
funds were being channeled away from religious centers of learning and, instead, toward secular-
sponsored education projects, is exhibited in their initial resistance to the opening of a new
university for social sciences and humanities. Interestingly, most of these complaints subsided
once it became clear that the university would be recruiting heavily from the ranks of the
religious elite for qualified teachers.6 2
Like the ulema, the leaders of religious orders and brotherhoods were equally concerned
with being able to at least maintain the basic functioning of the institution that provided them
with their daily bread. In many cases, we find that a simple desire to maintain their current
position, which most often also entailed preserving the institution to which they belong, trumps
other ideological or political preference. To illustrate, an empirical example of such logic
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emerges in the story of a certain medrese educated affiliate of a Mevlevi dergah in Beyazit,
Istanbul, Veled Qelebi Izbudak. Veled Qelebi had originally backed the CUP and the dergah with
which he was affiliated had even been the site of CUP gatherings and meetings. But Veled
§elebi eventually attempted to cut his ties with the local CUP branch not because he necessarily
disagreed with their cause or politics, but because he resented the fact that they did not pay
proper attention to the upkeep of the dergah.
The CUP had a couple of branches in Istanbul and one of those branches was
ours. We met in Dervig Kemalettin Bey's house, which was across from the House
of Zabtiye Naziri Ziya Papa in Beyazit, since it was the safest location. The police
wouldn't go in there. They couldn't hear us from the windows. Since our postman
Bedevi Sheikh Naili Efendi was incredibly brave, he was undeterred from leaving
Meyveret newspapers that came from Paris and other circulating [CUP] writings
in the dergah. The dergah was investigated after they [Ottoman authorities]
suspected a letter coming from Europe. Although they tortured the sheikh and his
brother in various ways, they did not give us away....
....CUP members liked me and I saw respect from them too... But they weren't
interested in the revitalization of dergahs. Whatever I attempted, they always
changed the subject by kindness and rewarding me with badges and medals. A
couple of times when I insisted further they threatened me ... Since some of my
wishes were not met, I [tried to] resign.63
As this passage reveals, and as we will see in greater detail below, the primary preferences of
religious elites lay not in some fundamental, religiously dictated distaste for modernization and
progress, but in a more basic desire to preserve their own position in society, their institutions
and their livelihood.
III. Religious Legitimization: Courting the Masses and the Religious Elite
The CUP, above all, wanted to centralize the state and impose stability and order through
modernizing reforms; the religious establishment, for its part, was concerned with retaining its
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position and status in society and remaining active in the fields of education and law as the
arbitrators of public morality. Given these sets preferences and the obstacles to state
centralization outlined above, how did relations between the CUP and the religious establishment
unfold?
The first and most obvious observation to be made is that the CUP extensively used
religious language and rhetoric to broaden its mass appeal, to placate the religious establishment
and to try to win over certain elements of the ulema. The CUP leadership wanted to make allies
with members of the religious establishment for its own political purposes but had absolutely no
intention of letting religious figures assume a dominant role in the centralized state structure.
The CUP's general approach to the religious establishment can thus be described a two-pronged
strategy that involved offering kind words and tangible incentives to those religious elites who
complied with their authority and working to marginalize and discredit-and in extreme cases
exterminate-the elements of the religious establishment that it could not co-opt.
$iikra Hanioglu has aptly described the CUP's "ideological flexibility"-or perhaps
cunning is the more correct term-as a "revolutionary tactic", arguing that the organization "told
diverse opposition groups whatever they wished to hear... For devout Muslims, it was a Muslim
organization piously striving to change the regime in accordance with the hadiths. "64 In CUP
publications, evidence to this effect abounds. Despite the fact that CUP leaders tended to be
ideological positivists/materialists seeking the secularization of the state, in public arenas they
often claimed to be better Muslims than the Sultan-Caliph himself. In short, the CUP leadership
embraced religious discourse out of recognition that bringing Islam onto the CUP's side-or at
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least not totally isolating it-was necessary for political success.
Murad (Mizanci) Bey, who was initially based out of Geneva, stands as one example of a
CUP opposition member who blended his politics with Islam and Islamic rhetoric in the years
prior to the Young Turk Revolution. Born in Tiflis and educated in Russia, he taught history at
the Milkiye before devoting his attention entirely to the opposition.'65 He gained much of his
prominence in the movement through the publication of his journal Mizan (Balance), the
popularity of which stemmed from the fact that it placed a strong emphasis on the role of the
Caliphate and the Islamic nature of the Empire.166 In a pamphlet written in French, entitled "La
Force et La Faiblesse de La Turquie", Murad provided an extensive argument outlining why
Islam was not to blame for the Empires' failures. He argued that Islam was by nature a liberal
religion, both in its mentality and its politics. In the past, according to the "old" and "true"
Islam, it was possible to engage in free and open debates. To demonstrate the inherently modern
aspects of Islam Murad even went on at lengths to explain how the Cartesian method had
actually been conceived of by great Islamic thinkers centuries earlier with the concept of
"tatbiki." The problem, according to Murad, was not religion; it was the Hamidian regime,
which "was violating not only those in favor of freedom but also the praise-worthy efforts and
integrity of conservatives as well."167 The CUP opposition's center in Istanbul also circulated
appeals in which it cited ulema support in an effort to further to legitimate its cause:
Thank Heaven, our cry has not been in vain. Now the time has come for the good
news. We have all understood that the greatest enemy of the Islamic and Ottoman
world is the great assassin Abd-ul-Hamid and his crew . .. brothers, most of the
ulema of our faith and the chiefs of our army belong to our Society, they share
our ideals and aspirations . . . We have obtained from the ulema a fetva
authorizing the destruction of the traitors. The ulema of the four sects agree that
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the strife is lawful in order to free our faith and state and country. They have
given us the permit of victory. The victory will be ours, for God is the helper of
the oppressed."'
Likewise, we find similar accusations casting Abdilhamid II as an enemy of religion in the
writings of Abdullah Cevdet, one of the most stringent positivists of the period who later became
known for his atheism, published in his journal Osmanli in 1898.
Sultan Hamit is Godless ... He disbanded the counsel parliament. Sultan Hamit
is a heretic for he gives himself the title "righteous" while it is a blasphemy to
call a contemporary sultan "righteous ", as is established by sacred fatwa. He is
engaging in intense blasphemy by partaking in the holy and high title and saying
"I'm the benefactor of the people.'"
This claim that the "true" Islam had become corrupted by indolent hocas and fraudulent sheikhs
and the demand that this situation be rectified was also a constant feature in 5'ura-yi Ommet
(Council of the Muslim Nation), another popular Young Turk journal. 170 In the pages of this
journal, even Ahmet Riza, who is typically branded as a rigid positivist in the historical literature,
claimed that Islam itself presented no direct obstacle to successful modernization and was not
"the enemy of a republican regime". 17 1 In a piece published in La Revue Occidentale Ahmet
Riza even likens the Caliphate and the ulema to a constitutional monarchy, citing the fact that the
ulema have the right to overthrow the Caliph if he violates the law.172 For Riza, it was not Islam
itself, but its degradation at the hands of irresponsible leaders that was the true barrier to
progress. 173
IV. The Absence of a Unified Religious Front
The CUP's attempts to leverage religious moral authority for its own political gain was no
doubt facilitated by the fact that the religious establishment failed to take any clear or unified line
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of action in response to CUP's initiatives. In the period leading up to 1908 we find that as a
result of early reform strategies, the religious establishment had become almost endlessly
divided, both within the official ranks of the ulema and at the local level among the various
tarikats, tekkes and and sufi orders. On the one hand, numerous members of the ulema served as
advisers to the Hamidian regime, and were thus closely aligned with it.'74 Sheikhs from the Arab
world and the Maghreb were in particularly close alignment with the Sultan.' Abdulhamid II
also won the favor of numerous ulema members through the allocation of generous funds for the
building and restoration of mosques and religious sites.'76 Such gestures made him popular with
numerous low-level ulema members in the provinces, who interpreted these improvements as a
sign that Hamid was indeed committed to preserving the livelihood of the religious class. 177
On the other hand, members of the ulema were also at the forefront of the opposition
movement against the Sultan, backing the cause of modem reforms. For example, the Egypt
branch of the CUP was actually under the effective control of conservative religious forces from
1886-88: prominent ulema members such as Hoca Muhiddin and Hoca Kadri came to assume
leadership roles and were backed by a flock of religious pupils from the famous center for
Islamic learning al-Azhar. The dominance of these religious figures created a large degree of
ambiguity; up until 1898 the Egyptian society claimed at once to be both a CUP affiliated
opposition movement and a "society composed of ulema and students (talebe-i ulum)", as
professed through its official journal Kanun-i Esasi (Constitution).7 "' Another prominent ulema
member Ubeydullah Efgani also repeatedly stood up against fellow clerics who attempted to
denounce CUP activities.'79 Finally, there is evidence that, during a trip made to Istanbul prior to
the Young Turk revolution of 1908, CUP members Talat Bey and Karasu Efendi were engaged in
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meetings and negotiations with a number of prominent members of the ulema.'80
As for the Sufi orders, generally speaking heterodox groups tended to side with the CUP
and more Orthodox and conservative factions supported the Palace, though this is not a
generalization that should be seen as set in stone. The Bektashi"', Melamis, Mevlevis, Badawi,
Khalwati, and S nbill orders, as well as elements of the Qadinyyah orders backed the CUP. The
level of backing varied by religious order and by location, but in many instances tekkes and
dergahs came to serve as functioning bases for Young Turk propaganda. Albay Hsamettin
(Ertairk), a member of the Bektashi order who also came to direct one of the CUP's affiliate
organizations the Tekilat-i Mahsusa describes the degree of collaboration between the religious
order and the Young Turks:
In Samatya the work of the sheikh of the Imrahor [dergah] was also impressive.
The sheikh of this dergah, Vehbi Efendi, who was from the law school, also had
relations with Paris. After they were excused, the students from the medical and
pharmacy schools would come to this dergah on Friday nights. It was in this way
that, secretly, they would procure newspapers and magazines. Especially our
hairdresser in Yenicami, Haci Haqim Efendi from the Bektaqi order was one of the
Young Turks. Huseyin Ulvi Bey, the son of the sheikh Mainir Baba of Sfitl ice
dergah, would shave here and would always bring newspapers. Haci Hagtim
would send these newspapers to Bektagi poet Harabi in the Merdivenkoy dergah,
and he would read it to the followers of the dervish lodge there.8
The more conservative Tijaniyyah, Sanusiyyah, Rifa'iyyah and Madaniyyah orders typically
allied themselves with the Sultan. The Naqshabandiyyah order too generally tended to the favor
the Sultan, though several prominent sheikhs deviated from this trend and backed the CUP, such
as Sevki Celaleddin who joined the Young Turk cause.'83 We also see that various active CUP
members were themselves affiliated with and openly supported different religious orders. Tal'at
Paga, for example, supported the Bektashi order" 4 and in Edirne, a religious figure by the name
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of Ipek Ibrahim Hoca was one of his close associates.185 Or take Naili Efendi, who was a
member of CUP's Istanbul branch in 1896 and was also a Badawi sheikh. 86
This is not to say that the religious orders and the ulema were entirely oblivious to the
need to put up a unified front against potential threats of the secular-minded CUP leadership. In
1911 an attempt was made to gather all the members of the various tarikats into one organization
under the name Cemiyet Sufiye (Society of Sufis). Yet this group failed to gain serious political
leverage on the account of the internal divisions and differences of opinion within in the Sufi
community. 8 7 Likewise, even in the wake of the Young Turk Revolution, when the secularizing
agenda of the CUP became increasingly apparent, the ulema itself remained divided. Some
religious elites forged strong ties with the CUP and even launched harsh tirades against their
religious colleagues and the very institutions in which they had been educated in trained. Other
religious leaders were more reluctant in their dealings with the CUP and remained highly
suspicious of the CUP's ultimate intentions toward the religious establishment. They conceded
that religious institutions needed to be reformed and were not opposed to modernization per se,
but they also wanted to maintain the ulema's dignity and position. Finally a much smaller but
vociferously defensive segment of the ulema advocated direct resistance to CUP policies.
Taking these divisions into consideration, it is entirely a-historical to speak of a religious
opposition unified against the CUP's modernization philosophy and attempts at state
centralization. This finding casts doubt on arguments that depict religion in general, and Islam in
particular, as inherently hostile to modernization and its agents. In fact, numerous sections of the
religious establishment were willing to walk hand in hand with modernizers, provided that their
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social position and status were not immediately jeopardized in the process. Ironically, it was in
part this willingness to embrace the modernists and modernization that ultimately weakened the
religious establishment as a whole in late Ottoman Turkey. As Ismail Kara has observed:
There were important consequences of the ulema moving away from an
oppositional stance, seeking a new identity in parallel with modernization, and
finding a new existence in fields foreign to their traditional area of competence.
First of all, the people and organizations that could oppose the secular acts and
thoughts of the sultan, bureaucracy and intellectuals weakened. In connection,
the ulema ' political and social place, activity and status fell behind that of the
intellectuals; they became followers as opposed to the leaders they once were.'88
Because immediate political conditions demanded that it do so, the CUP leveraged religious
moral authority, genuflected in the direction of religious sentiments and utilized religious actors
-all of which ultimately made it all the easier for the Kemalists to deal the religious
establishment a death blow from behind with its secular revolution upon independence.
Nowhere is this observation more clearly evidenced than in the divisions that beset the
religious establishment during the so-called 31" of March Incident (31 Mart Olay), when a
contingent of religious functionaries and army members marched against the capital demanding
sharia and attempting to unseat the CUP in the Spring of 1909. But before turning to the event
itself, it is necessary to provide some background about circumstances in the run-up.
V. A Widening Divide: The Religious Establishment and the 31V of March Incident
While the CUP fumbled to formalize its influence in the political arena with Abdiilhamid
II still on the throne, opposition to the Committee began to rear its head and political factions
opposed to the CUP's takeover and new-found influence began to consolidate. On 14 September
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1908 the Liberal Union (Osmanh Ahrar Firkasi), a liberal group popular with minorities and in
favor of decentralization-as opposed to the CUP's centralization policy-was founded.'89 And
on 5 April 1909 the Ittihad-i Muhammedi Firkasi (The Society of Muhammadan/Moslem
Union), a religiously conservative Islamic faction demanding the full implementation of the
sharia, also appeared on the scene. 90 The Society of Muhammadan Union was founded by a
man of obscure origins, Hafiz Dervig Vahdeti, who is believed to have been a salik (affiliate) of
either the Nakgibendi or Bektagi order. The Society's political objectives were pronounced in its
official publication Volkan.'91
The Muhammadan Union's leading man Dervig Vahdeti is thought to have been the
mastermind behind the 31st of March Uprising. Backing Vahdeti were a flock of lower-level
religious softa students and an army contingent. The softa students had been riled-up by rumors
that, as result of new CUP policies, they would no longer be exempt from military service. The
military men, on the other hand, had been irked by recent army purges launched by the CUP in
an effort to centralize control. Vahdeti and his followers marched on the capital demanding a full
implementation of the sharia. 9 2 Evidence suggests that the Liberal Union largely supported the
"religious" demonstrators. On the day of the uprising Prince Sabahattin even implied in an open
letter addressed to the army and the ulema that neither he nor the Liberal Union was actively
opposed to the uprising and that they would instead attempt to use it to their advantage. '9
Interestingly, despite the emergence of an "Islamic party" and the existence of a
"religious uprising" at this juncture in 1909, the religious establishment itself did not fully
coalesce behind either; rather, it remained completely fractured. And, while exceptions certainly
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did exist, the lines of these fractures began to take a somewhat clearer form. To begin with,
when it comes to the actual composition of the Muhammadan Union, it is curious to note that we
find no senior ulema members or kadi judges operating in the Society's central committee.194
Instead we find lower level religious functionaries, gerifs and sufi dervises as well as a handful of
low ranking civil officials and army officers. For example, the MU's Central Committee list
included imams and vaizes of several important mosques, a naib from a provincial city, sufi
derviges from the Halveti and Kadiri Orders, the son of a former Seyhuilislam, and a number of
retired military and civilian Pagas.1 95
This lack of distinguished ulema and kadi presence is not because the Society failed to
seek out the ulema's blessing. Attempts were made to contact ulema members in the provinces
and solicit their support.19 6 The organization's paper, Volkan, also repeatedly mentions the
Society's respect for the high-ranking ulema. On the day of the revolution, for example, the paper
ran a piece calling for the army to respect the religious establishment and the ulema class.
Here, just afew days ago, at what appeared to be a disciplinary meeting in a
barrack held at two or three in the morning, an officer advised his troops:
"Soldiers! You have seen these hocas with turbaned heads on these streets, have
you not? When we give the command, you will drive the ends ofyour bayonets
through them!!"
Could there really be someone giving such commands in the army? If there is, the
mistake is a rare one. Because in our country (millet), a soldier fights to become
either a martyr or a victorious fighter for the Islamic faith. Rather than
squabbling over land, a solider sacrifices for the lofty word ofAllah.
The ulema, who are turbaned, are the ones who will preach these facts and make
them known to the army. If the ulema suffer an affront in the eyes of the army,
what value will remain for the imams in the battalions and the muftis of the
regiments? If the soldier views the ulema as an enemy, how will the army's
spiritual force be sustained?m'
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Despite such appeals, it appears that many high ranking ulema members were simply opposed to
the MU's agenda, even though it centered on demands for sharia law. For its part, the religious
journal Srat Mastakim, stood behind the constitution and the CUP, calling the CUP an inorable
and sacred society. "1" Also, a piece that appeared in a journal fittingly named ittihad-i Islam
(Muslim Unity / Unity of Islam) several weeks before the uprising expressed alarm at how the
MU toyed with religion for political purposes and thus threatened Muslim religious unity.
Not long after the victory of the constitutionalists, some within our ranks deviated
and apparently formed a faction in the name of the Muhammadan Union. What is
the reason for this? What kind of movement is this that is against the community
of Islam which already falls under the name Community of Muhammad? Is this a
religious faction? If it is religious, then why have they deviated? If it is political,
is the mighty name of the Prophet just some toy?'
Other evidence of high-ranking ulema opposition to the incident abounds. Just two days after the
uprising the Islamic Society of Ulema (Cemiyet-i Imiye-yi Islamiye) released a statement
condemning the protesters. The Society demanded that the constitution be upheld and that the
army heed the advice of competent ulema members rather than follow fraudulent imposters.2 00
Likewise, the same organization's leading journal Beyanii'l-Hak decried the protesters, citing the
fact that such divisive behavior threatened to imperil the entire religious establishment and its
mission.
You all were out there demanding the sharia [and] we said: "that is our duty!".
But who knows with what intent and purpose you were told that the ulema isn't
protecting sharia, so rise up and demand it yourselves. But my children, let us
see, do you actually know what the sharia is? Is it not said that the sharia is
'finer than a hair sharper than a sword." Our homeland has fallen ill from the
damaging blows of an age of tyranny. It is virtually in the throes of death. From
all sides, enemies have fixed their gaze on us in anticipation. One doesn't partake
in such a noisy fracas with the most sacred of words, now, when the patient is on
his death bed. Do you know that, in our sharia, a point is made: when a sick man
110
is dying, you do not pronounce his last words for him! Are you paying attention
now!? The ulema says, "secure your position, then speak" . . What are we
working for, day in and day out? Why have we studied long and hard in the
Medreses? . . . today we will all rise from our deathbed together For that
reason, we shouldn't malign one another . . with you going in one direction, and
us going in another, our sharia will be torn apart and destroyed 20
Ulema members who also served as members of parliament such as Elmalil Muhammed
(Hamdi) Efendi, and Sahib Molla also stood behind the CUP, vociferously defending the
constitutional regime and advocating for the persecution those who participated in the March 31
incident.202
The CUP's response to the uprising was as swift as it was brutal, replete with arrests,
public-hangings and widespread, general repression. First, the Committee organized a
paramilitary force named the Action Army (Hareket Ordusu) that descended on the city and
effectively silenced the demonstrators in a matter of days. The uprising itself was then used as a
pretext by the CUP to justify purging opponents and ousting Abdulhamid II.
Although this crack-down against opposition was accomplished largely through force, the
demonstration of force alone could not legitimate the CUP or its centralizing mission. Moral and
cultural clout of the kind that could only be provided by religion also had to be exercised. The
CUP accomplished this through several avenues. First, the CUP was obliged to create an ulema
branch of its organization in order to demonstrate the seriousness of its commitment to the
religious establishment.20 3 Second, the organization maneuvered to acquire a fatwa providing an
official justification for Abdiilhamid I's dismissal on religious grounds. The text of the fatwa
was prepared by Elmali Hamdi Efendi. The Fetva Emini at that time, Haci Nuri Efendi initially
tried to resist signing it but he was cajoled into doing so, thus sealing Abdulhamid II's fate204
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To summarize, despite the ostensibly Islamic aims of the Mart 31 uprising, it seems that,
at its very base, the real subject of dispute was whether state administration should be centralized
or decentralized; for there were would-be winners and losers associated with each approach.
Otherwise, it is difficult to explain the strange merging of political bedfellows that led the
Liberal Union, a party backed by Christian and Jewish minorities, to support demonstrators
protesting for the full implementation of the sharia.
Upper-level ulema members with a secure position in the religious establishment's
hierarchy tended to view themselves as better off defending the CUP's modernization efforts and
the constitution, for they wanted to maintain their social status and position, which was still
possible in the current political climate as a result of the incentives being offered by the CUP
leadership in return for compliance. Put simply, upper-level religious elites were more
vulnerable to codptation. Ironically, then, many ulema members came out against low-level
attempts to agitate in the name of religion. Low level religious functionaries and students of
religion, on the other-hand, had much less to gain by siding with the CUP. The CUP was in
search of sources of legitimacy and these novices could not effectively offer it.
Furthermore, religious students and low-level functionaries saw the very institutions that
we supposed to afford them upward mobility being neglected, as upper-level ulema joined the
political fray. Lower level members of the religious establishment had no place in the new,
centralized state system from the outset, and thus they attempted to resist as the CUP tightened
its grip on power. This simple observation that some elements of the religious establishment
viewed policies aimed at centralization more favorably than others -and were thereby more
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likely to be co6pted- demonstrates that religious opposition to modem state centralization was
by no means a foregone conclusion. The issue is instead a matter of strategic consideration
regarding what one's own personal fate will be in a significantly more centralized, and state-
controlled political system.
VI. Reform by cooptation Continues: Coercion, Compromise and Cooperation
The 1909 spring uprising had served as convenient pretext, enabling the CUP to flush
many of its religious and non-religious enemies alike from the corridors of power. For the time
being, the opposition had been effectively silenced. The CUP had also significantly expanded its
reach and augmented its membership figures. "By late 1909, the number of CUP branches across
the empire had multiplied from 83 on the eve of the revolution (several of them minor cells) to
360, while membership had grown roughly from 2,250 to 850,000." 205 Still, the committee's
control over key segments of the bureaucracy, including law and education, remained far from
complete, and thus its strategic courtship with the religious establishment continued in earnest.
For one, even though the constitution (Kanun Esasi) had been reinstated, the reforms of
1909 made the document substantially more "Islamic" in both tone and content than the 1876
original. For example, an alteration to article 10 added a reference to sharia in connection with
the lawful reasons for arrest and a change in article 118 made Hanafifiqh a major source for new
legislation.2 06 For the most part, such references were mere window dressing aimed at making
the constitution acceptable to a public that was deeply religious and to the supportive sections of
the ulema, who the CUP was still reliant upon for legitimacy and support. Elmalh Hamdi
Efendi, a member of the ulema and the Parliament who also sat on the 1909 reform commission,
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portrayed the situation as follows:
... Everyone knows that a government, an administration or a code of law that
did not assume the guise of the sharia would not last long. Therefore . .. the
sharia embraced freedom and constitutionalism as its grand love... It was said
that the constitution was in compliance with the sacred sharia. Immediately, it
was welcomed and defended. Without a doubt, a constitution that was not
wrapped in the cloak of the sharia would not have received respect nor endured.
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Facade or no facade, this approach did garner success, as is reflected in the large number of
religious figures who lined-up in support of "constitutionalism" and went to great lengths to
justify the new constitutional regime in Islamic terms. Musa Kazim, who later served as
Seyhulislam, claimed that the "The constitution is nothing but the embodiment of some parts of
the fundamental provisions of the Koran." And Omer Ziyaeddin dedicated an entire volume to
demonstrating the Constitution's conformity with provisions of the sharia. 208 In the context of
late Ottoman modernization, the concept of constitutionalism thus came to acquire a distinctively
Islamic bent.
As has been demonstrated, the CUP was not only cognizant of the strength of the general
public's religious ties; from the outset the organization had been privy to the fact that religion
could serve as a powerful psychological and symbolic force capable of cementing the bond
between itself and the masses. By virtue of its lack of moral authority, CUP leadership not only
attempted to counter the influence of the religious establishment with threats and force, they also
vied to claim a share of the symbolic power of religious institutions through the clever and
calculated use of Islamic rhetoric and logic to defend the CUP's political agenda. Because the
CUP was not yet recognized by the masses as having any real independent moral authority of its
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own, the organization largely opted to meet the old religious system on its own terms in hopes of
successfully co6pting its elites and usurping its following. Demanding outright that people
exchange religious ties for state ties was out of the question, for it would have undoubtedly been
met with widespread resistance. Fusing religious imagery, symbolism and structures with the
CUP agenda, on the other hand, offered a viable alternative.
Furthermore, because the CUP lacked "capacity" and resources in the sense that its
administrative and bureaucratic penetration was weak, piggy-backing on the religious
establishment had tangible advantages that extended beyond mere symbolic clout. Evidence
below will demonstrate that the CUP used religious elites to staff the very institutions that they
hoped would one day be the machines of centralized state control and sovereignty for the simple
reason that few other qualified candidates existed. Forging this link through the codptation of
religious elites required the CUP to make a number of compromises that ran contrary to the
organization's "positivist" and "secular" ideological principles. These compromises and
overtures directed toward the religious establishment were, in principle, not necessarily ones that
the CUP wanted to make. Rather, the organization's primary objective of state centralization
necessitated a calculated collaboration with religion that was both rhetorical and material. The
rhetorical compromise helped the CUP to win moral authority in the eyes of the masses and the
material compromise via co6ptation unwittingly helped the CUP to mitigate the ability of the
religious establishment to act as a united force of resistance against centralizing reforms.
The religious establishment, for its part, was certainly not looking to forfeit authority to
civil control. Yet, because religious elites were primarily focused on narrow and individualist
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goals, the religious establishment as a whole failed to grasp the larger reality of how piecemeal
cooperation of some individuals could make everyone vulnerable to manipulation. For both
parties-and to the detriment of the religious establishment-shortsighted decisions had
unintended consequences. A continuation of modernizing reform via co6ptation had further
deepened existing splits and cleavages within the religious establishment and eventually
facilitated the states' capture of religious institutions.
VII. Understanding Incentives: Embedding Religious Elites in the New "Secular" System
The previous pages have repeatedly mentioned that in addition to the calculated use of
religious rhetoric, certain material incentives were being directed toward the religious
establishment in an effort to co6pt them and thereby secure their compliance with centralizing
reforms. The section that follows will show that such incentives took the form of offering
religious leaders secure positions in the new, centralized, and ostensibly "secular" institutions of
education, law, and politics. It is difficult to assess whether these incentives were part of a
conscious policy on the part of the CUP leadership to integrate religious elites into the system
and thus defuse a source of potential resistance or whether these incentives emerged as a result of
the fact the CUP was, in many ways, begrudgingly reliant on the religious establishment for
furthering its goal of centralization. The truth probably lies in the gray-area somewhere between
these two interpretations. Regardless, the availability of new professional avenues for traditional
religious elites in the early reform period facilitated co6ptation and prepared Turkey's founding
Kemalist regime for a successful secularizing revolution by setting the religious establishment
onto a self-undermining trajectory. The sections that follow briefly describe the process by which
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religious elites became integrated into new institutions of schooling and law, and how, as a result,
the coherence of religious power was gradually undermined.
Schooling: Religious Elites as the Pillar of a New "Secular" System
The CUP did its fair-share of grandstanding about the necessities of instantly reforming
all primary educational facilities to meet the standards set by the French and other major
European powers. In its political platform of 1908, the CUP makes specific reference to the
reform, centralization and proliferation of mass education in article 17, which stipulated that "all
schools should come under the control of the state" and exhibit "unity and order".20 9 Yet the civil
staffing shortages and lack of infrastructure described above rendered the immediate
"secularization" and "centralization" of schooling physically impossible, which in turn meant
that late Ottoman schooling took-on a hybrid-like quality placing it somewhere in-between the
traditional Islamic Koran school on the one side and the modem, state-run classroom on the
other. Such a transitional step in the development of centralized state control of education was a
necessary comprise that many CUP members would have rather avoided. Nonetheless, I argue
that this short-term and, in the eyes of the CUP, less-than-optimal solution, actually went on to
serve the interests of the state and its centralizing agenda.
Just how deeply embedded members of the ulema became in the state-built educational
apparatus as a result of co6ptation is demonstrated by the positions that they held in the new
bureaucracy. Ottoman statistical data in the form of the Salname (yearbook) show that ulema
members held key positions in various departments of the Ministry of Education and, in the
provinces, kadis and muftis often doubled as presidents of local education committees.21 0 The
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career biographies of some 2,000 ulema members also show that many of them ended their
careers working in field of education, teaching religion, morality and/or language in state-
founded elementary, middle and high-schools as well as the newly established universities. 2 11
Finally, local records, paint a similar picture. For example, records from the Annual Education
Yearbooks (MarrifSalnamesi) from the Diyarbakir Vilayet from 1898-1903, show that the vast
majority of teachers at all levels came from the learned religious class. 2 12
Furthermore, it is instructive to observe that the religious content of official primary
school curricula is not immediately eradicated-even with the Kemalist Revolution-but rather
slowly phased out over the course of 30 to 40 years. Tracing staffing figures, changes in
textbook content and class scheduling as well as the observations of primary school students all
emphasizes that religious messages and morality actually began to be stripped away from
educational texts long before schools were stripped of their "religious" teachers. In other words,
in the Second Constitutional Period we have a cadre of religious functionaries teaching on the
basis of materials that are slowly moving away from Islamic traditions and rhetoric.
Data from the very end of the 19* century shows that 1,025 of the 3,613 registered
teaching-staff and personal documented by the Ottoman state were teachers of religion and
morality (ulum-u diniyye ve ahlakzye muallimleri), meaning that they had a religious background
and training. This figure also excludes the large number of Arabic and Persian instructors
employed in the schools, most of whom also had undoubtedly received a religious education,
suggesting that the proportion would be even larger.213 Not to mention the fact that many of the
students who attended the teacher training schools had also actually originated from the
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medreses.2 " Even for "non-religious" courses, when no teacher was available, fill-ins were
plucked from the medreses and mosques.
Aside from those who had attended the teacher's training school, the chief
resource for securing teachers was the medreses and those who had attended
them. As had occurred in the Tanzimat period, from 1876-1909 a large
proportion of available teaching positions in the primary and middle schools
were occupied by people from the medreses. The village and neighborhood
primary schools generally utilized people such as imams, pray leaders (miiezzin)
and clerics (vaiz)-
Accounts from students from the period as well as photographs confirm this observation, as both
depict classrooms led by "turbaned" teachers. Aksin Somel, who has examined the writings of
students from the era in detail, notes that "the school masters (muallim-i evvel) of the public
ibtidai schools and most of the instructors were wearing white turbans, i.e. were probably
members of the ulema."2 16 In sum, as much as the CUP may have wished for the spread of an
increasingly standardized system of mass schooling devoid of religious influence, conditions
were such that they actually had to rely heavily on the assistance of the religious functionaries to
staff the very institutions that would eventually help to break religions' monopoly over learning.
But even if religious teachers were co6pted and became a mainstay in the primary schools
for the time being, religious instruction itself was on the decline. Here there are two trends worth
noting. First, there is a gradual reduction in the number of hours of religious instruction given to
primary school students. As Graph I. indicates, the hours of religious instruction decrease
incrementally, not in one fell-swoop with Kemalist reforms.
[Insert Graph I. about Here]
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Second, there is also a gradual shift away from the use of religiously inspired teaching materials.
For example, in the Hamidian period, the majority of texts, regardless of the subject, emphasized
religious values, Islamic ethics and conformity with the Sharia. For example, a primary school
text from 1905 designed to provide an introduction to the natural sciences also contains passages
citing the religious importance of obedience, such as: "It is our religious duty as Muslims to
obey the commands of our elders and those who are wiser than us which comply with the sacred
sharia. In other words, the Supreme Being commands us to be obedient." 2" In addition to such
religious references, of the 34 official text books used in primary and secondary education in the
Hamidian era, 15 begin with what is called the "besmele" in Turkish (or Basmala/Bismillah in
Arabic), a powerful religious symbol.2 1 s The besmele is the reoccurring phrase "In the name of
God, the compassionate, the merciful"(bismi-llihi ar-rahmini ar-rahTmi). This phrase is the first
line in the Koran and also begins each subsequent chapter (except the 9*). According to Islamic
tradition, a devout Muslim should recite this phrase throughout the day when completing basic
tasks, such as entering the house or beginning ones' studies. The existence of the besmele in a
sizable portion of text books in this period is therefore indicative of the fact that religious
indoctrination and instruction played a dominant role in primary schooling in this period.
Contrast this with the school text books used in the Second Constitutional Period, 1908-
1918. Only 2 of the 35 official texts produced and used in this period (one designed to teach
reading published in 1911 and one designed to teach Islamic history published in 1914) began
with the besmele. Similarly, purely religious justifications for the social norms associated with
good and morally upstanding behavior are increasingly replaced with justifications grounded in
concern for health and hygiene. For example, in text books from the Hamidian era, personal
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routine and hygiene practices are rationalized through the teachings of the Koran with argument
patterns to the effect that Allah does not love "unclean" people, therefore one must maintain
hygiene because Allah demands it.2 19 Conversely, in the second constitutional period, the
maintenance of good health, not religion, becomes the dominant rational for proper behavior.
Fittingly, in texts published between 1908 and 1918, even the Muslim practice of daily prayer is
framed as part of a healthy lifestyle and no longer depicted as a religious directive from Allah or
the Koran. For instance, a text book on morality (Musahabat-i Ahlakiye) penned by Ali Seydi
and published in 1916 (1332), instructs students that ". . . to maintain our health, we should
wake up early and go to bed early. As soon as we wake up, we should wash our hands and our
face well; or, rather, we should perform an ablution. After that, we should do five minutes of
exercise in the garden and room."220
Interestingly then, the story state-centralization in late Ottoman and Early Republican
Turkey is not one in which the doors of "secular" educational institutions are suddenly slammed
in the face of religious elites. Rather, these religious elites are invited in by reformers, even
courted, through strategies of co6ptation; then once formally ensconced in new institutional
structures their role is eliminated ever so gradually. It is difficult to assess the degree to which
this gradual shift was a conscious strategy pursued intentionally on the part of the CUP; but the
stark reality of staffing and resource shortages suggests that the process was, at least in part, the
unintended consequence of decisions necessary in the short-term. Intended or not, however, this
gradual unseating of the religious elite through co6ptation diminished the probability of a
resistance being launched from the top-levels of the religious leadership, a sizable group
potentially capable of rousing public sentiment against state centralization initiatives.
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To summarize, some state-run schools were so remarkably similar to schools run by the
religious establishment in the late Ottoman era that they are often indistinguishable: both were
staffed by the ulema and religious functionaries and had curricula that included a sizable dose of
moral and religious instruction, at least in the beginning. One therefore might be prompted to
ask: If the message reaching the student was largely the same, should it even matter whether the
environment in which it was delivered was "state-run" or "religious-run"? I contend that it
matters a great deal. Once reformers create their own institutions, religious elites become the
employees of and thus dependent on a new set of authorities, not only for their livelihood but
also for the maintenance of their social status. In such an atmosphere, religious instruction can
be slowly sliced away from the curriculum and the hiring of religious instructors can drop
gradually, year by year, without anyone embedded in the institution creating much of a fuss.
Such is the beauty of strategies of piecemeal couptation. Such would hardly be the case if
religious leaders were all ousted from the world of schooling all at once or suddenly required to
submit to the state. Put otherwise, the act of "institutional creation" gives reformers an
advantage, even if a majority of the "components" in the new institution are initially relics
coopted from the old guard.
Courts: Religious Elites Deliver Civil Justice (and Religious Justice too)
In the legal realm similar dynamics played out as reformers slowly phased out sharia
courts and grew a system of centralized nizamiye courts. In 1909 there was a move toward
increased secularization with the enactment of a law that banned the hearing of private cases by
sharia courts in instances where a judgment from a nizamiye court already existed. 221 Historians
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have also found evidence that the "dual" system of sharia and the nizamiye domains was
increasingly perceived as an impediment to centralization and development, especially following
the Young Turk Revolution in 1908.222 Nonetheless, the degree of ambiguity and overlap
between the sharia and nizamiye systems in during early modernizing reforms was substantial, as
was the extent to which traditional religious elites were codpted and integrated into the nizamiye
system.
For one, despite laws intended to officially delineate the legitimate domains of both
systems, many cases that should have been heard in nizamiye courts continued to be presented at
sharia courts.223 In large part this was because "litigants perceived the sharia court as the
preferred judicial forum as far as social justice was concerned" since the role of the judge in such
courts was to arbitrate between parties and procedures were more "user-friendly."2 4
Furthermore, from 1879 until the end of the Empire, nizamiye courts (as well as some sharia
courts) employed the Mecelle, a type of civil law based on the first-ever codified version of the
sharia, alongside the French procedural codes.2 25 Clearly, then, it is somewhat of a misnomer to
refer to these courts as "secular."
Furthermore, there is ample evidence suggesting that, in the short term, the advent of the
new nizamiye system actually opened up new avenues of employment for ulema members rather
than driving them out of the legal business. Here again, it is difficult to disentangle whether the
ulema were intentionally targeted for these positions by the administration in an effort to secure
their compliance with modernizing reforms or whether coptation through the large number of
ulema hires into the new system was the unintended consequences of a shortage of qualified
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lawyers and judges with civil training. Yet in either case, historical evidences shows that that in
lower courts, "the same judges from the ranks of the ulema often served in both the nizamiye and
the sharia courts".226 Work on the new Ottoman State Law school also demonstrates that nearly
half of the students that enrolled had actually had come from a religious background, rather than
from state-schools, and that special policies were even made to accommodate the sizeable
number of ulema members studying at the law school. 227
Additionally, we find that the incorporation of religious elites into the new systems via
co6ptation was by no means a phenomenon that occurred only amongst students at the law
school with mid-level positions. The previously mentioned collection of ulema biographies
compiled by Albayrak contains numerous examples of religious elites taking positions at all
levels of the new legal hierarchy in the nizamiye system, ranging from scribe to president of the
highest provincial criminal council.228 Many ulema even secured competitive postings in large
urban centers.2 29 Moving into the nizamiye system also does not seem to have connoted a "status"
down-grade of any sort, at least in terms of salary. Ottoman officials (intentionally?) made
working in the nizamiye system as profitable as working as a kadi in the sharia courts, and the
pay-scale for nizamiye posts closely mirrored the pay-scale for sharia courts presented previously
in Table IV.23
In order to summarize the data presented above about religious co5ptation into new state-
founded institutions for law and schooling, it is helpful to cite one final piece of evidence from
the collection of ulema biographies that is particularly suggestive of the way in which
centralization occurred in late Ottoman and Early Republican Turkey. Of the 78 biographies of
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ulema members that extend into the Republican period, we see the following trajectory for
members of the religious establishment:
* 22 went on to work in the Ministry of Islamic Affairs and Religious
Endowments/Diyanet
e 24 went on to work in the Justice Ministry
0 14 went on to secure teaching positions
* 11 remained unemployed
e 6 were imprisoned or fled the country
* 1 committed suicide23 1
In other words, these biographies depict a situation in which a large majority of ulema members
were given the opportunity to incorporate themselves into the nascent institutional framework of
the centralized state and, as a result, opted for tacit cooperation with rather than active resistance
to the forces of state centralization once the Kemalist's seized power. As the figures above
demonstrate, work in the judiciary and education system were popular alternatives to
obsolescence but so too was serving as a bureaucrat in what came to be the equivalent of a
Turkish Ministry of Religion. The creation of this bureaucracy, its objectives, and its subsequent
growth and entrenchment stands as perhaps the best example that the secular Turkish state is
anchored by deep religious roots. Before concluding, I briefly analyze of the birth and evolution
of Turkey's cadre of professionalized religious civil servants (whose modern influence is also
discussed in more detail in Chapter Six).
Institutionalizing the Religious Bureaucrat
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The immediate roots of Turkey's religious bureaucracy and bureaucrats can be traced to
1920, when the 5eriye ve Evkaf Vekaleti (Ministry of Islamic Affairs and Religious Endowments)
was established after the opening of the Turkish Grand National Assembly by the newly
established shadow government in Ankara. Amit Bein's excellent history of the Turkish ulema
shows that the short lived Ministry of Islamic Affairs and Religious Endowments "served as a de
facto alternative to the Sheikh ul-Islam and was primarily staffed by reform minded ulema." 232
Quickly on the heels of Lausanne treaty in August 1923, the Kemalist assembly approved a
resolution to make Ankara the capital of the new state while retaining Istanbul as the seat of the
actual Caliphate.2 3 In doing so, the assembly managed to temporarily preserve the symbolic
authority of Islamic leaders while isolating them ever further from the inner workings of the new
government. When the Caliph wrote to Ankara in the fall of 1923 requesting an increased say in
government decisions, Kemal issued a stringent response:
Let the Caliph and the whole world know that the Caliph and the Caliphate which
have been preserved have no real meaning and no real existence. We cannot
expose the Turkish Republic to any sort of danger to its independence by its
continued existence. The position of the Caliphate in the end has for us no more
importance than a historic memory.m
Regardless, in the crucial period between August 1923 and the spring of 1924, the Caliphate
remained in place as token of the Kemalists' link to Islam. Yet its actual influence diminished
daily. Finally, in March of 1924, in a demonstration of national authority Kemal abolished the
Caliphate completely. Simultaneously the Ministry of Islamic Affairs and Religious
Endowments was shuttered and replaced by the even more 'domesticated' Diyanet Igleri
Reisliginin (Presidency of Religious Affairs/ later to become the Diyanet igleri Baykanhgi and
from now on simply referred to as the Diyanet). With the abolition of the Caliphate and the
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creation of the Diyanet a Rubicon was indeed crossed. Soon thereafter the Kemalist government
abolished sharia courts, forced medreses to their close doors, and imposed a number of other
aggressive secularizing decrees. By the 1930s, the term ulema itself was even banished from the
official lexicon.2 35
The Diyanet, however, remained. With an official budget and state protection, the
Diyanet created something akin to a bureaucratic shelter for those religious elites who were, if
not entirely comfortable, than at least somewhat secure working in the service of the state. That
said, the Diyaent's position relative to the government was made very weak over the course of
the next decade. As Bein has documented, "The reforms of the early republic relegated the
religious administration to a subsidiary of the Prime Minister's office and left it without any
jurisdiction over religious education, judicial affairs, and Islamic endowments." At its absolute
nadir in 1931, the Diyanet "lost even the administrative authority over mosque officials and
employees" for a significant period of time.23 6
Table XIV contains data on amount of state-funding for the Diyanet from its creation up
until 1970. Table XV contains data on the number of people employed at the Diyanet from
1927-1980. The data in these tables reflects the fact that by the 1930s, the Diyanet's size and
authority had been shrunk and severely weakened.
[Insert Table XIV about Here]
[Insert Table XV about Here]
Although largely powerless, what remained of the Diyanet was not without purpose. Now at the
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almost complete behest of Republic, religious administrators and civil servants were given a
clear new mission: turning the masses into disciples of the state through state-sponsored and
religiously-grounded Turkification and nationalization initiatives. Immediately after the
Caliphate's demise in March 1924, the Kemalist government released a circular requiring all
religious elites to use the occasion as an opportunity to proselytize on the virtues of the nation
state in the public prayers and sermons.2 37 In the 1920s and 1930s the government tasked
religious elites in the Diyanet (as well as some "freelance subcontractors") with producing
modern Turkish translations of the Koran and other sacred texts as well as publishing sermons
for use in mosques across the country.23 Weak and diminished though they were, the ulema
retained a steady foothold as civil servants. This form of institutionalization not only cemented
the peculiar synergies between Kemalism and Islam (and thus religion and state) but also set the
stage for the religious establishments' eventual renaissance and reemergence as a state-centric,
capitalist, and moderate force for change once the Turkish political system began to open in the
1950s.
VIII. Conclusion
Herein I have argued that the story of institutional transformations to the modern state in
late Ottoman and Early Republican Turkey needs to be written with an eye towards the role that
religious elites played in the process. Although clashes between the religious establishment and
the proponents of state centralization did erupt, such events do not in-and-of-themselves
constitute the history of the period in its entirety. In fact, narratives that focus overwhelmingly
on such clashes have missed the bigger picture of how state-builders successfully codpted,
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employed and eventually captured religious rhetoric, together with a sizable portion of the
religious establishment itself, and directed it towards its own aims.
As religious elites worked to maintain their livelihood, social function and status in a
changing world, major shifts in the institutional structure of the state were underway all around
them. In time, these shifts would severely curtail the religious establishment's role as the
arbitrators of morality via education and justice. Yet in the period under investigation, the reality
of these larger, long-term structural shifts appears to have been eclipsed by a concern for the
more immediate future in the minds of many religious leaders, making them vulnerable to
co6ptation.
State builders, for their part, were facing a severe shortage of manpower and moral
authority and had solid reasons for enlisting the religious elite to help further their centralizing
reforms. Despite the ideological in-congruence between reformers ideology and that of religious
actors (staunch positivism vs a belief in celestial authority), a surprisingly large number of
religious elites aligned themselves with the CUP. Religious elites succumbed to co6ptation
strategies, not out of ignorance, but rather because being co6pted provided the advantages of a
seemingly secure position-at least temporarily-in a period where the future of religious
institutions was becoming increasingly uncertain. Dwindling resources for medreses and other
religious institutions had meant the threat of dwindling social status at the local level for anyone
affiliated with them. Men who possessed religious standing and substantial training in the
principles of Islam were able to temporarily side-step this impending crisis by allowing
themselves to be co6pted into the state system and using the skill to help further consolidate the
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nation state.
As attractive as government jobs may have been to religious actors in this period of
upheaval in the late 19 th and early 2 0 th century, piecemeal co6ptation by the state ultimately sent
the religious establishment into a self-undermining spiral that was difficult to reverse. Under the
Kemalist's rule in the 1920s-30s, state-driven secularization became increasingly aggressive.
Under other circumstances, widespread religious resistance to Kemalist reforms would likely
have erupted; but many late Ottoman ulema were now civil servants and as such, they were
unlikely to risk their jobs for the uncertainty that would inevitably accompany a life political
activism and violent resistance.
Like it or not, the ulema were now disciples of the state, who directed their efforts
toward bolstering the unlikely (and, in many ways, contradictory) fusion of Kemalism and Sunni
Islam that became the enduring form Turkish nationalism for decades. Gradual coiptation,
though far from complete or seamless, tempered and eventually "Turkified" many significant
religious figures-and isolated those who refused to abide. In the words of Omer Nasuhi
(Bilmen), who served as the Mufti of Istanbul for almost two decades under the Republic, in
Turkey "the duty of genuine men of religion is to pray for the welfare of the nation and the
homeland... "239 Of course, as recent events attest to, co6ptation by the state does not preclude
religious elites' from resurrecting a substantial role for themselves by working legally, through
various bureaucratic channels, from within the state. The steady expansion of Turkey's Diyanet
stands as a clear example. Strategies of piecemeal co5ptation have, however, make it unlikely
that these religious actors will challenge state sovereignty head-on through the type of ultra-
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conservative religious "fundamentalist" movements that have emerged elsewhere-such as in
Egypt, which is the subject of the next chapter.
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Table VI. Ulema Member Salaries by Administrative Unit
Administrative Unit No. Typical Kadi or Typical miftni
(from largest to of Naib salary salary
smallest) Units (per month) (per month)
1t class vilayet 18 5000 kuruq 1000 kuru
2nd class vilayet 7 4500 kuru 900 kurug
3rd class vilayet 10 4000 kuruq 800 kurug
1V class liva 29 2500 kuru§ 700 kuruq
2n lass liva 26 2250 kuru 600 kurug
3rd class liva 19 2000 kuruq 500 kuruq
Kaza 540 1000-1500 kurug 400 kuru
Nahiye 990 250 kuruq
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Table XIV: Diyanet's Budget by Year (1924-1970)241
YEAR BUDGET (TL)
1340 (1924) 1.422.650
1341 (1925) 1.687.401
1926 1.598.600
1927 1.796.240
1928 1.719.587
1929 1.677.157
1930 1.653.119
1931 640.350.
1932 607.196.
1933 616.586.
1934 611.986.
1935 610.616.
1936 607.630.
1937 608.241.
1938 608.100.
1939 625.640.
1940 672.518.
1941 697.518.
1942 880.835.
1943 905.404.
1944 927.044.
1945 753.907.
1946 1.500.669.
1947 2.716.106.
1948 2.879.573.
1949 2.859.215.
1950 2.912.720.
1951 7.819.071.
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1953 10.738.940.
1954 11.550.926.
1955 15.225.497.
1956 21.156.661.
1957 23.232.635.
1958 24.431.136.
1959 25.250.381.
1960 39.353.031.
1961 45.472.800.
1962 51.825.610.
1963 57.978.948.
1964 59.792.168.
1965 83.369.673.
1966 157.147.377.
1967 168.476.097.
1968 184.403.459.
1969 194.760.810.
1970 201.062.400.
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1952 9.149.072.
Table XV: Number of Diyanet Employees (1927-1980)242
Year No. of Employees
1927 7172
1928 6316
1929 6097
1930 5861
1931 1268
1932 1250
1933 1193
1934 1154
1935 ~1110
1936 1057
1937 1060
1938 1068
1939 ~1085
1940 1102
1941 1103
1942 1103
1943 1116
1944 1121
1945 1121
1946 1251
1947 1237
1948 1207
1949 1204
1950 5839
1951 6245
1952 7298
1953 8383
1954 9265
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1955 10630
1956 11101
1957 12201
1958 12474
1959 12976
1960 13835
1961 13471
1962 13470
1963 13471
1964 13547
1965 ----
1966 35557
1967 30240
1968 29846
1969 31222
1970 33060
1971 31149
1972 33876
1973 36572
1974 41450
1975 41452
1976 45042
1977 46542
1979 48732
1980 50765
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Chapter 4
The Problem of Parallel Systems: Nasser's Inheritance and State Consolidation in Egypt
On August 24, 1962 the popular Egyptian newspaper al-Jumhuriyah ran a headline that
captured the mood of the Nasser reform era: "THE STATE DOES NOT SUBMIT TO A
SPECIAL GROUP IN THE NAME OF RELIGION!" The message was clear-or so it seemed.
State authority was hegemonic and complete. No exceptions, even those rooted in sacred
tradition, would be allowed. As it turned out, however, the headline rang hollow. Behind such
proclamations of unrivaled state sovereignty lay a fractured and unruly tangle of disciplinary
institutions that were largely impervious to centralized state control. Indeed, much to its own
chagrin, the Egyptian state would repeatedly "submit to a special group in the name of religion"
on a number of issues related to schooling, legal authority and the regulation of faith-based
institutions.
This chapter sets out to show just how and why the pathway of state expansion and
consolidation in post-independence Egypt diverged so markedly from that in post-independence
Turkey. As readers will recall from the previous chapter, the Turkish Kemalist's final push for
centralization through a self proclaimed "secular revolution" in the 1920s and 1930s resulted in
strongly consolidated state sovereignty over institutions of schooling, law and religious
regulation. I made the case that the catastrophic success of the Kemalists' so-called "secular
revolution" was highly conditioned by a set of critical historical antecedents. Although the
Kemalists themselves were adamant in depicting their political program as a critical juncture -
and even employed an army of historians to reinforce the impression of a clean break with the
Ottoman past- the protracted process by which Turkish state-builders actually established their
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disciplinary authority was much more gradual and contingent. Ultimately, religion state
institutional synergies driven by co6ptation strategies during the reforms of the late Ottoman
period (1860-1922), not religion state separations, yielded the well consolidated and ostensibly
"secular" modem Turkish state for which the Kemalist's have claimed so much credit.
I argued that the decision to pursue co6ptative strategies was largely the product of
structural conditions in late Ottoman Turkey in the 19 th century, namely the availability of the
manpower needed to staff new institutions of schooling and law. Because the manpower needed
to launch centralizing reforms was scarce, reformers implemented strategies of institutional
change based on linkages with religious structures via piecemeal co6ptation. Enlisting religious
elites for the national cause was not considered optimal by Turkish reformers or the religious
elites themselves at the time. Nevertheless, gradual co6ptation at the individual level set into
motion a dynamic of "differential growth" that served to weaken the religious establishment,
ultimately allowing a cadre of secular-minded politicians to near completely co6pt religious
symbols and structures and redeploy them for their own nationalist purposes.2 43 I contended that
this process of co6ptation and redeployment is best conceived of as a gradual accumulation of
disciplinary sovereignty (not a sudden secular revolution).
The objective of this chapter is to demonstrate that the causal chain linking manpower
shortages to religion-state institutional synergies via successful state co6ptation of religion in
Turkey simply does not obtain in the Egyptian case. The intricacies of the argument are
developed below, but for the sake of clarity it is worth previewing the main claims here at the
outset. This chapter argues that the Turkey-Egypt divergence was much less about the actions of
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individual leaders or their capabilities in the 2 0th century than it was about the accumulated
momentum of institutional inheritances from the past. Although reform strategies in Turkey and
Egypt at exhibited numerous parallels, such as the shared spate of failed attempts to simply
convert religious institutions into modem disciplinary structures subservient to the state, one
crucial difference trumped all similarities. In Egypt, extensive foreign competition and,
eventually, occupation meant that manpower -the exact type of manpower that late Ottoman
Turkey lacked- actually became much more abundant from the 1850s onwards.
As a result, in Egypt new disciplinary institutions were created in almost complete
isolation from the religious establishment in a way that resembled the pattern of parallel systems
described in Chapter One. Rather than sharing expertise, Egyptian religious institutions became
largely insulated from the state, re-entrenched themselves, and grew in size over the late 19 th and
early 2 0th century. Furthermore, pathways for the upward mobility of individual members of the
religious establishment became greatly constricted in Egypt as graduates of the new secular
schools began usurping jobs traditionally held by men with religious training. The Kemalist's
could relegate religion by decree and forge durable religion-state synergies because they were
confronting a greatly weakened religious establishment, many members of which already had
one foot in the state system. In Nasser's Egypt containing religion would prove much more
difficult to achieve, for by the 1950s, the religious establishment was not only strong and
isolated, it had also grown hostile to the state for continually limiting its sphere of influence
without providing new opportunities for upward mobility.
The logic of the rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. I start by showing that Nasser's
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political program for state consolidation in the 1950s and 1960s closely mirrored the Kemalist
project of the 1920s and 1930s. Most importantly, both programs "ruled by decree" and shared
the ultimate aim of bringing the religious establishment under state sovereignty. The objective
was not religion state separation (as secularism is often understood) but rather the complete
relegation of religious institutions and elites to state authority. Next, I provide evidence to show
that whereas the Kemalists' largely succeeded in their pursuit of this objective Nasser and his
Free Officers largely failed. Finally, after first briefly considering some potential alternative
explanations, I move on to my own argument and evidence, tracing the trajectory of modernizing
reforms in education and law in Egypt from its beginning in the late early 19 ' century.
Specifically, I seek to illustrate how the type and sequencing of institutional reform strategies
(co~pation, conversion and parallel systems) applied in Egypt made it impossible to reproduce
the Kemalist outcome. For the sake of clarity, Figure IV uses a time line to juxtapose key dates
and the divergent strategies of institutional reform in Turkey and Egypt.
[Insert Figure IV about here]
I. Nasser Attempts a "Secular Revolution"
Although a quarter of a century separated the onset of Turkey and Egypt's respective
attempts at secular revolution, a number of similarities makes these two events comparable. Just
as in Republican Turkey, in Egypt too, it was a clandestine political-military organization that
forged the independent nation state. Egypt's Free Officers Movement was founded in the wake
of the 1948 defeat in the Arab-Israeli war and at its helm was Gamal Nasser. Like Mustafa
Kemal Atatfrk before him, Nasser quickly endeavored to launch an extreme make-over of
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Egyptian society forged from the top down. The "secular" disciplinary objectives of Nasser's
reforms took a direct cue from the CUP (Committee for Union and Progress) and Kemalists in
Turkey: bring the religious establishment's institutional structure completely under the mantle of
the state and fully centralize education and law under state sovereignty. Indeed, CUP
accomplishments had been greatly admired by a certain class of Egyptians. It was, after all, no
coincidence that the first two leaders of independent Egypt had been named after the two most
influential Turkish reformers, Cemal and Enver Pasha. In fact, Nasser explicitly fancied himself
as the Egyptian Atatirk , often directly citing the Kemalists as the inspiration for his own reform
initiatives.24 4
When it came to disciplinary institutions, Nasser's political program closely adhered to
the Kemalist blueprint of ruling through a series of government decrees. Immediately after
seizing power in 1952 Nasser ordained Law No.180 abolishing religious family endowments and
asserting state control over all Islamic charities.24 s In 1955, he issued a decree to permanently
close all shari'a courts.24 6 In a memorandum accompanying the decree, the state justified the
courts' closure by arguing that "the government cannot suffer the existence on the national
territory of judiciary autonomies which impose their will upon it, oppose its policy of reform, or,
lastly, choose their own way of reform."247 Then, in 1961 Nasser unilaterally enacted a series of
laws designed to force al-Azhar, the preeminent institution for Muslim learning (described in
Chapter Two), to completely submit to state authority. For centuries al-Azhar had both trained
the ulema and ran an extensive network of schools. Just as with creation of the Diyanet in
Turkey, the 1961 al-Azhar reform in Egypt turned religious elites into state-subsidized
bureaucrats.24 s Mosques were to become state property; imams and muftis were to become civil
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servants.
Another similarity between Turkey and Egypt was that a full frontal attack aimed at
annihilating the religious establishment was out of the question in both places since it risked
inciting popular resistance to the state. Both Nasser and Atatirk sought to capture the legitimacy
and institutional networks of the religious establishment and then use them to bolster the moral
authority of the nation state. Fittingly then, the 1956 Egyptian Constitution-just like its 1924
Turkish counterpart-specified Islam as the official state religion.2 49 Egyptian secularists were
not atheist or anti-religious but anti-clerical, much like their Kemalist predecssors.
Contemporary pundits and academics looked favorably upon Nasser's ambitious reform
project as it unfolded. Above all, they had faith in Nasser's potential to recreate the Turkish
experiment in grand societal transformation. At a lecture delivered at the Harvard Center for
Middle Eastern Studies in 1958, Richard Robinson hopefully opined that "Just as Kemal
Atatirk's dictatorship (1923-1938) prepared Turkey for a limited form of democracy, so perhaps
Nasser's authoritarian regime will prepare Egypt for eventual democratization."" Nothing could
have been further from the truth.
The Destabilizing Dynamics of Sudden Cooptation by Decree
Despite the wishes of western observers, Egyptian attempts to copy the Turkish
experience did not come to fruition. As we saw in Chapter 3, the Kemalists' anti-clerical
policies resulted in what might be called the successful state capture of the religious
establishment and thereby state sovereignty over disciplinary institutions. Religious elites traded
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their turbans and beards for the suits and mustaches of the typical state bureaucrat. Resistance
was minimal, demands for the return of the shari'a were completely abandoned, and public
education became the exclusive preserve of the state. Simultaneously, however, the ideational
glue binding the individual members of the new "secular" Turkish nation state was curiously
religious in nature: to be of Turkish nationality was essentially to be a Sunni Muslim and the
Diyanet played an active role in the Turkification of the state. Religious institutions had been
tamed while religious identity markers had been reconfigured and redeployed for secular
purposes. Turkish reformers had managed to both win religious legitimacy and eradicate the
traditional functions of the religious elite in the realms of schooling and law.
In Egypt the results of Nassers anti-clerical politics by decree were much more mixed and
ultimately destabilizing for the state. In a way, attempts at the formal codptation of religion post
independence only served to paint Nasser's regime (and those that followed) into an increasingly
tight corner. By virtue of the fact the religious elite in Egypt was brought under the state mantle
much more suddenly and en masse in the 1950s, religious actors were able to maintain a
comparatively large degree of autonomy and power. A formidable and unified force, religious
actors exploited their new position to encroach on state power and decision making in various
ways from the start. Some religious elites agressively pushed back against the state from within,
demanding more power and influence over state policy. Others attacked the state from the
outside, spurring on unofficial Islamic organizations that were explicitly hostile to the state's
newly asserted role as a sovereign disciplinary and moral authority.
Over time, these two types of challenges eroded the moral authority of the Egyptian state
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and its spokesmen. Although state sovereignty had been formally declared on paper (as
evidenced by the parade of military men subsequently appointed as Directors of al-Azhar
Affairs), in reality state control over religious elements was deeply problematic."' The state
found itself ensnared in a treacherous cycle of alternatively pandering to and violently
suppressing religious challengers. The upshot of this dilemma was a destabilizing spiral of
religious legitimization vs. secularization that ultimately prevented the state from achieving a
monopoly over institutions of social discipline. The more the Egyptian state tried to control
religious elites, the less popular it became; but without demoting the position of religious elites,
hegemonic state sovereignty and moral authority could not be achieved. Clear evidence of this
spiraling dynamic (and thus the limited nature of Nasser's reforms) can be found in the
institutional domains of education, law and religious regulation.
To take education first, although al-Azhar's educational facilities (university, secondary,
preparatory and primary) all formally came under the control of the Egyptian Ministry of
Endowments via a decree in 1961, the al-Azhar system remained as a distinct educational tract
under a common umbrella, effectively acting as an alternative to the "national" education system.
252 As mentioned above, efforts were made to place "secular" individuals who were loyal to the
regime in key positions in the now "nationalized" al-Azhar system, but subversive activity was a
more common practice than obedience to this new authority. Men plucked from the military and
inserted at the top of the al-Azhar hierarchy (Kemal al-Din Rif at, Ahmad Abdallha Ta'imah and
Husayin al-Shafi'i) all failed to create a constructive working relationship with most prominent
ulema. Meanwhile, the al-Azhar school system was actually expanding as the state tried in vain
to placate mounting tensions by increasing the institution's funding. Nasser introduced secular
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subjects and departments into the Azhari system with the goal of "modernizing" the curriculum
by diluting its religious content. These moves, however, failed to weaken the preeminent status
of theological studies. Furthermore, between 1955-1960 total student enrollment in the Azhari
system increased by over 60% from approximately 25,000 to 41,000.23 By the early 1980s,
enrollment numbers at al-Azhar University surpassed those at Cairo University. At the primary,
preparatory and secondary level too, al-Azhar's share of the total student population increased
markedly.2 4
Malika Zeghal astutely observes that Nasser's reforms of the Azhari system created only a
"temporary and superficial submission. "25 With time, Nasser and his successors increasingly
had to adjust to the ulema's demands. In a way, being formally subjected to state sovereignty at a
time when religious institutions were strong actually granted members of al-Azhar with the
instruments and positioning needed to gain an even larger political foothold in the 1970s. Many
Azharis emerged on the other side of Nasser's reforms as powerful political brokers who sought,
first and foremost, to enlarge "their own sphere of intervention as well as their independence vis-
a-vis the state" as opposed to foster national unity or honor state sovereignty.256
Nasser's legal reforms produced equally ambiguous results. Despite attempts on the eve
of independence to codify a uniform Egyptian Civil Code, family law was eventually dropped
from the Civil Code entirely and religious elites quickly came to see family law as one of their
last domains of influence.25 7 As a result, lest the closure of shari'a courts in 1955 provoke the ire
of the ulema and kadi (judges in shari'a courts) class, Nasser actually absorbed all current kadis
into the state system in one fell swoop, effectively giving them a privileged position over
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personal and family law from within the state.25 s Soon after the announcement, on September 27
1955, the Grand Mufti of Egypt, Hasan al-Ma'mum wrote a note in the newspaper Al-Ahram
urging the staff of the shari'a courts to practice with the same zeal and conviction from within the
state system. Furthermore, popular demands for the resurrection of the shari'a, far from fading
into oblivion as they did in Turkey, quickly resurfaced in Egypt. Come 1971, in a bid to placate
his determined religious competitors, Anwar Sadat issued a new constitution, Article Two of
which explicitly mentioned the shari'a as a chief source of legislation. By 1980, with religious
challengers still posing a serious threat to the regime, the language of Article Two was further
strengthened to declare that "...the principles of Islamic jurisprudence are the chief sources of
legislation." 259 A precarious constitutional theocracy was thus born.
Far from satisfying the state's religious opponents, the rewording of Article Two opened
the floodgates to a barrage of religiously grounded disputes over the appropriate scope of state
authority. Islamists repeatedly confronted the state in its highest courts, making the argument
that certain state practices and laws did not conform to the shari'a and were therefore null and
void. For example, in one landmark case in 1985 the head Sheikh of al-Azhar actually sued the
President and the Prime Minister (among others). The Sheikh's 1985 claim was issued in protest
to an earlier, low-level state administrative court ruling. In this earlier ruling, al-Azhar had been
ordered to hand over the interest that had accrued following a late payment for some medical
equipment. The Sheikh claimed that this low-level court decision violated the shari'a prohibition
on riba (interest/usury) and thus Al-Azhar should be absolved of any legal and financial
responsibility. The monetary amount in question was completely trivial (592 lira!). 260
Nonetheless, the case became monumental for it exposed holes in the disciplinary authority of
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the state that permeated to the very highest levels of the legal apparatus. Interestingly, in contrast,
Turkish Islamists have become capitalists par excellence. Today, as Egyptians flock to the streets
to topple what is left of the largely rotten and morally defunct state apparatus, it is unclear which
of two political systems, constitutional or theocratic, will win the day.
Finally, in addition to these challenges to the state's authority in the realms of schooling
and law, the attempted regulation of religious organizations and sites remained uneven and
inconsistent following Nasser's reforms, ultimately enabling the proliferation of enduring
challenges to state sovereignty. Non-establishment Islamic organizations like the Muslim
Brothers, which professed their primary loyalty to something larger than the state, developed an
intricate and complicated relationship with religious civil servants and Azhari institutions. To
this day, the leaders of non-establishment Islamic organizations-be they moderate or militant-
are often al-Azhar graduates who possess either ongoing ties to the Azhari staff and/or a position
in the official establishment themselves. Although these Islamic organizations have been
routinely blamed for the state's woes, they actually have "various levels of integration within the
[state] establishment -from salaried officials who do not accept the authority of the al-Azhar
leadership to complete 'outsiders' who preach in unregulated mosques, in the streets and through
the mass media." 261
There is no doubt that Islamic organizations critical of the state's right to sovereignty have
flourished in part because Nasser's reform program never entirely succeeded in controlling
religious venues or education. As Table VII indicates, attempts at mosque regulation yielded
limited success in Egypt. Unlike in Turkey, where mosque and sermon regulation became the
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norm, the majority of mosques in Egypt have remained free of state interference, providing a
venue for the dissemination of religious doctrine that undermines the moral authority and
sovereign disciplinary role of the state. In light of these challenges, the state has been left in a
precarious position: it cannot openly crackdown on these venues but nor can it sustainably
tolerate their existence if it wishes to remain fully sovereign.
[Insert Table VIII on Mosque Control about here ]
To summarize, the overall results of Nasser's reforms can hardly be said to have forced
the religious establishment into submission. Nasser's Kemalist-inspired attempt at a secular-
revolution by decree produced mixed results, failing as it did to secure exclusive state
sovereignty over disciplinary structures. As Tamir Moustafa remarks, "Egyptian government
policy towards religious institutions appears to be schizophrenic" for it continually "shifted back
and forth between strategies of domination and co6peration" without ever reaching a stable
equilibrium.2 62 The Egyptian state's failure to achieve sovereignty over disciplinary institutions
has exacerbated conflict over who can legitimately claim to be societies ultimate moral authority.
Do representatives of the state, or representatives of Islam possess the right "to have the final
word"? In this context, religious challenges to the state have metastasized, the power of the
ulema and Islamic challengers grows and religion's role in the production of social discipline has
actually increased, bringing momentous political consequences for the political development of
the Egyptian state.
II. Explaining Egypt's Failed Secular Revolution
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What accounts for Egypt's failed "secular revolution"? Why did anti-clericalism by
decree allow for the successful state capture of religious institutions (together with the low-risk
redeployment of religious symbols) in Turkey but not in Egypt? At one level the answer may
seem obvious: clearly the religious establishment somehow possessed a stronger ability to resist
the state's demand for submission and "protect its own turf' in post independence Egypt than it
did in Turkey. The puzzle that remains unsolved then, is how and why this disparity in the
strength of the religious establishment emerged in the first place, for it was by no means a
foregone conclusion.
But before going there, a final order of business. One could conceivably respond to the
assertions above by looking at things in reverse. Perhaps it was not so much that the religious
establishment in Turkey was weaker, but that the Turkish state was just stronger, be it in terms of
military might, resources or some other advantage. While it would be silly to cast a comparison
of this scope as any sort of natural experiment or controlled comparison, I believe a number of
factors allow us to rule out intuitive and popular arguments based on the notion that one of the
two states somehow possessed an intrinsic advantage. I quickly address these factors one by
one.
First, if one buys into the teleological underpinnings of modernization theory, it is
plausible that there may have been some sort of first mover advantage at play-i.e. the state that
begins the reform of disciplinary institutions first will always be one step ahead in the game of
consolidating its own control and moral authority. In these two cases, however, the historical
record suggests otherwise. Political programs to expand state control over schooling and law
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actually originated in Egypt at the turn of the 19 th century under Muhammad Ali Pasha
(discussed in more detail below). Similar programs did not even appear in the Ottoman Empire
until at least two decades later and were only applied in earnest fifty years after Muhammad Ali
first began his reforms. Historian Akin Somel reminds us that the "Egyptians provided the
beginning of a public education system" which, when "compared with the contemporary
situation in the Ottoman Empire ... constituted a highly uniform, well organized, and relatively
widespread structure."263 Likewise, in the field of legal reform, Egypt was actually at the
forefront of pioneering change in the 19 th century. European legal subjects were first studied in
Egypt at the School of Languages and Translation as early as 1836, whereas the Ottomans did
not introduce such subjects until several decades later.2 64
Yardsticks of state power (albeit crude ones) also fail to reveal a distinct advantage for
either Turkey or Egypt. Both Nasser and Ataturk were charismatic and popular leaders who
enjoyed the full backing of the coercive apparatus. The military in each country, although
certainly weak by western standards, had historically been considered among the strongest in the
region as measured in terms of troop strength and sheer firepower.2 s6 Furthermore, there had
been no shortage of war for either late Ottoman Turkey or Egypt, making it difficult to see how
Tilly's insights on how "war made the state" in Western Europe can be applied to explain the
uneven expansion of disciplinary authority in these two cases. In terms of monetary power, the
two states had come into the modern era in absolute dire straits. Both the Cairo and Istanbul
governments went bankrupt in 1875-1876 and became heavily dependent on foreign loans. 266
On other indicators too, Egypt and Turkey shared a number of features in the decades
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leading up to independence. Both were similarly sized, overwhelmingly populated by a Sunni
Muslim majority (upward on 90 percent), housed comparable religious minority populations and
had a high number of Sufi religious orders. Although theoretically plausible, there is also no
reason to believe that the Egyptian religious establishment was somehow more politicized than
its Ottoman counterpart. During his brief occupation of Egypt in the late 18th century, Napoleon
thought that the ulema would be excellent allies by virtue of their apolitical nature. He observed
that religious elites in Egypt had "gentle manners", were not "addicted to any sort of military
manoeuvrings" and were "ill adapted to the leadership of an armed movement."2 67 Furthermore,
whereas the Ottoman Shaykh al-Islam issued a plethora of fatwas on political issues in the 19 th
century, the Egyptian Grand Mufti issued very few. Rudolph Peters' content analysis of Egyptian
fatwas issued during this period finds only three fatwas on political topics. 26 8 As the seat of the
Caliphate until 1924, it was the Ottoman Empire, not Egypt, that was the center of Islamic
political influence in the 19th and early 2 0 century.
In light of these facts it is no wonder that scholars like Ahmet Kuru still find it "puzzling
that the Ottoman Empire, where Islamic institutions were so fundamental, gave birth to Turkey,
where assertive secularism has been dominant." 269 To be sure, the divergent trajectories of
disciplinary authority in Egypt and Turkey can only be understood through a careful analysis of
why, in the 19th and early 2 0 th century, the Egyptian religious establishment did not fall victim to
the same degree of institutional deterioration and weakening suffered by its Ottoman counter-
part. It is to this issue that I now turn.
III. Muhammad Ali Pasha, CoOptation and the Origins of Disciplinary Reform
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If anything stands as a testament to the fact that the divergence of Turkey and Egypt was
not inevitable, it is evidence from the first phase of centralizing disciplinary reforms in Egypt.
As this section will demonstrate, early patterns of institutional change in Egypt initially followed
a course that plausibly could have led to a greatly weakened religious establishment and a
triumphant and sovereign disciplinary state -that is, had this course not been derailed by the
massive swell in the number of foreigners residing in Egypt in the second half of the 19 ' century
and the policies that emerged as a result.
The first phase of Egyptian disciplinary reforms began in 1805, when the ulema of Cairo
nominated Muhammad Ali Pasha as the new governor. Determined to consolidate his own
authority and to build an army capable of protecting Egypt from imperial predation, Muhammad
Ali launched a program to re-order Egyptian society into a self-sufficient military and economic
machine. The creation of a centralized schooling system capable of training future military
officers, factory heads, teachers, judges and bureaucrats became a key component of his overall
reform strategy.
Underpinning this initial bid to centralize disciplinary authority was a strategy of
piecemeal co6ptation that exhibited patterns strikingly similar to those that would later evolve in
Ottoman Turkey. Lacking the qualified individuals needed to staff his new schooling system,
Muhammad Ali drew upon the expertise and human resources of the religious elite at al-Azhar,
crafting a careful program to make Azhari shaykhs part of the state system and turn them into an
indigenous corps of specialists. As part of this project, he sent many high level ulema to Europe
on educational missions. During these tours, it was customary for students to learn military
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sciences, engineering, printing, mechanics, and political subjects. Upon completion of their
tours, the shaykhs were then ushered into top positions in the state bureaucracy. Other high-level
ulema were made members of Muhammad Ali's Diwan (governing council) and/or employed as
propagandists to extol the virtues of military conscription." 0 Even low-level shaykhs and
promising madrasa students were brought in to either teach or learn in Muhammad Ali's new
technical training programs at the Preparatory (tajhiziyya) and Special (khususiyya) levels.2 71
Beyond solving the problem of expertise, the kind of co6ptation pursued by Muhammad
Ali had the added benefit of weakening the position of those religious men who resisted his
efforts towards state centralization. By locating administrative education outside of the religious
system and bringing religious elites into new institutions -as opposed to trying to reform
existing religious structures- Muhammad Ali avoided having to place non-Azhari trained
teachers in positions of power within al-Azhar itself. This was wise, for most ulema were
completely unwilling to accept orders from outsiders on their home turf. In fact, Muhammad Ali
never openly tampered with the internal affairs of al-Azhar at all. Instead, his strategy of reform
slowly depleted the religious establishment of some of its top talent by presenting them with
lucrative outside opportunities. Gradually, "some of the shaykhs and practically all of the
students [selected for Muhammad Ali's reform projects] had in the course of their government
sponsored training and state employment been alienated, organizationally if not spiritually, from
al-Azhar"2 72 With many prominent religious elites now "on board" with state centralization
initiatives, Muhammad Ali found he could move more easily against those recalcitrant shaykhs
that insisted on opposing the expansion of the state's disciplinary role. Although definitive
numbers are difficult to come by for this period, several contemporary British observers have
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remarked that al-Azhar was greatly weakened and enrollment figures decreased substantially as a
result of Muhammad Ali's reforms.273 In 1831, the mufti of Munsura even complained that the
ulema -well known for their wealth and authority less than half a century earlier- were
quickly becoming a poor people devoid of any autonomous influence.27 4 Muhammad Ali's
reforms had given the ulema new opportunities to join an increasingly centralized state
bureaucracy. Ironically, as J.W. Livingston points out, "Muhammad Ali they joined, and in doing
so contributed to their own irrelevance." 275
At one level, Muhammad Ali's reforms thus succeeded in changing the complexion of the
religious establishment. There emerged a new type of shaykh that straddled the fence between
government and religious service. Rifa'a al-Tahtawi -a religious student trained on one of
Muhammad Ali's educational missions who, in the 1830s, went on to establish a new
government School of Islamic Law & Jurisprudence that taught unorthodox subjects such as
French law, foreign languages and mathematics- was emblematic of this new breed. Even
after Muhammad Ali's demise, men like al-Tahtawi continued to tirelessly advocate for the
modernizing education, law and infrastructure to serve the needs of the state. But general,
overarching strategies of reform by co~ptation as occurred under Muhammad Ali became a relic
of the past.
A series of ultimately unsuccessful military campaigns aimed at expansion had gobbled
up an alarming amount of the Egyptian state's resources by the 1840's. Forced to drastically cut
back spending, Muhammad Ali's educational institutions quickly fell victim to the budgetary axe,
and the vast majority of primary, preparatory and special schools were closed at the urging of his
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own son Ibrahim. Muhammad Ali's educational missions to Europe continued on into the 1840s,
but the number of students being sent was much reduced. By the time Abbas I became ruler in
1848, only a handful of Muhammad Ali's schools remained intact and those that survived were in
dismal condition.27 6 These rapidly changing conditions on the ground brought the dynamics of
differential growth between religious and state disciplinary institutions to a halt and instead
ushered in a period of conservative re-entrenchment and explosive growth at al-Azhar. Without
the infrastructure put in place by Muhammad Ali, religious men who advocated for reform would
be forced to propagate their ideas and agendas from within the walls of al-Azhar itself via
strategies of institutional conversion (i.e. directly remolding al-Azhar into a modem disciplinary
institution that served the needs of the state). These dynamics will be addressed in the next
section.
IV. Shifting Course: Conversion
With Muhammad Ali's schools crumbling, the importance of al-Azhar and the madrasa
system as an avenue for upward mobility increased. The madrasas had always been one of the
best ways for poor young males to improve their economic and social status in Egyptian society.
277 Yet Muhammad Ali's institutions had created valuable new exit options for madrasa graduates
and thus, upon the closure of his state schools, something of a bottleneck occurred. Madrasa
students were no longer being redirected into state disciplinary institutions and this blockage,
together with the general atmosphere of economic downturn, led the number of madrasa students
to more than double in the mid-nineteenth century. Whereas enrollment at the height of
Muhammad Ali's reforms was estimated to be as low as 1,500-3,000 students, by 1846 numbers
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had reached nearly 7,500. Enrollment levels did drop momentarily at a point between 1855-
1865 because of a change in military conscription policies, but they were soon on the rise again.
By 1873 there were 9,441 students and by 1875 there were 11,095 students who called the
Azhari madrasa system home.278
[Insert Table IX on al-Azhar enrollment about here]
Growing numbers at al-Azhar eventually created an impending sense of chaos and unrest
at the institution. Although Muhammad Ali's immediate successors Abbas I and Sa'id did little to
quell the storm, Ismail (who ruled from 1863 - 1879) was so alarmed by the disorder and the
possibility that it may spill-out beyond al-Azhar's gates that he abandoned the long-held policy
of not interfering directly with the internal affairs of the religious establishment. Instead, he
changed course and openly endeavored to convert al-Azhar into an orderly institution tasked
with training tomorrow's teachers, lawyers, doctors, civil servants, and engineers through the
imposition of a non-religious curriculum and modern teaching and administrative methods.
Ismail found a handful of allies sympathetic to the idea of converting religious
institutions to new purposes from among the religious elites that had been groomed in
Muhammad Ali's training programs. These individuals -among them the most prominent being
Muhammad al-'Inabi, the aforementioned al-Tahtawi, 'Ali Mubarak, Mustafa al-'Arusi and 'Ali
al-Qusi- were a minority.2 79 Nonetheless, they took it upon themselves to redirect the religious
establishment to modern disciplinary purposes in the service of the state. To the dismay of most
Azhari's, these men sought to transform al-Azhar and the kuttab (Koran school) system into a
productive set of institutions replete with all the harbingers of "the modern", including a
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scientific curriculum, a clear hierarchy of authority, a standardized schedule of operation,
qualifying examinations, and completion certificates.
The first direct attempt to convert the religious establishment to new purposes came in
1864, when Shaykh Mustafa al-'Arusi was appointed as the rector of al-Azhar. At the urging of
Ismail, who wanted a crop of qualified teachers and judges, al-Arusi launched a controversial
reform code for al-Azhar mandating standardized exams, a formalized supervisory hierarchy, and
(most polemical of all) the addition of geometry, physics, and history to the curriculum.2 so Al-
Arusi's ideas were not entirely spontaneous. Indeed, his justifications for reforms built upon the
sensibilities of earlier shaykhs like Hasan al-'Attar who had voiced support for such changes
(albeit less actively and explicitly).2"' But now that these ideas were being translated into official
policy, they ignited fierce resentment from the majority of ulema who feared that such changes
would undermine their own authority. Al-Arusi's program to convert al-Azhar to new practices
and purposes incited such venomous attacks from his peers that it was completely abandoned and
he was deposed from his seat as rector in a matter of months. According to one historian of the
period, this reaction is hardly surprising. Reform by conversion directly "threatened the vested
interests of the heads of sects and the heads of the riwaqs (groups within al-Azhar), hence their
organized opposition to any rector who, albeit feared by all, was in the final analysis only as
strong as his backing." 282
At the forefront of the attacks against al-Arusi was Shaykh Muhammad 'Illaysh, a pious
and ascetic Azhari scholar of North African descent. Al-Arusi's successor as rector, Muhammad
al-'Abbasi al-Mahdi, had a modicum of success at restructuring al-Azhar's inner-workings after
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greatly watering-down the original reform code, but he too was ultimately limited by the
backlash and smear tactics instigated by 'Illaysh and his followers.283 The reform of disciplinary
institutions via strategies of conversion was not only falling short at al-Azhar. Soon after coming
to power, Ismail convened a group of inspectors to survey the kuttab system and draft a program
for reform. In 1867, the surveyors began compiling the law of the 7th of November (10' Rajab
1284), which was designed to install a uniform system of rules, exams, and curriculum aimed at
transforming the religious primary schools into a centralized and state-run enterprise. However,
as the head Inspector Dor Bey later wrote, "there was no real progress" and the introduction of
new subjects like arithmetic was never realized because teachers failed to comply with the
directives.2 s4
Attempts to change the practices and objectives of religious institutions via conversion
continued into the 1880s, 1890s, and 1900s under men such as Muhammad 'Abduh and
Muhammad Rashid Rida. For example in 1900 'Abduh and Rasid Rida published a Report on
Reforming the Shari'a Courts, which opened with a trenchant criticism of the conditions in the
shari'a system. "If you are looking for the local shari'a court," writes Rashid Rida in the
introduction to the report, "just approach anyone and ask for the dirtiest, most rundown and
despicable building in town. That will surely be the court and you won't even find chairs to sit in
there."28 s But even in the face of such criticism, most Azharis thwarted change, for they
believed that it would come at their own expense. As one student recalled:
When the Shaykh Muhammad 'Abduh came to the Azhar I was one of the younger
students. Our professors, may God forgive them, used to constantly criticize the
Shaykh in our presence and represent him as being dangerous for religion andfor
the religious-subtly dangerous. As a consequence our young minds were
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influenced by this, and I used to flee from encountering the professor for the sake
of my religion, and to flee from listening to his lessons, even though he was a
friend of my father. 286
It is important to note that Abduh primarily advocated for synthesizing the Islamic and the
modem -not for the full sale appropriation of European laws and practices.2 87 Even still, his
critics within the religious establishment responded with tabloid style mud-slinging. For
example, the publication Humarat monyati ran a compromising photo of Abduh in Europe
surrounded by a coterie of "scantily-clad" ladies. Similarly, the leaflet al-Babaghallo al-Misri
included a cartoon that showed Abduh embracing a "naked" European woman while also being
licked by a dog (a symbol of impurity).288
These barriers to change via conversion betrayed an inherent flaw in any attempt to
simply redeploy religious institutions to new practices and aims: obstruction from within. When
confronted with demands to remold their institutions to serve the interests of the state, many
ulema simply hardened against those elements of reform that went against their core beliefs and
interests. The majority of ulema eventually embraced some modem techniques of organization
and administration in the early 2 0th century, but repeated conversion-style reform attempts in
1885, 1896, 1908 and 1911 never succeeded in adding non-shari'a subjects to the madrasa
curriculum. This was a red-line issue for most members of the religious establishment because it
threatened the integrity of the knowledge that the ulema wished to preserve and thus their moral
authority and position in society. According to D. Crecelius, in the face of reform by
conversion, the ulema "withdrew around their own institutions in an effort to preserve them from
contamination." 28 9
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As readers will recall from Chapter Three, late Ottoman reformers met similar hurdles
and setbacks when they attempted to convert religious institutions to new purposes in the late
19th century. Reform via conversion rarely yielded the desired result and, when it actually did,
the pace of change was glacial. Out of frustration, late Ottoman reformers reluctantly shifted to
the more costly strategy of building entirely new disciplinary institutions on the fringe of the
religious establishment and then appropriating religious expertise to staff the new structures.
Egyptian reformers were equally frustrated with conversion's failures. Abduh, for instance,
bemoaned the insidious tendency among religious men to oppress progress and reform by
"shunning or avoiding knowledge, or ridiculing men of science to their faces and insulting them
and keeping a distance from them."2 90 But this is where the similarities with late Ottoman Turkey
end. For by the time Egyptians began to redirect efforts toward the creation of new disciplinary
institutions again, foreign penetration in Egypt had generated an entirely different set of
conditions under which new state and private institutional structures could be built in almost
complete isolation of the religious establishment.
V. Reform by Parallel Systems and the Displaced Religious Elite
As the frustrated endeavors to convert al-Azhar to secular purposes continued largely in
vain, Ismail initiated a second wave of attempts to fortify the disciplinary capacity of the state
by building an independent network of public schools and professional training institutes for
teachers and judges in the 1860s and 1870s. Ismail's Egypt, however, was not Muhammad Ali's
Egypt. Previously, during the reign of Sa'id (1854-63), momentous changes in economic policy
had opened up the country to an influx of foreigners eager to invest in and oversee Egypt's
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modernization. Ushering in a series of liberal reforms, Sa'id abolished the government
monopolies that had been erected by Muhammad Ali and upheld by Abbas I.291 The number of
European's in Egypt mushroomed from approximately 3,000 in 1836 to almost 90,000 by 1864
and 121,213 by 1866. From 1882 to approximately 1910 the country-wide ratio of foreigners to
Egyptians hovered between 1.5 and 2 percent.2 92 In key urban centers such as Cairo and
Alexandria, where the expansion of the state's disciplinary apparatus originated, foreigners
reached 9 percent and 20 percent of the population respectively.293
Foreigners established banks, which helped to finance the increase in trade with Europe
and also provided Sa'id and Ismail with loans to pursue public infrastructure projects. Ismail's
own "achievements" -including the construction of the Suez Canal, a nearly 50 million pound
program for public infrastructure, a war in the Sudan, and the purchasing (literally) of the title of
Khedive from the Ottoman's- had cost him a pretty penny. He owed enormous sums to
European creditors and by 1876 it became evident that the only way to stave off bankruptcy
would be to hand over control of the economy to European experts. 294 Even before Britain's
full-blown occupation in 1882, the influence of these European advisers and experts began
seeping into the institutional domains of education and law, as various foreign nationals sought
to imbue locals with particular loyalties through foreign schools and secure their economic
position by retooling the legal system. By World War I the burgeoning of English officialdom
reached its zenith in Egypt and the British occupied a dominant position in every ministry and
department except those pertaining to religion.2
In the section that follows I show that this foreign presence and influence encroached on
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the professional territory of the religious elite, blocked the integration of religiously trained
individuals into the state system and ultimately led to a bifurcation of religious and state
institutions. Prior to the foreign influx, the ulema had had three channels of upward mobility
reserved almost exclusively for them: 1) absorption into the mosque structure as imams,
muezzins, khatibs etc.; 2) entrance into the school system as teachers; and 3) entrance into legal
system of shari'a courts as judges or clerks. 296 Foreign presence and intervention erected major
barriers to channels two (education) and three (law) through various mechanisms- some
intentional, others unintentional; some mundane, others more dramatic- that will be illustrated
below. Faced with ever-diminishing professional and life opportunities, the ulema mounted an
increasingly vigorous defense of their remaining positions. What is more, this defense was
fortified in almost complete isolation from the state and served to form a "hard core" of
institutionalized resistance to the state's acquisition of disciplinary authority that endured through
independence. I examine these dynamics first with respect to schooling and then with respect to
law.
VI. Education: "Manufacturing Demagogues"
Foreign intervention -and eventually occupation- staunched the upward mobility of
Egypt's religious elites by forging an unbridgeable split in the field of education, with foreign
and state schools on one side and the educational institutions of the religious establishment on
the other. In large part this division stemmed from the fact that the unregulated growth of
foreign language and missionary schools in the 1860s and 1870s, together with the concomitant
development of new state (or government) schools in the European tradition, began to undermine
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Azhari graduates' status and opportunities. To examine the role of foreign schools first: In his
authoritative history of the Egyptian education, Heyworth-Dunne refers to the proliferation of
European schools during the period of Ismail's rule (1863-1879) as "the most remarkable feature
of his reign."2' Over 150 schools were opened by missionaries and foreign nationals of all
stripes. The number of students receiving education in foreign-run centers for learning only
increased in the wake of Ismail's abdication. Whereas there were an estimated 7,450 students in
foreign schools in 1875, by 1913-14 the number had climbed to 48,204 (the majority of them
Egyptian). 298 The proliferation of foreign schools is all the more astonishing when one considers
that there were only 9 "civil schools" (read state/government and non-Azhari) being run by the
government in Ismail's time.2 99 Private schools thus taught far more students than did
government schools in this period.
It is also important to note that foreign schools were an entirely independent or "parallel"
enterprise. The Egyptian government did nothing to regulate, administer or staff them. Since
money was tight, Egyptian and European officials alike viewed the foreign schools as a blessing,
for they partially alleviated the financial burden of having to grow the government's own
education system in order to staff the burgeoning civil service. Nonetheless these schools, with
curricula entirely structured around foreign languages and devoid of Islamic subjects, did not
absorb any graduates of the Azhari system into their ranks. What is more, these schools'
"modem curricula gave them great prestige, so their primary sections fed the government
secondary schools as well as the private schools while their secondary sections led to the higher
professions and many well-paid government posts." 00 As the graduates of foreign schools
gained a privileged position in the competition for government jobs and scarce state school slots,
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a gulf emerged between the new Europeanized elite and the traditional elite of al-Azhar.
The limited number of government schools operating during Ismail's rule squarely
situated themselves in the foreign/European tradition. For one, they were explicitly based on
foreign models, such as the British Lancaster model. Tellingly, the Head Inspector of Schools
under Ismail, a Swiss man named Dor Bey, habitually referred to the new government system
with the French term 'L'instruction publique'. Dor and his colleagues insisted that the new
system be a distinct space, with no connection to the military or the mosque.3 01 The government
schooling system did not include courses on religion until the mid 1940s, meaning that between
the 1860-1940s Azhari's were unlikely to have anything to contribute to the government system
besides teaching Arabic (which would soon be on the decline as the British imposed English). It
even appears that the shrinking category of Arab language instruction in the higher paying
government schools was largely closed to al-Azhar graduates until the late 1930s, when ulema
holding the newly created Specialization for Teaching Degree were finally granted the formal
right to teach in government schools.30 2
Developments in foreign and government schools aside, the vast majority of Egyptian
students received their only education in the kuttab school system, which was tied to the
religious establishment at the local level and staffed primarily by low-level graduates and
students from al-Azhar. In 1875, there were an estimated 4,725 such schools with 4,881
teachers and nearly 120,000 students.0 3 Beyond the legislation to coordinate these schools with
the government system that was drafted in 1868 (referenced above) another attempt was made in
1880 but never put into effect.3"4 Thereafter European advisers -and later British occupiers-
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adhered to an informal norm of not openly tampering with the religious life of the country.
Many considered al-Azhar sacrosanct, and Europeans worried that any direct meddling would
incite popular resistance to their presence. It is thus no coincidence that the only government
ministries to retain autonomy during the British occupation were those tied to the religious
establishment-the shari'a and personal courts subdivision of the Ministry of Justice and the
Department of Awqaf (Religious Endowments), which was responsible for the kuttabs and al-
Azhar.30 s For decades anything that transpired in the religious establishment and its system of
schools occurred largely in isolation from developments in the official government schools (or
foreign schools) and vice-versa. The two sets of educational tracks existed as parallel systems.
The only notable exception to this general rule of institutional bifurcation was the
creation of Dar al-'Ulum in 1872. Dar al-'Ulum was essentially a teachers training school that
blended Islamic higher education with the study of "modern" topics at the secondary level.3 06
Since Azharis had not been willing to alter the curriculum within their institutions, Dar al-'Ulum
represented an attempt to sidestep Azhari resistance. According to Louis Aroian, the institution
was unique on a number of levels, most importantly in that it made a concerted effort to draw
traditional religious elites into the modern disciplinary structure of the state. Arion writes:
From its inception, Dar al-'U/um was envisaged as the transitional institution
which would inaugurate the modern age in a socially-acceptable fashion through
a group already received by most Egyptians as conveyers of wisdom and truth-the
scholars of al-Azhar The Dar al-'Ulum graduate was seen as the "new man" who
would be equally acceptable to Egyptians educated in both the religious and
purely secular schools."
This all changed as the British began to assume control over the administration of education in
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the country. Concerned that Dar al-'Ulum was becoming a "rallying point of political and
fanatical intrigue" in 1895 Douglas Dunlop (who controlled Egyptian Education policy for
nearly three decades) shrank the school's size, attached it directly to the government's model
primary schools and changed the curriculum to focus more heavily on "practical" subjects.308 As
part of these changes, the British also tightened the entry requirements for Dar al-'Ulum. The
new entrance exams placed heavy emphasis on subjects like basic math, geometry and
geography. As most Azharis had little or no training in these subjects, it became increasingly
difficult for them to gain acceptance at Dar al-'Ulum. Several years later, to prevent reliance on
Azhari recruits altogether, the British created a new preparatory section for the school that was
completely independent of the Azhari system. As a result, the "old tie with al-Azhar as a source
of students was effectively eroded"309 transforming Dar al-'Ulum from conduit for upward
mobility for Azharis into yet another challenger in the competition for coveted teaching jobs.
Beyond derailing the one viable conduit of interaction between the Azhari and the
government education systems, several other dimensions of British policy had the effect of
reifying the dual nature of education in Egypt. The first set of blows came as the combined
result of British penny-pinching and the so-called "Indianization" of the Egyptian administration.
The Hunter Commission (also known as the India Education Commission), which met in 1882
and 1883, produced a set of findings suggesting that British policy in India had created a class of
intellectuals who lacked professional expertise and were highly critical of British rule. Lord
Cromer (the British controller-general in Egypt) and his colleagues took the Commission's
findings to heart and vowed not to make the same mistakes. Education policy in Egypt,
remarked Cromer, must prevent the "manufacturing of demagogues" as had occurred in India
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and should only produce as many graduates as there were jobs to be filled in the civil service. 310
In accordance with these ideas, the British restricted the number of state schools and the
number of students who could receive a state education. To make these restrictions more
formidable, Cromer also introduced fees into all government schools, forcing student's families
to pay for the privilege of a state education. By 1892, nearly 75 percent of students were paying
for all of their expenses (tuition, clothes, books, etc) in the state schools.3 "' Since the British
were only willing to spend less than 1 percent of their overall budget on education, this policy
also lessened the financial burden of keeping Ismail's government schooling system afloat during
the occupation.3 12 Concomitant with the introduction of fees came the formalization of close
links between the state schooling system and the bureaucracy in 1892. The British made
employment in the first tier of the Egyptian civil service contingent upon holding a secondary
certificate from the state schooling system; in order to gain employment in the second tier,
applicants had to at least posses a primary certificate from a state or equivalent private (read
foreign) school.3 3
Additional developments further prevented Azhari integration into the state. In 1893, the
Ministry of Public Education (already separate from Awqaf ministry that controled al-Azhar and
the kuttab schools) was reduced to a department in the British dominated Ministry of Public
Works, where over a quarter of all employees were European.3" By 1900, the official language
of state primary, secondary, and professional schools had become English, largely removing the
need for Arabic teachers. 3" Furthermore, the British used state primary and secondary schools to
train colonial administrators who were fresh-off the boat from England, which further lowered
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the demand for native teachers. In the 1890s and 1900s most men who joined the British
colonial administration were first brought out to teach English and other subjects in the state
schools as part of their initial training and acclimation. These new colonial administrators
typically served a two or three year apprenticeship in the schools and then moved on to other
posts in the Ministry of the Interior or Finance.316 Likewise, positions in the four professional
schools (teacher-training, law, medicine and engineering) gradually became dominated by
Europeans. In 1896 these schools employed 45 Egyptians and 16 Europeans. By 1906 the ratio
had shifted to 34 Egyptians and 47 Europeans.
Taken together, these policies ostracized the religious establishment from the government
education system and thus the state more generally. Tignor depicts the resultant dichotomy well:
"[B]y 1914 the gap between the two schools systems was quite distinct. Nowhere
did one system lead into the other The Westernized schools trained young men .
. .for service in the modernizing administration. The Islamic schools ... trained
young men basically in religious subjects and prepared them for the . .. roles of
shaykh, imam, mufti, and school teacher Only afew men had the ability, energy,
vision or opportunity to move from one system to the other, since regular channels
of access did not exist. 18
Under these arrangements, a wealthy class would monopolize both higher education and
government jobs. By contrast, the Azhari and kuttab education system, which continued to
service the Egyptian lower classes, became bloated with students who faced scant job prospects
upon graduation. Knowing that a state education would bring professional and financial
stability, parents were often desperate to enroll their sons in the state system. Few families,
however, had the money to do so. In a letter that Muhammad Abduh wrote to the travel writer
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and journalist Amedee Baillot de Guerville, he depicted the desperation of such poor families.
It is pitiful to see, each year, the spectacle of fathers and mothers of families
bringing their little boys to the Ministry of Education asking as a favor that they
may be accepted for free, invoking their poverty . . . but obliged ultimately to
return to their house or to their village deceived, disheartened, disconcerted, not
knowing what to do with these little children from whom they had dreamed so
many things.319
The alienation of the religious establishment from the state was thereby intensified by the
sobering class-based realities of the parallel systems.
With time then, what started out as simply two tracts for education (i.e. two distinct styles
of social discipline via schooling) hardened into a rigid institutional bifurcation that had weighty
political consequences for the future of state consolidation. The height of these tensions
culminated in the founding of the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1920s, "a movement largely
representing the interests of the more traditionally educated, and aimed at restoration of the
group's status and power." 20 Indeed, the self-proclaimed mission of the Brotherhood, "the
education of souls", signified that the government's exclusionary strategies of disciplinary reform
had inadvertently opened-up a political space for opposition to its policies in the name of
religion.12 ' The British "Indianization" of Egyptian education policy did not, therefore, prevent
the "manufacturing demagogues" that Cromer so feared. Instead, it manufactured demagogues
of a different variety by creating unbridgeable tensions between those educated by the state and
those relegated to the religious establishment.
All of these observations are further corroborated by the fact that, as Egypt came into its
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independence in the 2 0th century, the country's policymakers and leaders began to openly lament
how the "dual education system" of the 19th century had complicated the nation building project.
For example, the famous reformer Taha Husayn dedicated the majority of his 1938 book
Mustaqbal al-thaqafafi Misr (The Future of Culture in Egypt) to a critique of the country's
disparate educational tracts and the need to unify them so as to teach the young "to love the
Egyptian nation."322 Similarly an official publication from the Egyptian Ministry of Education
released in 1960 bemoaned how the system of "dual education" had "led to the creation of two
distinct classes with different culture, trends and tendencies, each of which hardly believed in the
other or had any serious understanding of it."323
The administrators of al-Azhar responded to this exclusion from the state by tightening
their grip on their own employees and students. In 1911 the High Council of al-Azhar drafted
employment rules explicitly banning the workers of al-Azhar from simultaneously holding
positions in the state system. According to the 1911 internal law:
The professors and employees are absolutely forbidden to pursue any profession
outside their own profession. They are not permitted to engage in teaching
outside the institution, nor accept any such employment, except by special
permissionfrom the Administrative Council. The Administrative Council shall not
give this permission except in a case of extreme necessity... 324
Chris Eccel's research into the al-Azhar High Council Proceedings shows that these rules were
upheld in a fairly strict manner. Although it was rare for Azharis to find employment in the state
system for all of the reasons mentioned above, when a few did manage to gain positions as
inspectors or teachers, they were often required to forfeit their post and/or a substantial portion of
their salary at al-Azhar.15 Here readers will recall that this stands in striking contrast with late
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Ottoman realities, where many ulema members simultaneously held positions in the religious
establishment and the state system with little problem.
In an attempt to further delineate Azhari professional territory, the same 1911 law also
clearly stipulated which jobs the ulema could rightfully hold: a primary degree from al-Azhar
allowed for teaching in the Koran schools attached to al-Azhar or in the provincial katatib; a
secondary degree allowed for clerical appointments in the shari'a courts, at al-Azhar, and in the
Department of Awqaf as well as mosque employment; the highest Alimiya degree allowed for all
of the above plus a career as a lawyer or judge in the sharia courts and or as a professor at al-
Azhar itself. 326 Despite the claim to exclusive professional privilege in these realms, the reality
was that in the legal domain too, the ulema were being displaced as a result of European
presence and policies. This is the subject of the next, and final, section.
VII. Legal Reform and the Shrinking Jurisdiction of the Shari'a Courts
Significant developments in the realm of legal reform also took root during Ismail's reign
and were thus colored by the presence and actions of European powers competing for markets
and influence. The first groundbreaking change was the introduction of the centralized Mixed
Courts system, which was established in 1875-6 and assumed jurisdiction in all civil and
commercial cases that involved a foreigner. Previously, under the terms of the Capitulations, a
dozen or so individual consular courts had rendered judgments in such cases based on their own
national legal codes. Under this system, disputes between a foreigner and an Egyptian had to be
settled either through diplomatic channels or in a consular court, which rarely granted judgments
in favor of Egyptian parties. As foreign debt to Europeans skyrocketed, the number of disputes
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of this type rose exponentially, motivating a complex coalition of Egyptians and foreigners to
argue in favor of a more unified court system. Ismail agreed to the creation of the Mixed Courts
because they would ostensibly allow him to protect the country's financial interests without
alienating those foreign bondholders who could bring out the country's complete fiscal collapse.
Foreign powers supported the Mixed Courts in part because Ismail agreed to adopt the French
parquet system, which would be headed by a foreigner and staffed by both foreigners and
Europeans.327
For our purposes here, the relevance of the introduction of the Mixed Courts system was
that it created a powerful and centralized disciplinary institution that was primarily staffed by
Europeans and had no interaction with the shari'a courts system. The Mixed Courts had adopted
French legal codes and the heads of al-Azhar had shunned the idea of teaching any foreign legal
subjects as part of its curriculum, meaning that graduates from the madrasa had no place in this
new legal framework. As Mark Hoyle has argued, "the first years of the Mixed Courts were a
time of judges, mostly newly arrived in Egypt, feeling their way through the new codes and
disputes."3 2 Two-thirds of all judges appointed to these courts were foreigners.32 9 Furthermore,
judges were appointed for life, leaving no room for Azhari incorporation later down the line (the
Mixed Courts were not closed until 1937). Soon, a Mixed Bar Association was set up as a
professional organization and eventually came to regulate lawyers operating in the Mixed Courts.
At the Association's founding in 1876 and at its first election in 1877, not a single Arabic name
can be found on the list of the 79 lawyers present. 130 Despite their limited jurisdiction, the
Mixed Courts also began to perform the function of registering and issuing land deeds and titles
-even when no foreign party was involved- thereby gradually stripping the shari'a courts of
173
one of its traditional duties. 331
More importantly the Mixed Court's, just by virtue of their existence and the foreign
expertise that they attracted (some of dubious quality), greatly influenced the subsequent
development of the Egyptian National Courts system. The idea for the creation of a centralized
system of National Courts emerged in 1880, when several proposals were put forth to extend the
jurisdiction of the Mixed Courts to include all disputes between Egyptian parties. The British,
who agreed for the need of a centralized national system in principle, feared that simply
extending the Mixed Courts to include inter-Egyptian disputes would allow the French to gain
even greater influence in the country. For their part, many Egyptian leaders feared that an
expansion of the Mixed Courts would just increase foreign domination. As a counter proposal to
the idea of extending the Mixed Courts, Muhammad Qadri Pasha (minister of Justice under
Tawfiq, Ismail's successor) advocated basing the civil law in the National Courts entirely on
Islamic law. To this end, he personally prepared a codification of Hanafi law entitled Murshid
al-hayran for eventual application in the new system.3 32
With the British occupation in 1882, the new Minister of Justice, Husayn Fakhri Pasha,
quickly dismissed Muhammad Qadri Pasha's proposal, arguing that the codification was not
sufficiently complete to merit the basis of a new legal system. Instead, he released an influential
memorandum that eventually became the foundation for the new National Courts system. The
new courts were to be directly modeled after, but structurally separate from, the Mixed Courts.
The National Courts would adopt essentially the same legal code as the Mixed Courts,
translating the French into Arabic. To the almost complete exclusion of religious legal scholars,
the judges for the National Courts would be drawn from several pools, including Egyptians who
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had studied law in Europe (primarily France), European residents familiar with the local laws
and language, and foreign judges of the Mixed Courts.33 3
The British were not ecstatic about the French basis of the new court system, but habit
and the availability of (French-influenced) personnel appears to have trumped other
considerations. As Lord Cromer would later recall, although the necessity of relying on French
practices was "regrettable", it was the most efficient solution.
French law and procedure had already taken root in Egypt. The codes
administered by the Mixed Tribunals were French. All the young Egyptians who
had received any legal training had been educated in France. It was, therefore,
inevitable that the new Tribunals should be based on a French rather than on an
English mode.334
While it may have been efficient in the short term, basing the National Courts system on the
French-inspired Mixed Courts was not free of repercussions.
For the religious establishment, the most significant of these repercussions was the
constriction of the jurisdiction of the shari'a courts system. Fakhri considered the question of the
shari'a courts specifically in his original 1882 memorandum, opting to greatly limit their sphere
of influence. He justified this decision in the following terms.
An additional question that merits consideration is the existence of the shari'a
courts side by side with the national courts.. . If this were to continue, keeping in
mind the differences in the laws and procedures of the two systems, a great
danger would result.. . If one were entirely free to submit his case to the court he
desired, then both systems would lose their respect and influence... Thus, it is
necessary to define the competence of both systems: to limit the jurisdiction of
shari'a courts to personal status and to make the other cases, be they civil,
commercial, or criminal, within the jurisdiction of the national courts.3"
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Although this policy almost immediately limited the job opportunities of those ulema seeking a
legal career, for the first decade of the National Courts' existence some Azharis did manage to get
a foothold in the system as lawyers. In 1893, however, a law was passed making a secular law
degree from a state or foreign school a prerequisite to advocacy in the National Courts system,
guaranteeing that, like in the field of education, in law too there would be little cross over
between the parallel sets of religious and state institutions.33 6 Adding insult to injury, judges and
lawyers in the National Courts earned much higher salaries than did those working in the shari'a
system.33 7 In response to these affronts, the kadis of the shari'a courts reluctantly reorganized
themselves solely around matters of personal status. Yet, unlike in late Ottoman Turkey where
the number of centers for shari'a law decreased drastically in the years before independence as
kadis joined the state system, I have found no evidence to suggest that the actual number of
shari'a courts was reduced in Egypt -- only their scope of jurisdiction was diminished.
As Crecelius illuminates, the religious establishment's objections to the legal reforms in
the second half of the 19th century were largely based on economic and professional concerns.
For, "by changing the basis of legal interpretation, the state was depriving ulama [sic], who
remained unfamiliar with the principle of modem legal interpretation, of one of the few
remaining means for entrance into the state bureaucracy."338 In the face of shrinking job
prospects Azhari students did organize to demand equal opportunity and chances for upward
mobility. In the 1920s, a group calling themselves the Committee of Azhar Students published a
memo outlining a long list of demands. Most of the group's complaints centered around issues of
professional status, including: 1) reorganizing all new state schools under al-Azhars authority; 2)
equalizing al-Azhar degrees with those granted by government schools; 3) ending employment
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discrimination against Azhari graduates; 4) equalizing Azhari and state pay-scales; and 5)
requiring religious courses in state schools that can only be taught by Azharis.33 9 Such concerns
were amplified as enrollment figures at al-Azhar continued to climb in the 1930s and 1940s (see
Table IX), but little was done to meet these demands. As one Azhari professor foreboded in
1945, "we are graduating in a single generation an army of unemployed that will be a source of
unrest first of all in the Azhar, and elsewhere; indeed a source of unrest for themselves and
everyone else."340
VIII. Conclusions
To summarize, although the political programs of Nasser and Ataturk exhibited
remarkable similarities, the institutional inheritances that they were working with could not have
been more disparate. In Turkey, religious institutions had been weakened and dispersed over the
course of the 19 th century as religious elites were gradually absorbed into the state system as
teachers, judges, bureaucrats and politicians through strategies of piecemeal coiptation. A very
large number of ulema members in Turkey tacitly supported the states' expanding disciplinary
role because the process by which it occurred afforded them with stable professional
opportunities. Although largely unintentional and driven by a lack of manpower, strategies of
reform based on the co6ptation of religious actors created powerful religion-state synergies.
These synergies augmented the state's moral authority and paved the way for comprehensive
state sovereignty over schooling, law and religious regulation in Republican Turkey.
Had disciplinary reforms in Egypt continued along in the same pattern of gradual
co6ptation as initiated by Muhammad Ali in the early 1900s, the paths of Egypt and Turkey may
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not have diverged so markedly. The increasing manpower supplies and expertise that flooded
the country from the mid- 19* century onward, however, meant that reform endeavors based on
co6ptation gave way to attempts at change by conversion and the creation of parallel systems.
The effects of creating isolated, parallel systems of education and law were especially harmful
for the state over the long term. The existence of parallel systems excluded religious elites from
the disciplinary reform process, causing religious and state structures to bifurcate and develop
into somewhat hostile, and even competing, systems. The religious establishment centered
around al-Azhar and the madrasas remained relatively strong in terms of sheer numbers, as its
ranks were not depleted via the piecemeal integration of shaykhs into the state system. Indeed,
foreigners and Europeanized Egyptians had monopolized key government positions in education
and law, greatly constricting pathways for the upward mobility of individual members of the
ulema. Ostracized from the state and confronted with increasingly dismal career prospects,
religious elites came to view the state's expanding disciplinary role and claims to sovereignty
with suspicion and enimity. Nasser was thus dealing with a large, angry and well-entrenched
religious establishment, which made sudden co6ptation and strategies of secularization by decree
impossible to actualize. The ulema's virtually complete disappearance from public politics in
early republican period in Modem Turkey was thus not to be repeated in Egypt.
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Table VIII: Mosque Control In Egypt341
No. Government No. Private Mosques % of Total Mosques
Controlled Mosques that are Government
Controlled
2000
3006
1975 5163
1982 6071
14000
14212
33575
26622
13.00%
17.50%
13.30%
18.60%
Table IX: Enrollment at al-Azhar 32
Year Number of Students
1800-1830 ~1500-3000
1846 7500
1855 5940
1867 4712
1875 11095
1893 8259
1901 11388
1917 15335
1927 11797
1941 13825
1951 18959
1954 25700
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Year
1954
1962
I
I - I
Chapter 5
Building the Disciplinary State in Greece
The divergent paths that characterized the Turkish and Egyptian reform of disciplinary
institutions had important consequences for the state's ability to enact secular decrees upon
independence. Turkey is, however, often considered to be a unique case; especially in the greater
Middle East. Is it? In this chapter I argue that to better identify and verify the generalizable
mechanisms behind Turkish strategies of state-building the best comparison lies not to the East
but to the West. Greece-although different from Turkey in almost every respect- was
confronted with major manpower and moral authority shortages at a formative stage in the state-
building process. As a result, Greek reformers used the piecemeal co6ptation of religious elites
to help expand schooling and legal institutions. Identifying a common source and trajectory for
reform strategies in two such dissimilar cases confirms that the mechanisms discovered in the
Turkish can indeed operate elsewhere.
For anyone even remotely familiar with Greek history and/or Hellenic nationalism, it is
no shock that the Orthodox Church played a formative role in the creation of modem Greece. In
fact, the founding myth history of Greek nationalism and independence revolves around the role
of the Orthodox Church as both the protector of an oppressed Greek identity during the period of
Ottoman rule and the ultimate champion of the modem Greek State. According to this narrative,
the Church is viewed as one of the pioneers of Greek independence-a unified force that blessed
the anti-Ottoman insurgents and provided unwavering support for the creation of an autonomous
Greek State."
The image of a natural, holly, and unconditional union between the Greek Orthodox
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Church and the Greek State is largely fabricated. Whereas some prelates and church
functionaries played a key role in the independence struggle and the forging of an independent
Greece, numerous others were hardly enthusiastic nationalist rebels. Many religious elites came
on board the Greek national project grudgingly-if at all-lured by the promise that their social
position would be as well (or even better) protected in the new Greece as it was under the millet
system of Ottoman tutelage. The narrative of a natural and essential connection between Greek
nationhood and the Church emerged only as the byproduct of strategic interaction between elites
and the resultant institutional compromises regarding legal and educational reform.
This chapter documents the close parallels between Turkish and Greek state-building.
Starting with the rise of Greek reformers, I discuss the shortages that they faced in terms of
military might, manpower and moral authority. Next, I explore the tumultuous period of church-
state relations during the era of revolution and provisional-governments from 1821 to 1832
when the church began to be weaken as result of both co6ptation and international factors. The
third section investigates Greece under the Bavarian Regency of King Otto, which sealed the
Churches fate as an "independent" entity, but an entity subordinate to the young Greek state. To
conclude I consider how the normalization of relations between the Greek Church and the
Istanbul Patriarchate helped to propel another half a century of gradual state expansion up until
the Ottoman Empire's collapse.
I. Greek Reformers
Just like the Young Turk reformers who were spreading their message from expat hubs in
Europe, the seeds of reform and revolutionary sentiment among Greek-speakers also germinated
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within the diaspora communities scattered around the periphery of the Empire. At the end of the
18th and the beginning of the 19th century, an influential Greek-speaking mercantile class based
out of locations including Paris, Pisa, Trieste, Venice, Vienna, Budapest, Bucharest, Jassy and
Odessa mobilized to support enlightenment through modernized schooling practices and
publishing initiatives.3 44 The nebulous group became involved in founding and sustaining a
small number schools that preached political classicism and new styles of learning. These
activities eventually culminated in the founding of the Philiki Etaireia [Friendly Society] in
1814, a revolutionary movement deeply influenced by Jacobin-style politics.
The Philiki Etaireia's predicament resembled that of the CUP in Turkey in a number of
important ways. For one, the Philiki Etaireia originated as an elitist secret-society, not as a
populist movement. Woodhouse remarks that "a conspiratorial society must have distinctive
characteristics: at least a clandestine character and membership, a system of initiation, a secret
oath of loyalty, a cellular organization, and the use of code names and ciphers ... The Philiki
Hetairia had all of them."3 45 In the first two years of the Society's existence (from 1814-1816) it
failed to gather a decent following, enrolling only about 30 members, the majority of which
came from the Greek merchant class in Russia. Only after devising a system to put 12 so-called
"apostles" in charge of recruitment did the organization expand in earnest. 346
Growing the Society was made all the more difficult by the fact that the organization was
extremely short on infrastructure and manpower. Although Russians covertly backed the
Society's venture, the majority of funds they offered-up were only to be released once Greek
independence was actually achieved. Furthermore, whether or not the Greek lands were ready
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for revolution, independence and statehood remained highly debatable. Nothing even close to
resembling a centralized state existed at the time. There was no centralized army so to speak, as
the military class was divided into localized and unruly waring factions (kleftes, the armatoli,
and the kapi) who were more like bandits the soldiers. General Alexandros Ipsilantis, who
became the head of the Friendly Society and the spearhead of the actually rebellion had at his
disposal fewer than 4,500 men, 4 cannons and a few cavalry.14 ' There was no centralized system
of national courts, military or otherwise; just ad-hoc committees to adjudicate cases.3 48 As Garry
Bass has shown, without the largess of idealistic European philhellenists and wealthy London
bankers, the revolution may have never even gotten off the ground. The revolutionaries could
barely sustain Greek independence, let along conjure the resources needed to launch a program
of universal primary education.3 49
At the time, a smattering of "Greek" schools were scattered throughout the Empire, in
places like Patmos, Smyrna, Mount Athos, Mesolonghi, Dimitsana, Ayvalik, Milies, and Chios.
Some of these institutions, such as Mount Athos, were primarily theological and firmly under the
direct control of the the religious establishment. Others schools began exploring 'progressive'
subjects, including the classics, maths and sciences. Research into the biographies of the early
Greek teachers shows that even this second class of schools was overwhelmingly staffed by men
with religious backgrounds and trainings." Access to general education was scant at best and
there were few men trained to teach. In 1823 Colonel Leicester Stanhope submitted a "Report
on the State of Greece" in which he observed that " there is a great want of educated men in
Greece. This is felt in the representative body the administration of justice, in the prefectures, in
the army and navy-in short, in every department of the state." 2
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The early Greek reformers and Friendly Society, like the CUP, endeavored to make up for
what it lacked in materialist terms through the extensive use of religious symbols and imagery in
its propaganda and other published materials. Jacobin politics aside, the organization needed
religious moral authority to further its political objectives. Initiation into the group was thus
conducted by a priest and printed literature made explicit appeals to the messianic beliefs popular
among the Greek-speaking masses.3 3 Effi Gazi is therefore correct in her observation that the
principles of the Society marked a "relocation of Enlightenment ideas in religious and
ecclesiastical contexts." 354
The writings of Adamantios Korais, a major figure in the Greek Enlightenment who
dedicated substantial energy to the promotion of education through the classics, provide an
excellent window into the way that Greek reformers were careful to make their work appealing
to the religious establishment (and the religious populous). One of Korais' most classic works
includes his story of "Papa Trechas", which served as the preface to his translations of the Iliad.
This story is worth exploring in some detail, for it perfectly depicts the type of fusion-both
symbolic and infrastructural-that Greek reformers were seeking from the Church.
The lengthy story takes place in a small village on the Island of Chios and depicts the life
of a middle-aged, misguided priest "Papa Trechas." Early into the story, Papa Trechas is
introduced to and begins studying the Iliad, eventually coming to the realization that only
education can save his village from ignorance, poverty, and tyranny. This realization helps turn
his life around and transforms him into a savior of the people and the nation. Papa Trechas
works diligently to transmit knowledge about the value schooling, urging his follower to dedicate
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themselves to both the Orthodox Church and methods of modem education. One day, after
collecting alms at his local church Papa Trechas tells his followers:
God does not reside in stones and timber but in the souls of good Christians ...
The greater number ofyou do not know how to read and write: we shall perform
an action incomparably more pleasing to God ifwe put out to interest the money
that we have collected, so that a teacher of reading and writing can be paid out of
it annually..
After describing this incident, the narrator implores the reader, "What do you say to this my
friend? Does the humble priest of Bolissos [Papa Trechas] appear to you more sensible and more
pious than the emperor Justinian, who cut down the pay of the school master to build splendid
churches?" The remainder of the story is packed with lavish praise for Papa Treachas' and his
good deeds. The morals to be drawn from the tale are obvious: priests and men of faith should
join in the mission to modernize society by serving as the apostles for the spread of modem
education. In the words of the author himself: "Only education can cure the diseased minds of
the masses. In this matter, the members of the clergy are the best doctors." "
For its own part, the real Orthodox religious establishment, much like the late Otttoman
ulema, became deeply divided in reaction to the appearance of reformers advocating for
revolutionary sentiments and new-styled institutions of learning. Research on the Philiki
Etaireia's membership lists reveals that nearly ten-percent of the organization were members of
the clergy, including 9 metropolitans, 8 bishops, 10 archimandrites, 9 archdeacons, 12 monks, 7
abbots, and 30 priests. 356 The metropolitan Germanos of Old Patras, for example, emerged a
pioneering leader, directing the revolt in Patras and bringing many of the clergy in the
Peloponnese region over to the revolutionary cause.3 57 The aforementioned report by Colonel
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Leicester Stanhope, documented that priests greatly aided the revolutionary cause. According to
Stanhope, "They traversed the country and enlisted their votaries in the honorable plot; they
fought in the ranks of the noble insurgents." 358
The initiative's of Greek reformers and the Philiki Etaireia, however, also elicited a
strong negative reaction from other parts of the Orthodox church hierarchy. In 1798,
Athanasiso Parios published his Khristianiki Apologia, a text that he said was supposed to be a
"preventative medicine for all those who, by the mercy of god, had not yet drunk of the
Voltairean poison."359 Similarly, in 1817, Mikahil Perdikaris lambasted the reformers for their
sacrilegious practice of adopting ancient Greek, as opposed to traditional Christian, names.
Perdikaris complained that reformers took "no pleasure in the surnames of their family, and take
the name of some ancient, or philosopher hero . . . So that one calls himself Empedocles and
Thrasyboulos, one calls himself Ass, another Blockhead." Perdikaris went on to point fingers
and name names, specifically criticizing the "impious and abominable Kyritsis in Ioannina"
whom he accused of having an agenda to " preach openly atheism and impiety" as well as
"mock the divine and supernatural mysteries of our church".360
In Istanbul, the Church organized heresy trials, book burning and general protests against
the increasing emphasis on natural sciences and classical heritage.3 1 In an encyclical of 1819,
the Ecumenical Patriarch and Holy Synod clearly signaled their distrust of modernizing school
reforms:
What benefit does our youth derive from learning numbers and algebra, cubes
and cube roots, triangles and tetragons, logarithms, calculus, ellipses, atoms,
vacuums, vortices, power and attraction, gravity, the northern lights, optical and
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acoustic matters and a myriad such things ... if their writing are full of solecism,
if they have no idea of religion, if their moral values are degenerate, if their forms
of government are injurious.2
As revolutionary ideas gave way to revolutionary bloodshed in the 1820s, the Orthodox religious
establishment began to slip into a self-undermining trajectory as some priests were coopted into
the ranks of the reformers and 'progressive' teachers while others opted for resistance.
II. Revolution, Provisional-Governments and Continued Religious Cooptation
The decade that followed was characterized by the continued co6ptation of religious
leaders for the national cause as well as infighting and general disarray within the Church's
ranks. At the first Greek national assembly in Epidauros in December 1821 the new Greek
government was eager to establish its religious credentials. The very first article of the new
constitution established the Orthodox Church as the official state religion. A Ministry of
Religious Affairs was formed under the direction of Bishop Joseph of Androusa in 1822.363 But
relations with the Patriarchate in Istanbul were headed full throttle down a collision course.
Upon receiving news of the uprising, Patriarch Grigorios V and 21 other prelates released an
encyclical condemning the Greek national cause and excommunicating those who supported it.364
Unfortunately for Grigorios, this show of loyalty did not satisfy Ottoman officials, who executed
him soon there after. The crisis gave rise to a wave of violent reprisals against Orthodox
religious sights throughout the Empire, depleting the churches ranks and causing many clergy
members to flee to the new Greece.
Intra-church relations were quickly approaching their nadir. Joseph of Androusa
struggled to put ecclesiastical affairs in order from his Ministry of Religious Affairs but without
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guidance from Constantinople, whose leadership had been decapitated and whose ranks had now
been thrown into complete confusion, he faced an uphill battle. As Charles Frazee correctly
points out, the Greek National Assembly, not the actual Church, had selected Androusa for the
post. Androusa therefore had difficultly implementing some of the new regulations set out in the
first constitution. For example, the new law that no bishops were to be consecrated without
government approval proved particularly tricky to enforce. Episcopal appointments and transfers
were nearly impossible to organize.365
Furthermore, the scope of Androusa's jurisdiction was ambiguous, in large part because
the succession of provisional governments and national assemblies (up until the arrival of
Kapodistrias in 1828) were unclear on exactly what role religion would play in the new Greek
state. Initially, Androusa served not just as the head of the Ministry for Religious Affairs but also
as the head of the Ministry of Justice. Jacques Visvizis has called Androusa's dual role a
"coincidence", though there is little doubt that Androusa's appointments had more to do with
winning religious moral authority and the lack of other qualified candidates than pure
happenstance.3 6 Such concessions to religion and religious sensibilities were commonplace at
the time. The first constitution of 1822, the second national Constitution of Astros in 1824 and
the third national Constitution of Troezena (1927) all made reference to the use of Byzantine and
Christian law until a uniform civil code could be introduced. 67 As a result, the delineation
between the jurisdiction of the "religious" legal authority of the Church and the "civil" legal of
the authority of the state was blurred. For years the two systems were fundamentally
intertwined.
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The synergies between religion and the courts produced a fair number of disputes during
the period of provisional governments which are well document by Jacques Visvizis. On the one
hand, in 1824 loannis Theotokes was appointed as the new Minister of Justice, now separate
from the Ministry of Religion (which was still in the hands of Androusa). Theotokes attempted
to centralize legal jurisdiction, tasking the Ministry of Religion with telling bishops and priests to
direct all non-religious disputes to the nascent system of official 'state' courts. However since
state courts were very few and far between, religious elites had to take it upon themselves to use
or convene courts of their own. Religious involvement in legal issues was so common at the
time that the Greek Executive Administration formally came out with explicit approval of the
Church's legal role. The Administration explicitly told members of the Church to continue to
convene courts and appoint temporary commissions ofjudges from the Church until the regular
courts could be established.
Even in places were regular state courts were founded, heavy use still had to be made of
the clergy. Religious officials were routinely employed to decide cases that lacked witnesses, to
write petitions and appeals, and to issue the threat of an ecclesiastical penance to law breakers.
The religious establishment's involvement in judicial matters was a major source of frustration
for Theotokes, as documented by the terse correspondence between the Ministries of Religion
and Justice in this period over the issue of legitimate jurisdiction. Religious involvement,
however was also largely unavoidable given the scarce resources of the state and the traditional
expertise of the Church.368 No doubt these controversies arose in part because the Ministry of
Religion was being used to help support the expansion of a legal system that eventually would
supplant religious authority altogether-though this was far from clear at the time.
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Similar types of overlap between religion and state also became increasingly apparent in
the field of education. On the 5th of July 1823 Theokletos Pharmakides, a devoted member of the
clergy was put at the head of the new states' education initiatives (Eforosfor the education and
moral upbringing of children). Pharmakides was a vociferous advocate of breaking with the
Patriarchate in Istanbul and establishing an independent Greek church to support education and
the national cause. A lack of resources and teachers, however, led Pharmakides to argue that "the
times were not right" for the development of a full blown system of education. He felt that the
Church first needed to be put in order. He left the post in a matter of months.369
The second Eforos for Education, Gregorios Konstantas, also a clergy member, was
similarly discouraged by the lack of man-power and resources. Nonetheless, instead of giving up
he at least made an effort to tour existing education institutions and to enlist the support and
assistance of some of his colleagues."O Simultaneously, on 19 May 1824 the Legislative body
appointed a Special Committee on Education to look into the issue of existing resources. The
President of the Committee was Anthimos Gazis, a learned clergy member. Among the other 4
deputies, one was a former monk.37 1 The Committees' final report appears to have been bleak. In
a summary of the report, Nikolaos Dragoumas writes that the state would definitely have to limit
its educational endeavors to only starting basic schools that focused on reading, writing, and
simple arithmetic. The best approach for the development of these schools, he wrote, had to be
"both inexpensive for the state and free for students." 2
Dragoumis' summary seems well informed. Data on enrollment in the Ionian Academy
from 1824-1825 (probably then the only existing higher-level school for the study of language,
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law and medicine) shows that there were only 74 students and that nearly all were either from the
clergy or had previously studied with Greek teachers from abroad.3 73 Even some Philhellens
from London, who aimed to materially support the Greek movement for independence, were
frustrated by conditions on the ground. In 1827 the Quarterly Review criticized the London
Greek Committee in the follow manner:
[P1rinting presses for a nation that cannot read! Constitutions for a country, the
purest patriots of which are klephtai, ie robbers! Mathematical instruments for a
people who do not know one cipher from another! And whirligig schools for a
youth who have hardly a village in which they can rest for a moment without the
expectation of having the scymitar at their throats.37 4
Confronting difficult circumstances, Greek education reformers opted to draw the religious
establishment closer and closer as the years passed.
Given the fact that relations between clergy in the new Greece and church officials in
Istanbul were becoming increasingly hostile, those affiliated with the Ministry of Religious
Affairs seem to have been happy to do their part to help the cause of national education. A
document from the Ministry dated 10 July 1825 says that the Ministry recognized "as one of its
duties the enlightenment of youth ... on a panhellenic basis."3 75 Also, Euangelidas finds
documentary evidence that the Ministry of Religion was actively involved in issuing state
teaching certificates in 1825.376
By the time loannis Kapodistria came to take control as the first head of state in a newly
liberated Greece in 1828, there was little if any question of how the state intended to fund the
much needed expansion of its primary education and legal system: the only way it could, through
the resources of the religious establishment. Soon after assuming power, Kapodistria received a
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notice from the Minister of Finance on January 1828 detailing the dire situation of the new Greek
state. The report stated that "From the moment when the [provisional] government was installed,
there was no direct revenue, even the smallest."" 7 Johnathan Miller, a foreign observer of
conditions in Greece commented on his visit from 1827-8 by saying that Kapodistria "brought
with him no troops, and only $60,000 in money. If this indeed is all the resources he has to
depend upon, I greatly fear the result of his attempt to establish order in Greece."3 78 Using the
Church was the only solution.
To this effect, on 18 January 1828 GenikE Ephimeris published a version of the new
educational plan that Kapodistria's government had submitted to the Legislature. The plan
documented that the government had identified two sources of funding for schools that were
deemed "appropriate to the present circumstances." First "half of the revenue of the local
monasteries" would be assigned to schools. Second, a tax on the sale of national resources would
be levied.3 79 In 1829 education and religion were both placed under the direction of the same
state directorate, the Ministry of Ecclesiastical Affairs and Public Instruction. That same year,
three committees were created to better coordinate the ecclesiastical hierarchy and systematize
education. The first committee was tasked with editing prayer books and catechism; the second
was charged with the preparation of grammar materials; the third was to study existing primary
school textbooks.380
With respect to the legal realm, Kapodistria sought to rely, at least for the time being, on
the informal (and primarily religious) system of courts that was already in existence at the local
level. He rejected outright the idea of adopting a foreign legal code; but he also rejected the idea
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of immediately codifying existing law and custom. Instead, he established a commission "to
prepare a modem Greek code, embodying such existing elements as could be assimilated without
difficulty."3"' The first courts of first instance started functioning around 1829 after the
government's publication of Ordinance no 8268 on the "Organization of the Courts." The content
of the law and the question of who could adjudicate were not entirely clear.38 2 There were still
proposals circulating between the ministries that suggested the use of mixed tribunals of lay
judges and priests for certain types of cases.
Interestingly, as the relationship between church and state deepened, the Greek
government's attitudes toward foreigners-and especially foreign meddling in education, began
to sour. Distrust of foreigners had a long pedigree in Greece. For example, as early as 1806 the
anomalously published Elliniki Nomarkhia warned that "To rely on foreign assistance in securing
her liberation Greece would only be substituting one form of alien domination for another."383
Given the circumstances, however, even the most patriotic revolutionaries sought out money in
the form of loans from foreign governments. That said, just because they sought foreign
financing did not mean that they welcomed foreign influence. In his reflections on visiting
Greece in 1823-44, G. Waddington observed that "the only key to their [Greek] affection is the
loan. They ask neither for our counsels, nor our hospitals, nor our officers, nor our Lancasterian
schools." 384
By the late 1820s and early 1830s the mounting hostility to foreign educators began
making missionaries and other foreign groups visibly uncomfortable. On 18 April 1828 GenikE
EphEmeris ran a piece decrying foreign schools and instruction in languages other than Greek. It
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is an "unforgivable sin", opined the writer,
... ifwe entrust our ten and fifteen year-old youths -who do not even know their
mother tongue, who have not been morally formed, and who have not been
initiated, as they should, into the dogmas of our holly religion- to foreigners who
teach them foreign languages."
In 1830, the Missionary Herald, which reported the proceedings of the American Board of
Commissioners for Foreign Missions, warned of the overwhelming presence of religious text
books for primary schools as well as what it saw as the increasingly troublesome relationship
between religion and state. The Herald reported that if
... ignorance and superstition, of which is confessedly much in Greece, are
allowed to in for a full share of influence in the settlement of church and state,
who can tell what may not occur to retard the process of improvement for half a
century to come.386
The following year, in 1831, the same publican reported the missionaries were actually being
pushed out of their own schools by representatives of the Greek Church. Priests were apparently
visiting all foreign schools to install Orthodox religious icons, sometimes forcing foreign
teachers to allow them to completely takeover religious instruction.3 87
Kapodistria, for his part, was meanwhile struggling to maintain positive relations with the
representatives of the Orthodox Church. As Woodhouse has argued, "[s]ince many schools were
based monasteries or otherwise financed by the Orthodox hierarchy, it was important to him
[Kapodistria] that relations be good." 38 Kapodistria's assassination in 1831 cut these efforts
short, but the general centralizing trends and strategies of reform based on the codptation of
religion lived on. According to Dakin, "the administrative system of the Kapodistrian period
survived into the period of the Bavarian regency and throughout the remainder of the nineteenth
194
century. The same is substantially true of the ecclesiastical system, the legal code, taxation, and
eduction." 389
III. The Regency Period: Greece's Secular Moment
By the time of Kapodistria's death, although officially still one, the church had for all
effective purposes ruptured. In 1833, with the advent of the King Otto and the Bavarian
Regency in Greece, the Church found itself in a vulnerable position that was strikingly similar to
the one that the Ottoman ulema would come to occupy nearly a century later. All the tumult of
the last two decades left the Church ill prepared for the radical "secularizing" reforms that lay
ahead. On July 15 an independent Synod of prelates was convened and within hours this group
had voted to officially cut-off relations with Istanbul and declare its autocephalous status through
a formal "Declaration of Independence of the Greek Church." The schism was now complete.
The synod's declaration paved the way for a new ecclesiastical constitution that placed the Greek
Church fully under the thumb of the King. The independent Greek Church was officially
demoted to the status of a state ministry.390 There was little question of where ultimate
sovereignty lay; it was with the state.
The Greek state wasted little time before appropriating Church resources and diverting
them to the cause of state-sponsored primary education. A committee of three clergymen,
including Spyrido Trikoupis and Theoklitos Farmakidis, and three laymen charged with
surveying the Church and monastic properties was quickly assembled. Within a matter of
months, Church assets and monastic properties were confiscated by the state and reallocated to
the Ministry of Education. The monastic establishment was large and valuable. There was one
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monastery for approximately every 1,500 people in the new state and monastic revenues were
estimated to put over 2 million drachmas in state coffers.391 For the bankrupt Greek state these
were major gains. Although this new source of revenue was alone not sufficient to immediately
institute high-quality universal primary education, it did help the state make significant progress.
As in modem Turkey then, the resources of the religious establishment were used to form the
backbone of the state's new education apparatus in Greece.
George von Maurer, a member of the Bavarian Regency, was the primary architect of the
both the new Church Constitution and the many changes that followed. In his memoirs/reports
von Maurer claims to have consulted with the clergy to come up with an arrangement that was
favorable to most, if not all, church officials. This assertion is highly questionable.39 2
Regardless, von Maurer's influence also extended into the legal realm. Over the course of his 18-
month term in Greece he published the Penal Code, the Code of Civil Procedure, the Code of
Criminal Procedure and the Organization of the Courts. Based on a reading of Maurer's On the
Greek People, which he published in 1835 and contains a detailed description of his strategies
and policies, it becomes evident that the Regency too coopted religious institutions and structures
into the new Greek legal system in ways that ultimately undermined Church authority. Despite
the fact von Maurer's Regency was a foreign one, the type of parallel institutional structures that
came to dominate the Egyptian landscape are nowhere to be seen.
In preparation for implementing his legal program, Maurer seems to have carefully
researched (to the best of his ability) the nuances of traditional Greek law and how it was being
practiced at the time. Unlike colonizers in Egypt, who kept their distance from religious affairs
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and institutions, Maurer directly engaged the religious establishment on legal issues. First, he
commissioned local reports by various native informants who could write in French and Italian.
Three such reports are published in the On the Greek People: one general report for all of
Greece; and two more specific reports, one from Chios and one that combines information on
Tinos, Syros and other Aegean Islands.393 Second, Von Maurer orchestrated a massive and
detailed survey with the Greek Minister of Justice Klonaris to systematically learn more about
the "types of law that had been in application up until now" across all of Greece. The actual
questionnaire for the survey was exceedingly detailed, thorough, and regionally specific with a
heavy focus on the traditional practice of family law and the role of the Church.394
As a result of his research and conditions on the ground, von Maurer was privy to the fact
that religious actors would have to be dealt with in the course of any legal reforms and that issues
of family law and religious regulation would be particularly tricky. In many ways von Maurer
came to serve as broker between the various competing interests in the new Greece, which
included liberal and secular minded reformers, the clergy of the new Greece, and the Patriarchal
hierarchy in Istanbul. Following the established Greek trend of coopting the Church to serve the
state, Maurer's ultimate solution regarding legal issues also included synergies and fusions with
religion that enabled church officials to maintain at least some symbolic influence, if not real
authority in the new system. First, although the delineation of legal jurisdictions outlined in the
"Declaration of Independence of the Greek Church" firmly put state sovereignty and civil law on
top, it also admitted to the existence of issues that "mixed" religious and secular aspects. These
mixed areas included things such as founding sites of worship, clerical education, and marriage.
395 Second, the very foundations for Greek civil law were drawn from conservative aspects of
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Byzantine law, which helped to preserve the symbolic status of the Church in family affairs. In
the words of the American Consul in Greece in 1840, in both education and law, "[t]he Church
had become the tool for designing men."396
One question remains: Why did the prelates of the independent Greek synod collectively
vote in favor of measures that would relegate their own authority and status on July 15 1833,
thereby making their co6ptation almost complete? The parallels with the late Ottoman ulema are
also relevant here, for the rationale behind this conundrum can be traced to how the decisions of
individual religious elites became focused on immediate individual well being and status
maintenance once the church had become vulnerable through self-undermining cycles. When the
July 1833 vote was made, 18 out of 56 archbishoprics and bishoprics were vacant and most came
to be filled by refugee bishops and monks that had recently flooded into the Greek state seeking
protection and opportunity.39 7 Given their poverty and refugee status, these religious leaders were
hardly in a position to assert authority against the Greek state, especially in the absence of
leadership from Constantinople. As Petropulos observes, the influx of refugee clergy and monks
also undermined the religious establishment's authority via a different mechanism.
Their [the refugees'7presence in Greece also undermined the independence of the
autochthonous clerics, who recognized the necessity of courting favor with the
secular authorities in order to avoid replacement by the refugee bishops.
Separated by conflicting material interests and divergent sectional loyalties, the
bishops could not speak or act as a united corporation."
What is more, the way that the Regency planned to refashion the diocesan structure of
independent church under the Greek state meant that all bishops would retain an official post of
some sort. By a decree of 20 November 1833, there would be only ten posts for bishops, one for
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each of the nome. The remaining bishops were to each be assigned a provisional see, which
allowed them to continue their works, albeit at a somewhat lower level. As the clergy died out,
the provisional sees were not allowed to be replaced, thereby gradually decreasing the clergy's
overall ranks.39 9
Acts of open rebellion against the Church's increasing subordination were not entirely
absent, but they typically emanated from the lower ranks of the religious hierarchy (just like in
late Ottoman Turkey). In several popular uprisings that took place in Mani, Pylos, and Argos
monks took the opportunity to agitate against the formation of an autocephalous church and the
state's appropriation of monastic resources. This type of protest continued into the 1840s and
1850s with monks like Christophoros Papoulakos inciting fervor against the so called
"Protestantization" of the Orthodox Church.4 00 Kosmas Flamiatos, another firebrand Orthodox
fanatic working from Patras, collaborated with Papoulakos and a handful of of other
Philorthodox conspirators to protest the spread of state-sponsored public education. The
"official"and "independent" Church, now squarely aligned with the Greek state, promptly came
out against such individuals so as to safeguard its own position, thereby legitimating the state's
efforts to crack-down and arrest religious elites who challenged the status quo.
Koliopoulos and Veremis have observed that the protests of low-level radicals and
mavericks actually undermined real opposition to the church-state fusion. "It was perhaps one of
the main and lasting weaknesses of the old ecclesiastical order that opposition to the new order
was channeled to and voiced by charlatans, and dissipated itself in inconsequential peasant unrest
which as a rule alienated the educated Philorthodox thinkers." 40' As in late Ottoman Turkey then,
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the split between low-level fanatics and mid/upper-level sympathizers with the state further
prevented the religious establishment from regaining its lost sovereignty.
IV. Ecclesiastical Reunification and State Expansion: Cooptation beyond State Borders
The Church had been so weakened by the late 1840s that it was having a genuine
difficultly training future clerics. The aforementioned decree issued on November 20 1833
ordering provisional sees not to be restaffed in the instance that a clergy member died had
worked all too well. The Greek state was happy to see the power of the Church weaken but was
not in a position to let it collapse entirely: the need for religious moral authority was too strong.
The state was also going to need the help of the the Church, both in Athens and in Istanbul, to
fulfill its nationalist goals of expanding north. As a result, the Greek government took no real
efforts to block the reconciliation process that finally normalized relations between the Greek
Church and the Ecumenical Patriarchate in 1850, a move that revitalized clerical ranks in Greece
and the Church's status overall.
In the decades that followed, the Greek government continually reaped the rewards of
religious moral authority and even used the resources of the Patriarchate to carry out its
irredentist designs in places like Macedonia. Gradually, territories to the north came under the
umbrella of the Church of Greece (as opposed to the Patriarchate in Istanbul). In 1866 the
dioceses of the Ionian Island were made part of the Greek Orthodox Church. In May1882 the
dioceses of Thessaly, Arta and part of Jannina came under the authority of the Church of Greece.
The state's expansion, like the process of piecemeal co6ptation itself, was gradual. For example,
control of the dioceses of Greek Epiros, Macedonia, and Thrace was not transferred from
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Istanbul to the Greek Church until as late as 1928.402
During the second half of the 1 9 th century the Greek irredentist movement worked
through religious channels, relying on intelligence from the Patriarchate and cooperation from
local bishops and churches. Not all bishops in the northern territories were enthusiastic
supporters of the new Greek state and its expansionist policies. When confronted by recalcitrant
elements, politicians in the new Greece would win-over some popular lower-level clergy
members and attempt to have the problematic bishops replaced.4"3 By far the strongest weapon
of Greek irredentists were the schools connected to the Patriarchate. Statistics from the
Patriarchate from 1904 show that the diocese not yet under the control of the Church of Greece
were home to hundreds of schools that could be exploited for the irredentist cause. In Jannina
there were 184 schools, in Castoria there were 153, in Monastir there were 67, in Vodena there
were 72, in Salonika there were 40, in Serres there were 61, in Drama there were 67, in
Philioppopolis there were 45 schools and in Adrianopole there were 88 schools.404 Text books
produced by the Greek state were distributed and in used at many of these schools.4 5
While using religious elites and institutions the Greek state was also extremely careful to
prevent church (and especially Patriarchal) authority from ever encroaching on state sovereignty.
The ultimate testament to this fact is that when the Ottoman Empire collapsed and the
Patriarchate was looking for a new home, the Greek government preferred to have the heads of
the Orthodox Church held forever hostage in a "captive" Istanbul than have them wielding real
authority from the peaks of Mt. Athos in Greece proper. The hypocrisy was blatant. For
decades now Greek leaders had defended the existence of the Ecumenical Patriarch in Istanbul,
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arguing that removal of the Patriarch would cause a general crisis of confidence in the Orthodox
world and would open the door for permanent Russian domination over the Eastern Orthodox
Church.4 6 Greek elites had explicitly linked the legacy of the Patriarch's seat in Constantinople
back to the city's "glorious past" as the capital of the Byzantine Empire, giving it a formidable
symbolic place in the narrative of Greek national identity. In short, the Patriarch was one of the
most heavily used religious symbols in Greek elites' repertoire.
For their part, late Ottoman elites wanted the Ecumenical Patriarch out of Istanbul. For
certain, the Ottomans had good reason to question the political loyalties of then Patriarch,
Meletios IV, who had served since 1921. Meletios had been thoroughly implicated in anti-
Turkish activities during the Greek occupation. As a result, the nascent Turkish state made a
considerable diplomatic efforts to see that the Greek Patriarch's headquarters be moved to the
Holly Synod on Mount Athos in Halkidiki, a region located within Greek territory. Yet Turkish
demands fell on deaf ears and international pressure eventually succeeded in convincing the
Turks to agree to a compromise: the Greek state would force Meletios IV to abdicate his position
and the Turks would allow for a new Patriarch, who would be stripped of all political and
administrative authority, to exercise his spiritual prerogatives over the Greek Orthodox
community.*0 7
The compromise with the Turks over the fate of the Patriarchate was indicative of the
Greek elite's general attitude towards religion. This last wave of Greek reformers, like those who
came before, aimed to strip religious authorities of real political power while at the same time
appropriating, leveraging and maintaining religious identity markers by linking them to the state
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in such a way as to legitimate the state sovereignty. That this was the underlying objective of the
Greek state is evidenced by two facts. The first is that the Greeks did not press the Turks to
secure the precise conditions under which the Patriarchal institution was to maintain its
existence. The Greeks did not demand any written commitment from the Turks on the issue and
effectively took the Turkish promise to allow the Patriarch to continue his religious duties at face
value.4 08 The fact that the Greeks were so adamant that the Patriarch remain in Turkey but then
did so little to formally safeguard the institution demonstrates their preference for symbolic as
opposed to real religious authority. The second relevant fact is that Meletios IV himself, together
with other religious authorities, fiercely resisted the Greek decision to maintain a politically
castrated Patriarchate in Constantinople.4 09 Ironically, Meletios actually sided with the Turks in
wanting the church headquarters moved to Mt. Athos or somewhere else within Greece! He
realized that the symbolic location of Constantinople was just that-symbolic-and that the best
chances for exercising real power would be from within the Greek state itself.
Despite Meletios recalcitrance, he ultimately lost his battle with Greek national
authorities and was deposed. Divested of all formal authority, the Patriarchs who came after
Meletios were essentially powerless and could not even offer effective protection to the small
Orthodox community of Istanbul. Partly as a result, the Orthodox population of Istanbul has
declined from 110,000 in 1923 to a mere 2,000 today.410 The sad fate of the Orthodox Christians
in Istanbul was the price that had to be paid to maintain the national-religious symbolism of the
Patriarch while simultaneously preventing him from meddling in the political affairs of the new
Greek state. The next chapter shows that it was not only the Greek Orthodox community in
Istanbul that became the victim of state-expansion strategies based on institutional and symbolic
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synergies with religion. Religious minorities throughout both Greece and Turkey have faced
similar troubles, precisely because of the role that religious co6ptation played in the state-
building process.
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Chapter 6
Successful Secularization, Failed Pluralism: the Plight of Religious Minorities in Greece
and Turkey
In Greece and Turkey modernizing reform strategies that relied on co6pting religious
elites into the state's disciplinary institutions -as opposed to constructing parallel systems of
education and law that excluded them- tamed potential religious challenges to state
centralization and ultimately enabled state sovereignty to reign in these realms. The general
predilection for strong, orderly and "secular" states would suggest that the piecemeal co6ptation
of religion is largely a good thing, in that it benefits overall stability and moderates religious
actors. On many levels, as the previous chapters have shown, this is true. There is, however,
also a darker side to the religion-state synergies built via co6ptation. Over the long term, states
that rely on religious elites to help create their disciplinary institutions and provide moral
authority have a very difficult time embracing pluralism, multiculturalism and diversity. Secular
states with religious roots, like Greece and Turkey, have done well with "nation-building"
because of their uncontested sovereignty over education and legal institutions; but the religious-
nationalism that they disseminate via these institutions leaves little room for the tolerance of
minorities-especially religious minorities. Put simply, strategies of institutional reform
significantly shape how both state identities and state enemies come to be defined. When states
piggy-back on religion to expand, state-sponsored religious nationalism often triumphs. Under
this arrangement, the state is the protector of religion and religion is the guardian of the state.
The enemy, almost by default, becomes the religious "other".
This chapter argues that studying the nature of early reform strategies for disciplinary
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institutions can help answer other important questions about nation-building, the creation of state
identities, and acceptance of pluralistic norms. It is one thing to acknowledge that states and the
people who rule over them try to extend the reach of state control and perfect its implementation.
The Greek, Egyptian and Turkish states were certainly no exception to this general rule. But just
because state elites exhibit the will to exert and expand their power does not tell us which social
categories they will chose to reinforce in their bid to perfect control. For this reason it is crucial
to explore the issue of how and why certain categories of social identity are defined, imposed,
reinforced and linked to the state. In other words: Why do state elites reinforce certain social
categories over others in the state consolidation process?; and How do the imperatives of state-
building lead state elites to emphasize some aspects of identity and down-play others?
In this chapter I cite a number of examples from the historical record in Greece and
Turkey to show that state elites have privileged religious categories over potential alternatives,
such as race, blood-ties or language. Just precisely why religious identity markers assumed this
privileged position in Greece and Turkey -and why these same states struggle to embrace
norms of pluralism and multiculturalism today- makes sense, I argue, given what we have
learned about the coptative mechanisms of institutional change through which their disciplinary
apparatuses were built. Co~pting religious elites into the state structure leaves state elites at least
partially beholden to the demands of religious actors, who's own priorities have shifted as they
seek to maintain their exclusive, monopolistic link to the state.
I begin the analysis by describing that, even as late as the 1920s, both Greece and
Ottoman Turkey (what was to become the modem Turkish state) were home to significant
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minority populations. I show that, although minorities of all stripes existed-linguistic, ethnic,
etc-it was primarily religious minorities that became the explicit target of state-sponsored
ethnic cleansing through population transfers. Next I demonstrate that there are numerous
reasons to believe that these states' decision to target the religious "other" in the 2 0 ' century did
not stem primarily from previous patterns of violence or some kind of deep-seated tradition of
ancient hatred. Finally, through several short and specific historical case studies, I provide
evidence to show that Turkish and Greek state elites in the 2 0' century consciously implemented
discriminatory policies based on religious categorization. I conclude with some more
contemporary examples that illustrate the powerful (and pernicious) legacy with respect to
pluralism that can result from building state disciplinary structures through the co6ptation of
religion.
I. Minority Groups in 2 0th Century Greece and Ottoman Turkey
Looking back to the 1920's, it is clear that the situation facing state elites in Greece and
Ottoman Turkey was one of upheaval and devastation. In the early months of 1922 the lands
encircling the Aegean Sea lay in ruins. The Balkan Wars of 1912-13, World War I and finally the
Greco-Turkish War and the Turkish War of Independence had completely destroyed what little
remained of Ottoman imperial control. Years of fighting had steeped policy makers in an
environment of suspicion and hostility. This antagonism was directed both at internal minorities
and at land-hungry neighboring powers, creating a spiraling situation in which leaders had
become increasingly obsessed with questions of border security and internal dissent.4"' As the
Greeks, Turks and major European powers confronted one another across the negotiating table at
Lausanne in November of 1922, the chief issue at stake was how to create well-fortified states
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encapsulating loyal and governable populations. With all parties involved eager to settle the
region's conflicts once and for all, considerable leeway existed for the new national leaders to
forge states in a way that they saw fit.
The wars had caused substantial ethnic un-mixing and, as a result of migrations,
expulsions, and killings, the territories making up the new Greek and Turkish states were much
more linguistically, religiously and ethnically homogeneous than they had been just twenty years
earlier. Nonetheless, both states still included substantial minority enclaves as well as large
swaths of territory that were ethnically, linguistically and religious mixed. Table X and Table XI
provide information on the minorities living in Greece and Turkey respectively when
negotiations opened in 1922.
As the tables demonstrate, both territories were really still complex ethnic, linguistic and
religious mosaics. In addition to Greek speaking Greek Orthodox Christians, the enlarged Greek
state also included Chain Albanians, Arvanites, Gagauz Turks, Sephardic and Ashkenazi Jews,
Doenmeh, Muslim Cretans, Pomaks, Roma, Slavs, Muslim Turks, Valaades, and Vlachs. The
new Turkish state, in addition to housing Turkish speaking Sunni Muslims, included Alevis, Arab
Christians, Jacobites and Assyrians, Armenians, Circassians, Karamanlides, Greek Orthodox
Christians, Kurds, Jews, Laz, Pontics and Roma. The fact that ethnic, linguistic and religious
cleavages were cross cutting as opposed to reinforcing further complicated the task of defining
citizens. For example, the Valaades spoke Greek but were Muslim. Should they remain in Greece
by virtue of linguistic similarity or be sent to Turkey to join their religious brethren? What of
communities like the Pontics and Karamanlides, who largely spoke Turkish but were Greek
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Orthodox Christians? Were they to keep their homes in Turkey, where they had lived for
centuries, or should they be uprooted based on religious difference? Such were the questions
confronting Greek and Turkish state elites as they endeavored to secure their borders and
strategically reorganize the internal composition of their states. Establishing the boundaries for
legitimate membership in the state-and, by the same token, defining enemies and minorities-
was perhaps the most pressing issue for political leaders during this period. As Anthony Marx
has pointed out, "selective exclusion was not tangential to nation-state building, as liberals argue,
but was instead central to how social order was maintained." 413
After months of wrangling over the contents of a peace agreement, Greek and Turkish
parties concurred that the minority question would be best resolved by implementing a
"population exchange" between the two countries. 414 Formally, the treaty mandated that "there
shall take place a compulsory exchange of Turkish nationals of the Greek Orthodox religion
established in Turkish territory, and of Greek nationals of the Moslem religion established in
Greek territory."4 " This exchange came to involve the identification and forcible uprooting and
relocation of 189,916 individuals living in Greek territory and 355,635 individuals living in the
new Turkish state. The agreement further stipulated that an additional 750,000-950,000 people
who had left on their own accord to avoid the violence would not be allowed to return to their
homes.416 Although the population exchange did not succeed in completely removing all
religious minorities from Greece and Turkey, the results were astounding. According to journalist
Bruce Clark, the exchange stood as
proof that it was possible, both practically and morally, to undertake huge
exercises in ethnic engineering, and proclaim them a success. Massive population
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exchanges, agreed by governments over the heads of the ordinary people, became
a conceivable and often attractive option for world leaders.17
Furthermore, as I will illustrate through the series of detailed historical cases presented below,
the type of religious categorization used to conduct the population exchange went on to shape the
way that the state treated all remaining individuals who were loyal to a religious organization
other than the one privileged by the state.
II. Religious Categorization, the Product of Violence?
Before establishing that the use of religious categorization was a conscious, state-driven
policy choice, it is important to rule out the possibility that previous patterns of violence
somehow determined the identity cleavages around which the Greek and Turkish definitions of
citizenship would be constructed. Such a line of reasoning goes as follows. A vast amount of
fighting and bloodshed took place in the region prior to states'formal attempts to define
minorities and initiate a population exchange. Was it not simply the case that war-time
allegiances were based on religion, making it the logical and natural criterion by which to
separate warring parties through a population exchange and to construct new states? There
certainly does exist some evidence to suggest that violence, especially that perpetrated during the
Greco-Turkish war, served to harden religious differences. For example, such logic emerges from
an interview with Dimitriou Misailidi, a member of a Karamanli community that was forced out
of Turkey and sent to Greece. Although Misailidi himself recalls having a fairly positive
relationship with his Muslim neighbors, he puts the point thus: "How do you expect a Turk to [go
on] loving you when the Greek army stepped into Turkey and killed the child of that Turk on his
very own soil."4 18 Conceding that a history of violence is important, there are three reasons why
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previous patterns of violence are misleading if used as the only variable for predicting state
elites' decision to use religious criterion to define minorities and enemies after the fighting had
ended.
For one, the idea of exchanging populations based on religion was not a spontaneous
response to the Asia Minor atrocities of the 1920s. The idea of an exchange had first originated
in 1913 and had been circulating in Greek and Turkish political and military circles for some
time. Furthermore, a minority exchange agreement similar to that which was eventually enacted
in 1923 had actually already been reached by the Ottomans and the Greeks in 1913. Under the
terms of this earlier agreement, the Muslims in Macedonia and Greek Epirus would be
exchanged for the Orthodox Greeks in the Vilayet (Province) of Aydin. 419 Soon after the 1913
agreement was concluded the maelstrom of WWI engulfed the region, rendering its execution
impossible. Yet the interesting point to be made is that the idea of removing the population of
Aydin was not the result of uncontrollable violence between the Greek and Turkish communities
living together in the province. In 1913, the citizens of Aydin "were not persons uprooted by the
tumult of war and ruined by military campaigns. They were peacefully living people, prosperous
and satisfied, feeling secure and having no desire to abandon their homes."4 20 Here, state-
builders' desire and actual attempts to remove religious minorities preceded the outbreak of
violence.
Secondly, a reading of interviews with Orthodox Greek Karamanlides living together
with Muslims in the Cappadocian region of central Anatolia also suggests that previous patterns
of violence alone did not determine state-builders' decision to remove minorities on a religious
211
basis. The Karamanlides had maintained peaceful relations with their Muslim neighbors and had
been largely unaffected by the type of inter-communal violence brought on by national armies in
the Aegean and Black Sea coastal communities; yet they were removed from Turkey nonetheless
during the exchange. The interviews demonstrate that, despite being devout religious
practitioners, local village identity often trumped religious differences for both the Karamanlides
and the Muslims. Although religion was central to everyday life, hostility across religious
groups was not the norm. In fact, the native Muslim Turks and the Christian Karamanlides of
Cappadocia were, in many instances, actually united in their disdain for the incoming Muslim
refugees from Greece.
Evlabias Moumtzoglou, who was forced out of the village of Chalbadere (close to what is
now Aksaray in Central Anatolia) in the spring of 1924, depicted the native Turks that he lived
with as his protectors:
Three months before we left the Turkish refugees from Greece came [to
Chalbadere]. They were from Kozani and they knew Greek. They glorified their
homeland; but they were terrible people. They beat us up and asked for food.
They would have killed us all. The native Turks were the ones that saved us."4 2
Another Cappadocian native, Evanthias Govisoglou, contrasts the good will of his native
Muslimneighbors with the grabbing-hand of the incoming Muslim refugees. Govisoglou wanted
to make sure that what he left behind went to a native Muslim Turk whom he trusted, in this case
the village leader (Mouhtari).
The (refugee) Turk who wanted my house came with a mattress and was waiting
to get inside. Ijust pushed him out of the way, I couldn't speak. He went and sat
on the sidewalk. The native Turks were crying: "We ate olives and bread together
for six hundred years; this thing that's happening, it's difficult for us too" they
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said. We all told ourselves not to cry ... I closed all the doors to the house and
just after I locked them I took the key and I gave it to the head of the village
(mouhtari). He could give the key to whomever he wanted."'
G. Xaziliadi, who was forced to leave the village of Soulotzova, which was home to
approximately 100 Turkophone Christian Orthodox families, also recalled his Turkish Muslim
neighbors with fondness. His testimony shows that both Orthodox Christians and Muslims in
some areas resented the way that the exchange tore-apart the fabric of local life.
We were the last ones to leave and when were leaving the Turks saw us off, crying
until the very edge of town. We lived well together with most of the Turks until the
very end. They didn't want to let us leave. They didn't even want to hear about the
Turks who would be coming from Greece. There, on the edge of town, where we
separated, they cried and said: 'my Greek friends, they took silk from our hands
and are giving us goat hair.42
The lesson to be drawn from the experience of the Karamanlides is that the identity category
around which the population exchange was based was not merely a mechanism intended to
separate warring religious factions. Rather, emerging nationalist politicians on both sides
recognized the strength that could be garnered by replacing Muslim citizens with Christian
Orthodox ones and visa versa. The Greeks saw little harm in taking-in more Greek Orthodox
Christians and the Turks remained fearful that the Karamanlides' loyalty to the Greek Orthodox
Patriarch would eventually undercut efforts to consolidate state control in this underdeveloped
rural region.4 " Religion was thus the determining factor that led to the Karamanlides deportation
-not because the Karamanlides had engaged in religious conflict with their Muslim neighbors
but because Greek statesmen recognized the advantage of diluting other minority strongholds
within Greece by importing devout Greek Orthodox individuals. Similarly Turkish statesmen
recognized the advantages of removing Christian communities from the heart of the new nation.
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Third, and finally, the fact that leaders in Greece and Turkey were still debating the
definition of a "minority" in the period leading up to the population exchange reinforces the
point that a religious definition was not preordained by patterns of violence. In Greece, the
nationalist ideas circulating at the elite level were based on irredentism, which had been
enshrined in the concept of the Megali-Idea (Great Idea). At heart, the Megali Idea was "the
aspiration to encompass within Greece the territorial expanse of Byzantium and to regain the
intellectual supremacy of Ancient Greece."42 s Despite the over-arching goal of territorial
expansion, Greek statesmen spoke loftily of attempting to harness the ethnic and linguistic
heterogeneity of diverse populations by adopting a flexible notion of Greekness based on
Isocrate's dictum: "We consider Greeks all those who partake in our culture."42 6 The early
nationalist ideals entertained by Greek thinkers were thus similar to those later described by the
Benedict Anderson as an imagined community forged through a common language.4 " As the
historian A.A. Pallis observed at the time:
[After 1913] the national ideal is not anymore a purely Hellenic Greece but the
establishment of a large Hellenic state in which many foreign elements would
coexist with the Hellenic one, keeping naturally their particular national
consciousness under the sovereignty of the Hellenic element and using as their
connecting link the Greek language-the official language of the state.428
Eleftherios Venizelos, who was the Greek representative at Lausanne and became Prime Minster
soon thereafter, had been a vociferous proponent of the Megali Idea. Yet the "inclusive" and
"pluralistic" ideals of the Megali Idea eventually came into conflict with the strategic
imperatives that he believed were necessary to establish and maintain control over the
population. On the eve of the exchange, this theoretical desire to assimilate diverse elements of
society through a common language and Hellenic culture could not be completely reconciled
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with the practical concerns of border control and citizen loyalty. Venizelos realized the
potentially divisive nature of the minority question and the importance of solving it in a manner
that would be beneficial for Greece's long-term security. Prior to the opening of talks at
Lausanne he expressed its urgency thus:
Without exaggeration, the future of Greece depends on whether we get the right
or wrong solution to this question. If we fail to arrive at the right solution there
will be disasters which one trembles even to think of; whereas a successful
solution will contribute within in a few years to our recovering from the
unbearable burdens which the defeat in the war has bequeathed us, and to our
securing, after the collapse of the Greater Greece, the consolidation of the Great
Greece, of which the frontiers will never be secure if Western Thrace and
Macedonia are not ethnologically as well as politically Greek territories...'
What Venizelos needed was a definition of citizen and minority that would save the state from
internal divisions and external exploitations.
Likewise, in Turkey the question of what it actually meant to be a Turk was still
unresolved. Although Muslims had held a privileged position under Ottoman rule, the role of
religion in the new Turkish state was yet to be determined and leaders had not entirely agreed
upon definitions of minority and "Turk". As in Greece, the most pronounced dilemma faced by
Turkish nation builders was that the confines of territorial nationalism as suggested by state land
holdings and "ethno-linguistic" nationality by virtue of the Turkish language did not overlap in
the slightest.4 4
Riza Nur, who was among the envoys sent by the new Turkish national government to
Lausanne, recalls the dilemma in his memoirs as follows:
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Franks [Europeans] assume that there are three types of minorities in our
country: minorities by race, minorities by language and minorities by religion.
This is a great danger for us. When they are against us, these men think so deeply
and well! By the term 'race' they will put Circassians, Abhazes, Bosnians and
Kurds in the same category as Greeks and Armenians. By the term 'language' they
will turn those Muslims who speak other languages into minorities. By the term
'religion'they will make two million Kizilbas*, who are pure Turks, into
minorities."
As Nur's exclamation demonstrates, not only would the way in which minority was defined have
lasting implications in terms of the consolidation of internal state security, the "correct" decision
was not obvious.
Nur credits himself with ultimately imposing a definition of minority that was based on
faith rather than on race or language. Although some historians dispute Nur's claim to have
coined this definition, at the Lausanne conference he and other negotiators did consistently insist
on defining minorities broadly in terms of non-Muslims (gayri-Mushm). Using this broad
definition made sense in that it aligned with the character of nascent state disciplinary
institutions, which had a religious bent as a result of how they were built. Using gayri-Mushm
to define minority groups was also advantageous because it meant that European powers could
not justify a further division of Turkish territory based on the claim that Kurdish and Alevis were
ethnically, linguistically or even religiously (being Shi'ite, Bektasi etc., since these are "types" of
Muslims) different. It would also guarantee that surviving Armenians would be permanently
relegated to outsider status. Still, there were also less favorable consequences of defining
minorities in the broad terms of Greek Orthodox Christian vs. Muslim. For instance, in Turkey it
opened the floodgates to Albanians, Roma and other Muslim groups;4 3 2 and in Greece it did not
solve the question of what to do with the massive Slavic, Orthodox Christian populations in
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Macedonia.
Tying these points together, in this section I have demonstrated that previous patterns of
violence were not perfectly correlated with religious differences and that they therefore cannot
fully explain why state elites opted to define minorities in terms of religion. Rather, at the
highest level of politics, there existed an internal debate over the content of national identities
and the criteria by which they would be defined from this point on. The nature of this internal
struggle within Greece and Turkey is thus well captured by Przeworski's 1977 insight that
"cultural struggle is a struggle about culture, not a struggle between cultures.""' Rigidly
adhering to any singular definition of "minority" would entail substantial complications
(removing populations that had been consistently loyal, e.g. the Karamanlides) and absorbing
some undesirable ones (Albanians, Roma). Yet this contingency did not deter Turkish or Greek
state elites from selecting a singular, religiously-based category. As I will show below, the
proclamations and actions of state elites both demonstrate that they were willing to forsake the
instrumental flexibility that a more nuanced system of determining minorities and enemies would
have afforded because they realized that: 1) enforcing a single and dominant cultural divide
would lower the costs of securing mass compliance with the national idea since religiously
influenced disciplinary institutions were already in place; and that 2) such a strategy could also
help further cement the subordinate status of majority religious elites under state sovereignty by
offering them an exclusive, and monopolistic position as the guardians of faith and nation.
III. Imposing the Religious State
The words and deeds of Greek and Turkish politicians support the contention that state
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elites consciously and consistently pursued a policy of reinforcing religious categories in the
early 2 0th century. For example, in a parliamentary debate that took place in May of 1920, Emir
Pasha, the representative from Sivas, warned against the too rapid propagation of a racially or
ethnically based Turkish identity:
There is a Caliphate founded in the name of Islam . .. I request that we not act
only in the name of the Turks [Turkluk namina istimal etmiyelim] because we did
not gather here only in the name of the Turks. Ifyou please, it is more appropriate
to say Muslims or even Ottomans not Turks. In our homeland there are
Circassians, Chechens, Kurds, Laz and other Islamic peoples. Let us not speak in
a divisive manner that will leave [these groups] on the outside.3 '
Another prominent Turkish nationalist, Rauf Orbay, put an even more explicit emphasis on the
role that religion would play when he declared in 1922:
It is hard for us to control the general situation. This [state authority] can only be
secured by an authority that everyone is accustomed to regard as unapproachably
high. Such is the office of the Sultanate and Caliphate. To abolish this office and
try to set up an entity of a different character in its place would lead to failure
and disaster It is quite inadmissible. 43S
In merging their nationalist agenda with religious symbols, Kemalist leaders claimed to be
learning from the "past mistakes" of the Tanzimat reformers who had come before them. Ziya
Gokalp, the most influential and original thinker behind the emergence of Turkish nationalism,
argued that, in trying to completely separate Islam from the modern state, the Tanzimat had
"reduced it [the state] to an inorganic condition" and made it untenable. "People can neither
entirely drop the religion they hold sacred", wrote Gokalp, "nor can they dispense with the
necessities of contemporary civilization. Reason demands, not that one be sacrificed at the
expense of the other but that an attempt be made to reconcile the two."4 36 In short, even the
Kemalists (for who positivism was the true religion) realized that nominal Islam (as a system of
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culture and socialization as opposed to purely faith) had to be utilized in the service of the state,
not abandoned entirely, given the nature of existing institutions and loyalties.
Greek state elites had come to envision the link between the church and the nation in a
similar fashion. One observer writing in Foreign Affairs at the time of the population exchange
argued that the Greek decision to define minorities by religion was, by this point, an almost
natural extension of the historic relationship between religion and politics in Greece:
The choice of a "religious" test as the sole basis for determining nationality seems
a singular one; yet. . . in the Near East other tests may be suggested- doubtless
were - only to be rejected . . A test of blood or descent would be useless, for the
racial origin of large parts of the population is not traceable ... A language test
would have been still less satisfactory... When you make a treaty of exchange it
is necessary to have an objective criterion in order to prevent property owners
from forswearing themselves for the sake of keeping afoothold with their
property. Among the Greeks, Church has been immemorially interwoven with
State and all "Hellenes," even if agnostic, have their children baptized in the
Orthodox Church and claim membership in it.43 1
State elites in both Greece and Turkey were not just paying lip service to religious symbols.
Their actions also stand as a testament to the fact that religious categorization (and also
discrimination) had become, for better or worse, one of the guiding mantras of state-sponsored
nationalism. I employ three separate historical examples to demonstrate that state-elites actively
implemented discriminatory policies based religious identity categories. The first example
recounts how Greek administrators tried to use religious categories as a justification for
deporting Muslim Albanians from the contested region of Epirus. The second case demonstrates
how Greek politicians imposed religiously based categories in their resettlement policies in order
to create an overwhelming Greek Orthodox presence in areas that remained religiously mixed.
The third example illustrates the durability of religious categorization and discrimination by
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showing how Turkish statesmen employed religious categories in the economic sphere into the
1940s in order to hasten the creation a Muslim middle class that was sympathetic to, and
representative of, the state's religio-nationalist identity.
IV. The Cham Albanians: From Friend to Muslim Foe
The evolution in Greek elites' attitudes towards the Chain population of Northern Epirus
demonstrates how reform strategies base on synergies with the Orthodox church eventually
hardened attitudes against religious minority groups. The overwhelming majority of Cham
Albanians were Muslims who belonged to various Sufi orders (primarily Bektashi) and settled
around the numerous tekkes (houses of worship) situated in the region. In 1923 official Greek
documents reported the number of Chains to be 20,319, most of whom were living in Thesprotia,
an area close to the Albanian border in the northwest corner of Greek Epirus.43 8 Referring to the
Chain Albanians a "very tough nut to crack", A.A. Pallis described them as follows:
By religion Muslims, by decent Greek Epirotes who were converted to Islam in the
1 7' century, they are linguistically Albanian, and by political sympathy Turkish, as
is shown by the desire of many of the them to emigrate to Turkey and by the fact
that during the numerous Albanian insurrections against Turkey they have
invariably sided with the Turks.,-
Despite Pallis' description, other sources claim that the Chains were in fact divided amongst
themselves as to where their loyalties lay. A special envoy of the Council of the League of
Nations visited the region and found that a large portion of the Muslim population did not want
to be included in the Greco-Turkish population exchange and that most people had no idea of
their origin or preferences beyond their local religious affiliations.44 4
The ambiguity of the Chains' self-identification aside, the Greek state originally had
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viewed the Chams as a group that could be assimilated to a dominant Hellenic culture.
Immediately following the end of the First World War, Venizelos spoke of the Albanian speakers
of Northern Epirus with lofty praise. He claimed that all the residences of Epirus had been
Greek long before the Kingdom of Greece was founded. "One may be tempted," remarked
Venizelos
to raise the objection that a substantial portion of this Greek population uses
Albanian as its mother tongue, and is, consequently, in all probability, of
Albanian origin; but the democratic conception of the Allied and Associate
Powers cannot admit of any other standard than that of national consciousness. .
. It may be useful to add that the present vice-president of the Greek Ministerial
Council, Mr Repoulis; ... the cornmander-inchief of the Greek naval forces and
Minster of Marine, Admiral Koundouriotis; and the majority of the crews of the
Greek navy speak Albanian as their mother tongue."
The close relationship between religion and the Greek state, however, made it difficult to
reconcile a favorable view of the Chams with the realities of Greek Orthodox religious
nationalism. A review of the official reports that circulated between local administrators in the
region and the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Athens clearly demonstrates that by 1923 the
Greek government had come to view the Chams as enemies who should ideally be removed (and
if they could not be removed, then at least their influence should be mitigated). This is best
evidenced in a memorandum sent from a local Greek administrator in the Dirrahio district in
northern Epirus to the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 31 May 1923. This document reveals
that the Greeks had approached the Albanian government with the idea of trading the Muslim
Chain populations in Greece with a community of Greek Orthodox people living on the Albanian
side of the border. To the dismay of Greek officials, Albanians refused to consider such a
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scheme. 442 The fact that such a diplomatic overtures were being made indicates that Greek
statesmen had hardened their thinking on the minority issue, and had done so in religious terms.
This assertion is further bolstered by the fact that such scheming was not limited to
diplomatic relations between Greece and Albania. The Greeks also made a considerable effort to
include the Chams in the Greco-Turkish population exchange of 1923 simply by virtue of the
fact that they were Muslim. After extensive debate, the Chains were officially omitted.
Certainly the Greeks would have been happy to see them go; but Italian and Albanian delegates
at the Lausanne Conference made a strong case that the Chains primarily self-identified as
Albanian nationals (a dubious claim) and thus could not rightfully be sent to Turkey.
Nonetheless, local Greek authorities in charge of resettlement did not always honor the Cham's
official exemption from the population exchange and this group increasingly became the target
of state sponsored repression and unofficial deportations. Reports compiled by League of
Nations representatives charged that local Greek authorities were intentionally making life
unbearable for the Chain Muslims in order to force them out of Greece.4 3
Furthermore, Turkish historians have found evidence that somehow a number of Albanian
speaking Muslims were actually forcibly subjected to the Greco-Turkish population transfer and
wound up in Turkey. For example, in his memoirs, Turkish statesman Riza Nur claims that a
number of Albanians from Janina were transferred and began populating the Erenkoy and Kartal
districts of Istanbul." In light of such reports and evidence, international authorities continued
to insist that the Greeks distinguish between "exchangeable" Turkish Muslims and non-
exchangeable Albanian Muslims. But Greek authorities were often simply unwilling to
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acknowledge that such a distinction existed. In the eyes of the (Orthodox) Greek state, Muslims
were Muslims. Documents reveal that local Greek authorities warned the central state that the
Muslim Chams were really "Turks" in disguise and that they were seeking to gain a political
foothold in the region with help of Albanian authorities.
In mid June of 1925, as a result of international pressure as well as a basic failure to be
able to actually distinguish between "true" Chain Albanian Muslims and Turkish Muslims, local
Greek administrators temporarily settled on a policy of not deporting anyone unless they outright
declared Turkish loyalties.44 6 Nonetheless, this hardly settled the issue and Greek officials
remained uncomfortable with the Albanian Muslim minority in its midst. As correspondence
records between Greek administrators in Epirus and central authorities in Athens demonstrate, as
the 1920's wore on, the Cham question was a constant source of irritation for Greek authorities
seeking to impose standardized, Greek language schooling in the region, for the Chams were not
associated with the Orthodox churches through which most educational initiatives had been
organized.44 7
Low level tensions sparked by religious discrimination simmered well into the 1930's.
These tensions finally came to a head with the outbreak of WWII and the Italian invasion of
Greece. The Italians are said to have manipulated the Cham issue to stir-up resistance to Greek
rule and, indeed, many Chams appear to have collaborated with the Italian occupiers. Once the
Greek army succeeded in pushing the Italian forces from its territory, it resolved to remove the
Muslim Chams' influence once and for all. Over 100 tekkes were burned to the ground and
Cham communities were systematically cleansed from the region. The Greek state expropriated
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Cham properties and encouraged nomadic Vlachs to settle in these houses and lands.4 48
Unfortunately, the Cham's situation was not unique. As we will see below, numerous other
religious minority groups living in Greece and Turkey also suffered at the hands of the state by
virtue of their religious affiliations.
V. Religion and Resettlement: Diluting Slavic Exarchate Influence in Macedonia
Much like the shift in attitudes towards the Muslim Chains, Greek resettlement policies
also reveal that the state was consciously employing religious categorization to maximize its own
access to resources, power, and influence. These resettlement policies had a momentous impact
on the religious make-up of Macedonia, an area that was one of the most religiously, ethnically
and linguistically mixed in all of Greece. The overwhelming majority of Muslims residing in
Macedonia had been subjected to forced deportation as part of the Greco-Turkish population
exchange. Yet a sizable number of Slavic speaking peoples remained. These Slavic
communities had been living in the area for centuries and even constituted a majority in some
provinces. Although a "voluntary" migration scheme with Bulgaria in 1919 had led some Slavs
to migrate across the border, there was still a substantial Slavic influence in the region in 1923.44'
With respect to the state's categorization of the Slav's loyalties, religion was again the
guiding mantra. Yet in this case it was internal divisions within the Christian Orthodox world that
preoccupied Greek state-makers. The Greek position was that the true "nationalist sentiments" of
any given Slavophone was best determined by his ecclesiastical allegiance. Although all Slavs
were Christian Orthodox, in official documents the Greek state often divided Slavs into two
distinct categories. The first was the Voulgarizondes (also referred to as Grecomani by some
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Slavs today), who supported the religious rule of the Ecumenical Patriarchate and thus attended
"Greek" churches and schools. The second group was the Skhismatikoi (Schismatics), who
followed the Bulgarian Exarchate (the Bulgarian National Church which had split from the
Patriarchate in 1872) and frequented Bulgarian churches and schools.4 0 Despite speaking a
Slavic dialect as their first language, the Voulgarizondes were considered assimilatable and thus
potential "Greeks". The Greek authorities remained incredibly suspicious, however, of the
Skhismatikoi. As a result of these suspicions, Greek elites implemented resettlement policies that
explicitly aimed to dilute Slavic (and especially the Schismatikoi) influence in the borderlands.
The ultimate goals of these resettlement policies were to leverage existing to links with religious
institutions to create a buffer-zone of religious loyalists that could 'protect' the Greek nation from
pernicious would-be infiltrators as well as to dilute concentrated pockets of potential resistance
to the state."
Resettlement statistics, as well as the statements of Greek policy makers and observers
made immediately following the population exchange, strongly support the argument that the
nationalist Greek government was engaged in a concerted effort to have Greek Orthodox
Christians constitute the majority in all of Macedonia's provinces. First, although 54% of the
total refugee population that arrived in Greece was classified as urban and only 46% was
classified as rural, resettlement funding schemes heavily favored the rural migrants. According to
Charles Eddy, a highly disproportionate 86% percent of funds were allocated to rural
resettlement, with the remaining 13% going to urban groups.4 2 Furthermore, the vast majority
of these rural settlements were set-up in the region of Greek Macedonia, the stretch of land that
separated Greece from Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Turkey. Although some of the settlements were
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constituted from the homes and lands that exchangeable Muslims had evacuated, in many cases
new settlements were attached to existing villages or simply started from scratch.4 "
Beyond these patterns of funding and resettlement, statements by policy makers and
observers support the assertion that a primary aim of the refugee resettlement programs was the
ethno-religious homogenization of the nation state. In his memoirs, Colonel Stilianos Gonatas,
who served as Greek Prime Minster between 1922-4, recalls that "We settled the rural refugees
particularly near the borders of the state in order to consolidate the frontier populations so that
they could defend themselves against irregular aggressions."4 Outside observers also
acknowledged that the goal of religious homogenization underpinned resettlement decisions.
Charles P. Howland, writing in Foreign Affairs at the time of the resettlement, remarked that the
population of Macedonia "has been raised from 513,000 to 1,277,000" and that "more than 1,500
villages have been built, each containing from 100 to 500 families" in order to "eliminate civil or
guerrilla war among villages and comitadji, and to reduce appreciably the chances of war
between Greece and her neighbors who so often have had or created an excuse for intervening on
behalf of non-Greeks in the table-lands and valley-pockets of Macedonia".4 "
In large part the movement of Greek Orthodox Christian refugees into the Macedonian
region achieved the desired effect of forcing Slavs to either adhere to the Greek national cause or
abandon their homes and join religious sympathizers in Bulgaria. The population statistics in
Table XII. show that by 1926 the Slavs (in this table referred to as Bulgarians) and Muslims had
been greatly outnumbered in all Macedonian provinces as a result of the refugee resettlements.
[Insert Table XII. about here]
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Like in the case of the Cham Albanians, the historical record of refugee resettlement illuminates
the fact that Greek elites enacted policies to undermine the influence of religious minorities not
loyal to the Greek Orthodox Church-Muslim and Christian alike. By invoking a concept of the
national identity in which religious loyalty equated loyalty to the state, state builders produced a
climate within which the achievement of security and order came to be equated with religious
homogenization. Earlier linkages between religion and state disciplinary institutions became
further reified through forcible policies of resettlement based on religious categories. The Turks,
too, followed a similar strategy. It is toward state-sponsored discrimination toward non-Muslim
in Turkey that I now turn.
VI. Religious Classification and Economic Discrimination in Turkey
Forcible policies based on religious categories were not limited to deportation and
resettlement. The use of religious categories crept into other aspects of administration in the new
states and colored the everyday experiences of individuals well into the 1930's and 1940's. This
fact is well exemplified by the economic policies of religious discrimination employed by the
Turkish state. The taproot of these economic policies can be traced back to the thinking of the
Young Turk intellectuals. These scholars had carefully followed Russia's transformation and
warned that the prospects of survival for a society composed only of peasants and officials would
be dim. To be strong, they argued, the new Turkish state needed a commercial, bourgeoisie class
made up of the dominant national group- Turkish Sunni Muslims. One such intellectual, Yusuf
Ak9ura, expressed this point of view as follows:
[The] foundation of the modern state is the bourgeois class. Contemporary
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prosperous states came into existence on the shoulders of the bourgeoisie, of the
businessmen and bankers. The national awakening in Turkey is the beginning of
the genesis of the Turkish bourgeoisie. And if the natural growth of the Turkish
bourgeoisie continues without damage or interruption, we can say that the sound
establishment of the Turkish state has been guaranteed."'
Yet Ak9ura and his contemporaries failed to appreciate the fact that the "natural growth" of the
Turkish bourgeoisie remained highly unlikely, for non-Muslim minorities had long cornered the
dominant industries of the countries commercial capital, Istanbul.
Statistics compiled on the eve of the exchange clearly demonstrate that the Greek
Orthodox Christians had held a major stake in local businesses and were highly active in both
Turkish and foreign-owned companies. In 1921, 66% of Istanbul's restaurants and 94% of its
beer halls were Greek owned. Furthermore, 528 of the 654 registered wholesale ventures
belonged to Greeks. 457 Likewise, a basic tally of Greek employees in the major companies
registered in Istanbul (shown in Table XIII) demonstrates the Greeks played a dominant role in
banking, shipping and insurance.
[Insert Table XIII about here]
In addition to the Greeks, the Jews and a small group of Armenians were also influential players
in the Istanbul business scene. Despite minority dominance in business, through a series of
policies that were indicative of the Turkish states' commitment to reinforcing religious
categories, the Turkish government quickly dismantled religious minorities' economic networks
and influence. Removing non-Muslims from prominent commercial positions would provide
citizens with a constant reminder that the new Turkish state was, above all, one for Muslims and
by Muslims. Two of the most infamous laws imposed by the Turkish government were law
228
#2007 and the capital tax (varhk vergisi). Law #2007, which the Turkish Parliament passed in
1932, effectively barred non-Muslims from some thirty trades and professions, including
itinerant merchanting, tailoring, insurance and real-estate.4 58 As a follow-up to law #2007, in
1936 the Greek Orthodox Christian minority was also prohibited from acquiring new property.45 9
Many existing minority properties were seized by the state.
The capital tax, which was formally instituted in 1942, dealt a death blow to religious
minority involvement in economic life. The tax mandated a levy on property owners, business
men, and certain categories of workers who were required to pay based on their earnings.
Special local commissions made the actual tax assessments and were afforded much discretion in
their audits. In the case of Istanbul, it was the city's defterdar (director of finance) Faik Okte
who administered the criteria for tax assessments. Okte's memoir reveals that the primary factor
determining any given taxpayers' assessment was his religion. Okte's offices placed taxpayers on
one of two lists: the "M" list for Muslim or the "G" list for Gayrimuslim (Non-Muslim).
Citizens on the "G" list were typically taxed ten times more than those on the "M" list.4 60 In
addition to the "G" list, later on a "D" list was also instituted for Donme Jews, who were to pay
twice as much as Muslims. 4 61 Defaulters, of which there were thousands, were sent to forced
labor camps in Aykale, a region in northern Turkey known as the Turkish Siberia. In a matter of
years, these Turkish policies succeed in removing almost all traces of Christian (and to a lesser
extent Jewish) influence from economic life. The resultant economic vacuum was filled by an
emerging class of Sunni Muslim merchants and business leaders. It perhaps no wonder then that
the pious, business-minded Sunni Muslim elite currently running the Turkish state are, first and
foremost, purebred capitalists.
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At this point a summary is in order. The path of history is a winding one, and I lest I lose
my reader in an endless stream of official policies and proclamations, it is worth reminding them
of why such a detailed investigation was necessary in the first place. What I have shown through
these historical discussions is that religion was consistently and concertedly used as category by
state elites to determine which individuals would be considered loyal members of the state and
which would be forever deemed enemies and minorities. In other words, religious
discrimination was institutionalized, state sponsored and widely practiced in both Greece and
Turkey. By virtue of the sheer scope of any state endeavor to categorize an entire population on
a singular identity dimension the process by which categorization occurred was not seamless.
Nonetheless, given the expected complications, it is remarkable that the Greek and Turkish
authorities pursued the aim of imposing a religiously homogeneous state with such consistency
and severity. Religious discrimination and categorization colored a wide range of state policies
and were implemented through a chain of command that led from top-level national authorities
down to local administrators. Religious elites had been a central part of disciplinary reforms in
the 19 th century in both Greece and Ottoman Turkey; years later, the reverberations of this policy
could still be felt as state sanctioned prejudice and exclusionary religious nationalism became the
institutionalized norm.
By linking the state-building mission to religion in the early years of reform, Greece and
Turkey were able usurp religious institutions of schooling, law and social organization and
impose their will through these pre-established networks. The history of Greek and Turkish
state-building thus exhibits a peculiar wrinkle: the symbolic function of religion was being
preserved and extolled through state imposition of religious identity categories at the same time
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that the actual power of religious institutions was being severely undermined. Religious
institutions themselves may have been tempered through this process of co6ptation and
nationalization but, as a direct result, the state assumed a nominal religious identity and state-
sponsored religious intolerance became commonplace.
VII. Historical Legacies, Modern Conflicts
The problems associated with pluralism and religious minorities did not end in the 1940s
for either Turkey or Greece. If anything, these issues have only come into starker relief as both
countries try to assert their European credentials and bring their legal systems into line with
international norms on individual rights and freedoms. As Elizabeth Prodromou has observed,
"Greece has been grappling with the question of how to reinforce its model of national identity in
a way that balances its historical majority religious tradition with a commitment to basic
democratic rights and freedoms for all citizens."462 The same goes for Turkey.
Briefly describing a few of the modern day "dilemmas of religious pluralism" at stake in
Greece and Turkey goes to show just how durable and deeply entrenched the institutional
legacies of state-building can be. In the last several decades Greece has witnessed sensational
(albeit mostly peaceful) controversies over the official status of the church, over the inclusion of
a "religion" category on identity cards, and over the building of a mosque in the nation's capital.
In Turkey, equally contentious disputes about minority and religious properties, about state
documentation practices, about the role of the state's Sunni dominated Directorate for Religious
Affairs (Diyanet), and about the status of minority groups under a new constitution have taken
center stage. Quickly documenting these disputes illustrates how strategies of state-building can
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continue to "reemerge" and "resurface" in the form of contemporary political conflicts about the
viability of pluralist ideals and norms. I look first at Greece and then at Turkey.
Soon after Greece joined in the European Union in 1981, the ruling Panhellenic Socialist
Party (PASOK) initiated a number of social and political reforms that challenged the traditional
legal role of Church in state and societal affairs. For one, under PASOK, Greek Family Law was
radically restructured in 1983 to conform to European principles of gender equality. Most
importantly, the divorce law was liberalized, with the introduction of no-fault divorce and
divorce by mutual consent- both dramatic departures from the traditional religious roots of
Greek Family Law that had prevailed heretofore. 4 63 These changes to the Family Law
eventually passed through parliament and faced only minimal resistance from religious
authorities. When PASOK made an effort to take things one step further, however, proposing a
bill to formally disestablish the Orthodox Church -and thereby break the symbolic and
institutional link between religion and nation- the party met extremely fierce resistance.
Prominent Orthodox hierarchs and conservative segments of society waged an aggressive
campaign in opposition to disestablishment. Concerned about its popularity and electoral future,
PASOK quickly backed down, allowing the Church to maintain its privileged position under the
state mantle. Greek advocates of pluralist reform lamented PASOK's about-face, arguing that it
signified the state's inherent inability to embrace religious tolerance and diversity more generally.
464 Indeed, maintaining the state's nominal religious identity and institutionalized link to religion
proved more important than conformity with European directives.
A similar set of political disputes came to the fore in Greece in 2000-1 over the issue of
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whether or not a person's religious affiliation should be printed on the state-issued identification
cards. By this point, Greece was had become increasingly diverse and religiously heterogeneous
as a result of immigration from the Balkans (especially Albania) and elsewhere. Ruling party
PASOK argued that religion should be removed from state issued documents because including
such a category not only violated EU mandates but also paved the way for inequality and
prejudice. In response, the Orthodox religious establishment waged an political battle that ran
for months in order to keep religion on Greek identification cards. The Church's tactics included
issuing a petition to prevent PASOK's measure, which was ultimately signed by nearly a third of
the entire country!465 The Church's bellicose campaign culminated in a massive demonstration in
the capital (and smaller rallies elsewhere). Oulis et. al. describes the main set of protests as a
powerful spectacle.
The event was a huge success, as it gathered hundreds of thousands ofpeople in
Constitution Square in Athens, just opposite the Parliament building ---monks
waiving black and Byzantine flags, thousands ofpriests signing hymns at the top
of their voices and ordinary people waving Greek flags with the white and blue
cross, while the Archbishop declared that no one could steal the identity of his
people, no one could push them into forgetting their history and their tradition.466
The rallies and the Archbishop's emotive speech in Constitution Square were broadcast
repeatedly on national television.
The Church (which had allied with the conservative opposition) ultimately failed to
stymie the ruling party's determination to push through a new "religion-free" format for identity
cards. In response, Archbishop Christodoulos ramped-up his rhetoric about the detrimental
effect of the EU's pluralist "melting-pot" values on both Hellenism and Orthodoxy. Furthermore,
he began causing real trouble for Greek politicians via other avenues, protesting a high-profile
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visit by the Pope and stirring up controversy over ecclesiastical jurisdictions. 4 67 PASOK, which
had learned from its failed attempt to disestablish the Orthodox Church in the 1980s, had little
choice but to weather the storm. Identity cards would now be "religion free", but political
disputes about how to best reconcile multiculturalism and the Greece's particular variety of
religious nationalism continued, coalescing around other issues.
The protracted controversy over whether or not to build a mosque in Athens provides a
third and final piece of evidence indicative of the Greek state's ambivalent stance on issues of
religious pluralism and diversity. In recent years Athens' Muslim population has grown to an
estimated 120,000-150,000 people. Despite this surge in Muslim residents, for decades, a series
of proposals to build a mosque that would accommodate the city's religious minority community
have been put in the political pipelines, only to ultimately be jettisoned. In 2006 approval for the
construction of a mosque in the Eleonas outskirt of Athens-itself the product of years of
wrangling which culminated in a six hour-long parliamentary debate-was squashed by
resistance from local residents and politicians. One force driving local resistance was a law (in
place until 2009) stating that metropolitan bishops were required to give their consent before a
building license could be given by town planning authorities for any new house of worship other
than a Christian Orthodox church.4 68 In the last two years, although the requirement for bishops'
approval has been abolished, radical right-wing political groups-occasionally backed by certain
religious actors-have succeeded in halting construction plans. Figure V. shows a campaign
poster that one such group plastered around Muslim enclaves in Athens in 2010. For now,
Athens remains the only capital in the European Union without a mosque-a symbol of the
Greek state's inability to reconcile religious dimensions of state identity with the requirements of
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pluralism and tolerance.
There are a number of striking parallels between the Greek struggle to embrace tenants
of religious tolerance and pluralism and the Turkish struggle to do the same. To begin with,
religious minorities' struggle to maintain properties and to secure permission to build places of
worship in Turkey has an uncanny resemblance with the "mosque in Athens" controversy
described above. As mentioned in the previous section, numerous non-Muslim groups were
stripped of their properties in Turkey in 1936 in a wave of state-sponsored religious persecution.
Since these religious communities still lack legal status under the Turkish law, it has proven
difficult for them to provide formal proof of ownership and rightfully reclaim their properties.
Since 2002, Turkish authorities have made four attempts to restore the property rights of non-
Muslim communities; but it was only this past August that the Land Registry Law was amended
to actually allow for the full reclamation of property by minority foundations.4 69 Still, given that
the implementation of zoning legislation differs from province to province, procedural problems
and arbitrary decisions connected with minority places of worship and properties abound. For
example, the European Commission's 2011 Progress Report on Turkey sites that Alevi places of
worship (cemevis) are not recognized and that Alevis have faced serious impediments to
establishing new ones. Christian groups have come up against similar obstacles. Furthermore,
the Turkish law does not allow higher-level religious education for minority groups-the Halki
Greek Orthodox Seminary, for example, has been closed since 1971 and the Armenians
Patriarchate's proposal to open a university department for its clergy has been pending for years
without resolution.470
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Disputes surrounding the documentation of religion on identity cards stand as another
similarity linking the problems of pluralism in Turkey and Greece. State issued identification
documents in Turkey still list religion in terms of major faith group, though these documents do
not discriminate between types of Muslims (Alevi, etc.). Until 2006 it was obligatory for state id
holders' religion to be indicated. For identity cards issued since 2006, individuals have been
entitled to request that the religion entry be left blank. This hardly remedies problems of
religious prejudice, since leaving the category blank is tantamount to an admission of minority-
or even worse, atheist-status. At present, religious discrimination in Turkey is commonplace.
As Zeki Basatemir, a member of the board of directors of the Syriac Catholic Church Foundation
in Turkey, told a reporter for Zaman (Turkey's most popular paper): "Although there are not
written rules, I am not allowed to have a career in the police, military and in high levels of the
bureaucracy because I am a Christian."471
In 2010 a new case was opened in the European Court of Human Rights against Turkey
(Sinan Igik vs. Turkey) arguing that Turkish religious identification practices violated individual
rights and freedom of consciousness. The case has opened the "black-box" of the
Muslim/Islamic category and placed the general Turkish practices of religious documentation
under increased scrutiny. In 2004 Mr Igik applied to a local Turkish court in Izmir requesting
that his identity card feature the word "Alevi" rather than the word "Islam." The Izmir court
dismissed the applicant's request on the basis of an opinion it had sought from the legal adviser at
the Diyanet (Turkish Directorate for Religious Affairs). In the Diyanet's opinion, the term
"Alevi" referred to a sub-group of Islam and therefore the indication "Islam" on the identity card
was correct. The European Court of Human Rights ruled against Turkey on the basis of Article
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no. 9, arguing that Mr. Iik's application had led the state to make an assessment of his faith,
which clearly violated the state's duty to maintain neutrality and impartiality on religious issues.
472
The Diyanet is at the center of most Turkish controversies regarding both pluralism and
the relationship between religion and state -and for good reason too. Although the Turkish
state is self-avowedly "secular" according to the 1982 constitution, an officially sanctioned
version of Sunni Islam still enjoys a privileged -and constitutionally protected- place in the
state structure through the Diyanet, which is akin to an established church. Under law no. 633
(last updated in 1965) the Diyanet has a mandate to "operate affairs related to belief, worship,
and moral principles of the Islamic Religion, enlighten the public about religious issues and
administer places of worship." 473 In practice this means that the Religious Affairs Directorate is
responsible for, among other things, the creation of all sermons and mandatory school textbooks
on religion. Today the Diyanet employs over 100,000 civil servants and has an annual state-
budget approaching 1.6 billion dollars. To get a sense of the magnitude of this expenditure, its is
worth considering that, in 1999 for instance, the Diyanet's budget was equal to the amount spent
on five other Turkish Ministries combined (Work and Social Services, Industry and Trade,
Energy and Natural Resources, Environment, and Tourism). 4 74
While some circles accuse the AKP of expanding the Diyanet with the nefarious intention
of "Islamicizing" the state, in actuality, the Diyanet's share of the state budget was sizable long
before the AKP ever took power. Table XVI shows that, since 1993, the Diyanet's funding has
actually remained fairly consistent relative to other government expenditures. Indeed work by
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G6zaydin shows that, since as far back as 1951 when the countries political system began to open,
the Diyanet's share of the state budget has held fairly steady between approximately 0.5-1 %.45
[Insert Table XVI about Here]
Financing aside, it is important to point out that under the current constitution, non-
Muslim religious groups and Muslim groups that deviate from the Diyanet's Hanafi-inspired
version of Sunni Islam, lack legal status and official representation in the Diyanet all together.
For over two decades, formal attempts at rapprochement between the Diyanet and various Alevi
groups have yielded little resolution. Alevi leaders (dedes) still do not enjoy the perks that come
with official status, such as state-issued paychecks drawn from tax-payer money. Reha
QIamuroglu, one of the architects behind attempts at establishing formal relations between the
Alevi community and the Turkish state, recently initiated discussions on securing state salaries
for the country's 100,000 Alevi leaders. In 2009 he abruptly gave up the cause in frustration for
lack of progress.4 76 amuroglu told a reporter for the newspaper Zaman in an extended interview
that the "establishment running the regulation of religious services in Turkey is bizarre."
If there are objections to giving dedes a state salary, than there also should be
objections to making imams civil servants.... When you don't want to solve a
problem, you find excuses. Just like car-parks are 'new establishments' that
should be subject to legal regulation so too are Alevi houses ofworship
(cemeviler). This is all that we are after.7
The change in preferences is dramatic. Religious elites who once sought to escape the state's
authority are now fighting to be under it!
The sheer bureaucratic inertia of the Turkish Directorate for Religious Affairs, however,
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makes it an institution impervious to change and to the inclusion of minority voice. Since the
founding of the Republic, Sunni Islam, and the religious elites that represent it, have always
enjoyed a unique degree of protection and sponsorship as part of the state's bureaucratic
infrastructure. This is a privilege that the Sunni elite seek to retain, making reconciliation with
the Alevis difficult. More important still, under the current Turkish constitution, it is in fact
illegal for political parties to contravene the Diyanet. Article 89 of the Political Party Law
states:
"Political parties cannot have any intentions that are in contravention ofArticle
136 of the Constitution, which is concerned with the position of the Presidency of
Religious Affairs, which, in keeping with the principle of laicism remains removed
from all political views and thoughts, which aims for national solidarity and
unification and which fulfills the duties laid out in the special law, in the general
administration." 7 8
This make the eradication of the Diyanet inconceivable under current political and legal
arrangements, for any party that seeks to challenge the Diyanet faces the threat of immediate
closure by the Turkish Constitutional Court.
The Turkish state is in the midst of preparing an overhaul of its 1982 military
constitution. Few observers, however, expect significant-if any-change in the status of
Diyanet. The Diyanet is simply too large and too closely linked to the preservation the sacred
ideological fusion of Kemalism and nominal Islam. This has left Turkish minority groups in a
quandary. In an interview in September 2011, Lakis Vingas, the Representative of Minority
Institutions under Turkey's General Directorate for Foundations and himself a member of the
country's Greek Orthodox religious minority, expressed a guarded hope for the future of state-
minority relations. "All of the positive changes [the return of properties, EU directives]
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occurring recently seem to show that the Erdogan government sincerely wants members of
minority groups to play a more active part in the life of the country, " said Vingas. He
emphasized, however, that minority groups' and religion's formal status under a new constitution
will be the ultimate test of real and meaningful change. "We all pay taxes so, if the government is
going to help one religion it should help them all ... Basically, what this all comes down to is
how the term "Turkish Citizen" is going to be defined."47 9
VIII. Conclusions
To conclude, I summarize the objectives, logic, and findings of the study. The project
was motivated by a theoretical concern regarding how states come to gain control over the
institutional domains of education, law and religious regulation. The mainstream literature on
state-formation has largely focused on the coercive and extractive capabilities of states. States,
however, are made of more than just tax bureaus and armies. State's are also pedagogical,
corrective and ideological organizations engaged in the politics of moral regulation,
socialization, and the rule of law. At the project's highest level of abstraction, I have argued that
state-making and moral regulation are co-constituting historical processes.
At a more concrete level, I have explained why some former Ottoman states succeeded
in achieving exclusive sovereignty over schooling and law and religion upon independence -
thereby consolidating state power and moral authority- whereas others did not. To do so, I
focused on the phenomenon of "secular revolutions", which are top-down political programs in
which elites aggressively move perfect their sovereignty by relegating the religious
establishment to state control.
My main argument was built around a comparison state-building and secularization in
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Turkey, Egypt and Greece, focusing on the critical historical antecedents that preceded
independence and in these three countries. I found that when manpower for early modernizing
reforms in education and law in the 19 th century was severely constrained, state-builders were
more likely to employ strategies of institutional reform based on the co6ptation of religion,
thereby integrating religious elites into nascent state structures in a piecemeal fashion. This
turbulent (and at times violent) process of integration and cooptation spawned a dynamic of
differential growth that severely weakened religious institutions. When religious institutions
were weakened in this way in the 19' century, it became possible for nation-states to exert full
control over the religious establishment upon independence, producing what we consider today
to be successful "secular revolutions".
Lastly, I explored some of the repercussions that result from the use of cooptative reform
strategies. Specifically, I demonstrated that states that rely on the codptation of religious elites to
their build disciplinary institutions also tend to generate a particularly virulent breed of
exclusionary religious nationalism. State's built on religious synergies may be powerful and
sovereign moral authorities dept at creating "disciples of the state", but they are also intolerant of
minority groups and have extreme difficulty conforming to contemporary multicultural and
pluralist norms about how states should operate.
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Table X. Minorities in Greece
Group Language Religion Exchanged
Albanian (Cham) Predominantly Muslim (Bektashi) unclear (in the end most appear to have
Albanian, some Turkish been exempted but there are Turkish
reports of numerous Albanians coming
with the exchange)
Arvanites Arvanika, some Greek Greek Orthodox no
speakers
Gaga(v)uz Turks Gagauz (Turkic Greek Orthodox no (but some individuals appear to
Language) have been admitted to Turkey)
often written in Greek
script
Jewish (Sephardic) Ladino, Greek, Italian Judaism no
Jewish (Ashkenazi) Yiddish, Greek, Judeo- Judaism no
Greek
Jewish Ladino and Greek Explicitly converted to yes
(Doenmeh/Donme) Sunni
Islam in the 17th century
but
often secretly retained
Judaic
practices
Muslim Cretans Kritika (a dialect of Muslim yes
Greek)
Pomaks Pomak a South Slav Muslim no
language often
considered a dialect of
Bulgarian
Roma Romany Muslims and very few no
Orthodox Christians
Slavs Various Slavic dialects Schismatics (supporters of Voluntary exchange in 1919 but many still left
closely the Bulgarian Orthodox behind as shown by stats. Also, internal
related to Bulgarian, Church) and Patriarchists displacement, sent to the
Greek or Grecomanoi island to depopulate and help state control
(Supporters of the Greek
Orthodox Church)
Turks of Macedonia Turkish and Greek Sunni Muslim Yes
Turks of Western Turkish and Greek Sunni Muslim No
Thrace
Valaades Greek Muslims Yes
Vlachs Koutsovlach sometimes Greek Orthodox and very No
(Romanizontes) divided between small number of Muslims
(Aromanian and
Megleno-Romanian)
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Table XI. Minorities in Ottoman Thrkey
Group Language Religion Exchanged
Alevis Kurdish and Turkish Bektashi, Shi'ite and Sunni no
Arab Christians, Arabic, Assyrian, Various Eastern Christian no (but the Turks tried to exchange the
Jacobites Chaldean, Churches Arab Orthodox population of Mersin)
and Other Eastern Turoyo
Christians
Circassians' various dialects of both Sunni Muslims no, (but there are some reports that
Circassian and some 9,000 were transferred to Greece
Abkhaz-Abaza in 1922 as a result of collaboration
with the Greek army)
Greeks Turkish and Greek Greek Orthodox yes
Karamanlides
Greek Orthodox of Greek Greek Orthodox no
Istanbul,
Imbros and Tenedos
Kurds Kurdish (Kurmanci, Muslim no
Zaza-Gorani)
Jews Ladino and Turkish Jewish no
Laz (Laziar) Laz, a language closely Sunni Muslims no
related
to Georgian and
Mingrelian
Ponitcs Turkish Greek Orthodox yes
Roma Multiple Nomadic Muslims no
(called Cherkes in Turkish. The name is in fact a blanket term for various related North Caucasian peoples,
primarily Abkhazians, Adighe and Ubigh; although occasionally Chechen and Ingush are also included).
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Table XII: Population Breakdown by District in Macedonia: 1912 vs. 1926
Population in 1912 Population in 1926
]Elassona
Greeks 88% Greeks 100%
Muslims 12% Muslims
Bulgarians Bulgarians
Miscellaneous Miscellaneous
Grevena
Greeks 78% Greeks 96%
Muslims 18% Muslims
Bulgarians 4% Bulgarians 4%
Miscellaneous Miscellaneous
Katerini
Greeks 80% Greeks 100%
Muslims 18% Muslims
Bulgarians 2% Bulgarians
Miscellaneous Miscellaneous
Kozani
Greeks 60% Greeks 100%
Muslims 40% Muslims
Bulgarians Bulgarians
Miscellaneous Miscellaneous
Annasselitsa
Greeks 75% Greeks 100%
Muslims 25% Muslims
Bulgarians Bulgarians
Miscellaneous Miscellaneous
Kailaria
Greeks 20% Greeks 93%
Muslims 76% Muslims
Bulgarians 4% Bulgarians 4%
Miscellaneous Miscellaneous 3%
Verria
Greeks 70% Greeks 93%
Muslims 20% Muslims
Bulgarians Bulgarians
Miscellaneous 10% Miscellaneous 7%
Florina
Greeks 32% Greeks 61%
Muslims 32% Muslims
Bulgarians 35% Bulgarians 37%
Miscellaneous 1% Miscellaneous 2%
Edessa
Greeks 40% Greeks 86%
Muslims 48% Muslims
Bulgarians 12% Bulgarians 14%
Miscellaneous Miscellaneous
244
Enotia
Greeks 54% Greeks 64%
Muslims Muslims
Bulgarians 46% Bulgarians 26%
Miscellaneous Miscellaneous 5%
Kastoria
Greeks 56% Greeks 78%
Muslims 24% Muslims
Bulgarians 19% Bulgarians 22%
Miscellaneous Miscellaneous
Yenitsa
Greeks 56% Greeks 96%
Muslims 39% Muslims
Bulgarians 5% Bulgarians 4%
Miscellaneous Miscellaneous
Ghoumendza
Greeks 36% Greeks 79%
Muslims 42% Muslims
Bulgarians 17% Bulgarians 19%
Miscellaneous 5% Miscellaneous 2%
Salonique
Greeks 29% Greeks 80%
Muslims 26% Muslims
Bulgarians Bulgarians
Miscellaneous 45% Miscellaneous 20%
Kilkis
Greeks Greeks 97%
Muslims 66% Muslims
Bulgarians 29% Bulgarians
Miscellaneous 3% Miscellaneous 3%
Langada
Greeks 36% Greeks 100%
Muslims 60% Muslims
Bulgarians 4% Bulgarians
Miscellaneous Miscellaneous
Chalcidique
Greeks 86% Greeks 97%
Muslims 14% Muslims
Bulgarians Bulgarians
Miscellaneous Miscellaneous 3%
Siderocastro
Greeks 19% Greeks 84%
Muslims 40% Muslims
Bulgarians 37% Bulgarians 15%
Miscellaneous 4% Miscellaneous
Serres
Greeks 47% Greeks 94%
Muslims 40% Muslims
Bulgarians 9% Bulgarians
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Miscellaneous 4% Miscellaneous
Zichni
Greeks 74% Greeks 95%
Muslims 17% Muslims
Bulgarians 7% Bulgarians 5%
Miscellaneous 2% Miscellaneous
Pravi
Greeks 40% Greeks 100%
Muslims 60% Muslims
Bulgarians Bulgarians
Miscellaneous Miscellaneous
Drama
Greeks 15% Greeks 97%
Muslims 79% Muslims
Bulgarians 5% Bulgarians
Miscellaneous 1% Miscellaneous 3%
Kavalla
Greeks 29% Greeks 100%
Muslims 69% Muslims
Bulgarians Bulgarians
Miscellaneous 2% Miscellaneous
Nestos
Greeks 98% Greeks 100%
Muslims Muslims
Bulgarians Bulgarians
Miscellaneous Miscellaneous
Thassos
Greeks 100% Greeks 100%
Muslims Muslims
Bulgarians Bulgarians
Miscellaneous Miscellaneous
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Table XIII. Greek Employment in Foreign and Turkish Companies in Istanbul 19234"
Company
Registered Foreign Concessionary Companies
Commercial Bank of Near East 90%
Orosdi Bank 60%
Deutsche Orientbank 50%
Credit Lyonnais 50%
Compagnie d'Assurances Generales 99%
Banco di Roma 50%
Banca Commerciale Italiana 50%
Banque hollandaise pour la Mediterranee 50%
Banque Fancaise de Pays d'Orient 50%
Ionian Bank 50%
The Adriatic Petroleum 50%
Assicurazioni Generale 50%
Union of Paris 20%
Helvetia (insurance) 20%
Bank and Manson Insurance Co. 25%
Halcyon Line 25.00%
Khedivial Mail Steam Ship 25%
Messageries Maritimes 25%
Paquet 25%
Gelchrist Walker and Co. 25%
Lloyd Triestino 25%
Walter Seager Co. 20%
Registered Turkish Companies
Societe Cooperative des Marchands de 100%
fromage de Constantinople
Minoterie d' Orient 60%
Minoteries Unies 60%
Compagine d' Assurances Generales de 60%
Constantinople
Banque de Salonique 50%
Industrie Chimique et Olifere 40%
Balia-Karaidin 40%
Banque Nationale de Turquie 25%
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Percent of Greek Employees
Fabriques Unies de Ciment Arslan et Eski- 25%
Hissar
Fabriques Unies de Conserves Hermes et 25%
confiance Cartal
Mines de' Heraclee 20%
Society Nationale d' Assurance Turque 20%
Cine-Magic 20%
Docks et Chantiers de Stenia 20%
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25%Societe de Glace de Constantinople
Table XVI: Directorate of Religious Affair's Share of Overall State Budget in Turkey481
Year
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
Percentage
0.9
1
0.9
0.6
0.7
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.6
0.6
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.8
0.8
0.7
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